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2 BEYOND THE PALE
INTRODUCTION
Governme-nts around the world have at different times adopted
various race-conscious policies for various reasons. These policies
generally fall into three categories. First, in the United States, for
example, the Jim Crow system was used systematically to reinforce
racial preferences in social, political, and economic life, to favor the
white majority and exclude the black minority. This system can be
characterized as one designed to further majority preferences in
majority economies,1 that is, a system where the dominant majority
not only controls the economic and political system but also has
instituted racial preferences for its own majority members. Today,
in the United States, governmental policies work in the reverse,
as "compensatory preferences" to blacks and other designated mi-
norities, to offset majority advantages and historical wrongs.
India similarly pursues preferential policies for its untouchables.
This second type of racial policy is aimed at implementing minority
preferences in majority economies, to benefit minority groups in eco-
nomies dominated by majority members. By contrast, in countries
such as Malaysia and Nigeria, governments institute ethnic pre-
ferences to favor politically dominant (though economically weak)
majority groups and to restrain minorities deemed by these
governments to be "too" economically powerful. At various times in
Europe, similar treatment was directed at the Jewish minority.2
This third type of policy institutes majority preferences in minority
economies, that is, economies "controlled" by minority groups.
What the United States calls "affirmative action" today is but one
instance of similar actions undertaken historically and presently
by governments around the world. In developing countries in
particular, these forms of "affirmative action" to boost certain
governmentally designated ethnic minority groups have been urged
as crucial to the reduction of ethnic conflicts and consequently, to
1. See THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLiCIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTrVE 37
(1990).
2. See, e.g., ROBIN COHEN, GLOBAL DIASPORAS 1-29 (1997) (discussing the imposition of
quotas restricting the number of Jews in Tsarist Russia who could enter the professions or
higher education).
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the success of law and development projects--on the ground that
the institution of markets and democracy cannot be undertaken
without taking into account the distinctive environment of devel-
oping countries, specifically the prevalence of ethnic divisions and
tensions.3 No doubt the rationale offered by the governments
involved whenever ethnically targeted preferences are adopted
varies depending on the objectives set by these governments, the
philosophical and political rationale behind these programs, and the
history of the countries themselves. There are, however, common
threads that run through the three categories of preferential
programs briefly mentioned. Whether called "discrimination" or
"white supremacy," "affirmative action," or "compensatory pre-
ferences," "Northernization" (as pursued in Nigeria) or Malaysia's
"sons of the soil" preferences, they are essentially designed to
achieve a governmentally designated objective. In other words, the
essence of these different programs is the institution of "govern-
ment-mandated preferences forgovernment-designated groups"4 to
correct continuing group disparities and ethnic stratification.
With the abolition of Jim Crow preferences in the United States,
Category One preferential policy is no longer practiced by any
government in the world and has no serious scholars advocating on
its behalf in standard scholarly journals. Categories Two and Three
continue to be pursued in many countries and have provoked both
passionate support for and opposition to governments' use of race
or ethnicity as a basis for governmental objectives. Almost wholly
ignored in the debate on preferential policies, however, both in
developing and developed countries, is the type of preferential
policies practiced not by the government but by private groups to
favor members of their own ethnic or racial groups-"[t]he
spontaneous preferences of particular individuals and groups for
'their own kind ... ,"' The proliferation of ethnic economies in the
3. See, e.g., Amy L. Chua, The Paradox of Free Market Democracy: Rethinking
Development Policy, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 287 (2000); Kevin Davis et al., Ethnically
Homogeneous Commercial Elites in Developing Countries, 32 LAW & POL'Y OF INTL BUS. 331
(2001). Whether economic disparities or disparities in entrepreneurship are causes of ethnic
conflicts is contested. See, e.g., DONALD HOROWrIz, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 113-31
(2000); Davis et al., supra, at 355-58.
4. SOWELL, supra note 1, at 14.
5. Id.
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United States and other countries, whereby disadvantaged groups
that cannot compete successfully in the mainstream economy
turn inward to leverage their group affinities and establish an
economic base for the group, can be explained by reference not
to government-mandated preferences but rather to their own
preferences for members of their own groups in their pursuit of
entrepreneurship. This particular sort of preferential policy is the
focus of this Article.
Assume that a small Korean-owned cleaning business relies on
word of mouth to find suitable employees in order to save on
advertising and other search costs. This Korean-owned business
may be located in a Korean ethnic enclave of Korean restaurants,
groceries, laundries, wig stores, and other Korean-owned shops.6 As
a small business, many of the company's employees are members
of the owner's family. As part of the Korean ethnic economy, the
cleaning business can also find, at low or no cost, Korean employees
if the owner needs to hire from outside his or her own inner circle.7
The owner may also prefer to hire other Koreans, or engage in
lending and other preferences favoring other Koreans, because of
shared language, culture, kinship, community, or a sense of mutual
trust. An ethnically homogenous work force thus is created. An
ethnic economy thus is reinforced and perpetuated.
Assume also that a black-owned business in Harlem engages
in similar business practices, hiring African-American workers
from the neighborhood rather than those from other ethnic groups.
Or that this black-owned business has successfully established
linkages with other clusters of black-owned firms,8 buying from and
6. The term "ethnic enclave economy" usually refers to a locational cluster of businesses
owned by ethnic persons who hire other coethnics. See ALEJANDRO PORTES & ROBERT L.
BACH, LATIN JOURNEY: CUBAN AND MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 203-05
(1985); see also infra Part II.A.3.
7. The term "ethnic economy" usually means an economic sector consisting of"coethnic
self-employed and employers and their coethnic employees. Whatever is not part of the
ethnic economy belongs to the general labor market." IVAN LIGHT & STEVENJ. GOLD, ETHNIC
ECONOMIES 4 (2000); see also EDNA BONACICH & JOHN MODELL, THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF
ETHNIC SOLIDARITY (1980) (exploring the relationship between class and ethnic solidarity
among Japanese Americans). One may have an ethnic economy that is not an ethnic enclave
because the ethnic businesses are not spatially proximate to one another. See infra Part
ILL 1.
8. African-American entrepreneurs once thrived in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and the city's
2003] 1525
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selling to one another and generating a positive ripple effect for the
black community. 9 Similar stories about ethnic solidarity and
"fraternal and communal sentiments" 0 abound throughout the
United States and in many countries around the world,sometimes
resulting in the establishment of a distinct type of ethnic economy,
the ethnic niche-the clustering of ethnic entrepreneurs in the
same occupations and industries." Indians' 2 and Pakistanis, for
example, own a large proportion of gas stations and budget motels
in the United States and newsstands in New York City. 3 The
diamond industry is dominated by Orthodox Jews who rely on
ethnic networks to further economic exchanges." Cambodians
and Vietnamese in California own a disproportionate number of
doughnut shops and nail salons, respectively. 5 Koreans own a
large number of green groceries in New York City and wig stores
nationwide."6 Arabs own grocery stores in Chicago, as do Lebanese
Muslims in Detroit and Toledo.1 7 Soviet Jews operate half the
taxicabs in Los Angeles.'" In the developing country context,
the Chinese in Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and other
Southeast Asian countries dominate certain lines of commerce,
black community of Greenwood was a center of black businesses. JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, SELF-
HELPAND ENTREPRENEURSHIPAMONG BLACKAMERICANS 204-09 (1991); see infra notes 328-
38 and accompanying text. For an apt discussion of the revival of black enclaves in the
United States, see Lynette Clemetson,Revivalfora Black Enclave in Pittsburgh, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 9, 2002, at Al.
9. Studies show that Cuban businesses in Miami, for example, buy inputs from other
Cuban firms, work on the products, then sell them to other Cuban firms who then sell at
retail. See generally Kenneth L. Wilson & Alejandro Portes, Immigrant Enclaves: An
Analysis of the Labor Market Experiences of Cubans in Miami, 86 AM. J. SOC. 297 (1980)
(examining the extent to which the phenomenon of self-enclosed minorities modifies general
labor processes in the U.S. economy).
10. WERNER SOMBART, THE JEWS AND MODERN CAPITALISM 33 (1953).
11. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 20.
12. See generally Edwin McDowell, Hospitality is Their Business, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
1996, at D1 (commenting on social and cultural factors that underlie the growing success of
Indian Americans in the hospitality industry).
13. See infra notes 354-55.
14. See infra note 357.
15. Donatella Lorch, An Ethnic Road to Riches: The Immigrant Job Specialty, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1992, § 1, at 1.
16. See infra notes 291 and 346.
17. IVAN LIGHT & EDNA BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS: KOREANS IN LOS
ANGELES 1965-1982, at 439 n.4 (1988).
18. Id.
1526
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as money lenders, labor contractors, shopkeepers, and brokers, and
like the Jews in Europe, became known as "middleman minorities,"
because of their "middle," "go-between" positions between producer
and consumer, owner and renter, elite and masses, employer and
employee.' 9 As noted, "[clapital and labor are often organized along
ethnic lines. Fukienese entrepreneurs in Hong Kong, Malayalee
clerks in Bombay, and Ibo plantation laborers in Equatorial Guinea
were all mobilized into their economic activity on the basis of ethnic
affinity." 0
These minority groups have established an ethnic economy in
different countries, often by relying on group cohesiveness and
homogeneous networks to create economic benefits for group
members.2' To the extent that they are created by immigrants,
19. HOWARD PAUL BECKER, MAN IN RECIPROCITY 225-37 (1956). The term *middleman
minority" originally referred to ethnic minorities who were market traders in precapitalist
societies. Middlemen are marginal people who specialize in trading and reside in global
diasporas, for example, the overseas Chinese, Jews, and Lebanese. COHEN, supra note 2, at
101-04. Early works by a number of scholars study the role middleman minorities play in the
economic structure of many countries and its impact on ethnic relations internationally. See,
e.g., ABNER COHEN, CUSTOMS AND POLITICS IN URBAN AFRICA 14-25 (1969) (describing the
mercantile activities of the Hausa of Nigeria). See generally HUBERT M. BLALOCK, JR.,
TOWARD A THEORY OF MINORITY-GROUP RELATIONS (1967) (discussing various theories of
minority group relations that can be empirically tested); R.A. SCHERMERHORN, COMPARATIVE
AND ETHNIC RELATIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR THEORY AND RESEARCH (1970) (analyzing
intergroup relations at the societal level).
Although African Americans have not generally been viewed as part of the middleman
minority tradition, some scholars have argued that this is due to neglect, rather than
historical fact. According to John Sibley Butler, a professor of sociology at the University of
Texas at Austin, the adjustment to America of the "black bourgeoisie, black Brahmans, black
elite, and the black upper class..., bears a striking resemblance to middleman minorities
throughout history." BUTLER, supra note 8, at 236. (defining the 'Afro-American middleman
group as consisting of those individuals who were entrepreneurs and professionals of the old
segregated economy"); Joel Kotkin, The Reluctant Entrepreneurs, INC:, Sept. 1986, at 81, 82
(discussing the history of the black merchant class in the North and South of the United
States, despite the fact that "by law or by tradition, black businesses were forced to operate
within the narrow limits of an all-black economy" rather than "break out" to serve non-black
clientele). West Indian blacks who came to the United States were particularly
entrepreneurial, with a business tradition that was not destroyed by slavery because the
West Indian slaves were not under the complete control of the masters but were able to tend
their own private plots and sell their surplus in the market; by 1901, they owned twenty
percent of Manhattan's black businesses. Id.
20. HOROwrTz, supra note 3, at 8.
21. The term "ethnic economy" is a more general term than "ethnic enclave," which refers
to a type of ethnic economy with ethnic businesses that are spatially or geographically
clustered, or "ethnic niche," which is used to mean the concentration of ethnic business
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some ethnic economies may also benefit from the diaspora's
linkages that continue to be maintained, culturally and eco-
nomically, with homeland institutions.22 Sociologists have noted the
tendency to equate members of one's ethnic group withthat "inbred
group of near or distant kinsmen whom one knows as intimates and
whom therefore one can trust. One intuitively expects fellow ethnics
to behave at least somewhat benevolently toward one because of kin
selection, reinforced by reciprocity.... Fellow ethnics are, in the
deepest sense, 'our people."'23
The existence of the ethnic boundary, delineating insiders and
outsiders, with preferential policies favoring "us" and excluding
"them" has been and remains an established fact of life. To the
extent that such old-fashioned preferences exist in developing
countries, it is presumed that they are transitory and that the
advancement of modern capitalism will make such practices
obsolete.24 To the extent that such ethnic preferences are prac-
ticed by ethnically homogeneous groups in modern, economically
developed countries such as the United States, they tend to be
viewed as particularly anomalous; they are thus rarely acknowl-
edged openly, overshadowed by the prevailing ideal of liberalism
and its emphasis on diversity, universalism, and assimilation.25 In
owners in certain lines of business.
22. See, e.g., Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1012-14 (2001).
Professor Chander discusses how homeland governments appeal to their diasporas for
financial, investment, and charitable support. This Article touches on the relationship
between diasporas and the homeland institutions from the reverse angle-it looks at how
homeland institutions have provided support for diasporic ethnic economies in the
immigrants' adopted countries. See infra notes 116, 118, 289-92 and accompanying text.
23. PIERRE VAN DEN BERGHE, THE ETHNIC PHENOMENON 25 (1981).
24. H.H. GERTH & C. WRIGHT MILLS, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 189, 215
(1958); SOMBART, supra note 10, at 33; see also Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and
Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1003, 1048 n.177 (1995). Max Weber, for example, remarked that modern capitalism
required a radical break from traditionalism and ethnic capitalism. MAX WEBER, BASIC
CONCEPTS IN SOCIOLOGY 109,251-52 (1969). To the extent that a group's preferences for its
members have been studied by legal scholars at all (as opposed to sociologists), they have
generally been viewed as a primitive, personalized mode of exchange that will disappear
once institutional reforms are put in place. See Davis et al., supra note 3, at 332-33 for a
discussion of this argument by proponents of New Institutional Economics.
25. See J. Higham,Introduction: The Forms of Ethnic Leadership, in ETHNIC LEADERSHIP
IN AMERICA 14 (J. Higham ed., 1979). As Higham stated:
Intrinsically, the ethnic group is a link with the past and a bulwark of stability.
[Vol. 44:15211528
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the United States, in the case of African Americans in particular,
"[to even admit that Afro-Americans have a business tradition was
congruent with interfering with the process of integration.""
Indeed, although sociologists have long noted this phenomenon,27
legal scholars have more or less ignored this last form of pref-
erential policy and have devoted their attention to studying
government preferences instead. For example, in recent years,
U.S. law and development scholars have expressed support for law
reform initiatives, adopted by countries such as Malaysia, that
favor ethnic majorities through government-instituted "ethnically
conscious interventions into the market" in order to manage ethnic
tensions by imposing restrictions on the economically dominant
minorities and preferences for the politically dominant majority.2"
There is also a vigorous body of scholarship among constitutional
scholars that examines whether to support or to oppose government
preferential policies for minorities in the United States.29 Indeed,
to the extent that preferential policies are promoted and pursued
in the United States, the liberal consensus among supporters
dictates that they are to be pursued by the government, within the
ambit of the law, whether instituted legislatively, administratively,
It depends on instinctive sympathies and ancestral loyalties of a wholly
nonrational kind. Modernization, on the other hand, demands rationality,
calculation, progress, and material incentives. It brings deracinating forces into
the ethnic group and sets up an inner tension between "modern" techniques and
goals and ethnic loyalty.
Id.
26. BUTLER, supra note 8, at 274; see also Joseph Perkins, Creating a Climate for Black
Business, HERITAGE FOUND. REPS., Jan. 1990, at 65 (describing the tradition of black
enterprise in the United States).
27. See, e.g., BONACICH & MODELL, supra note 7; COHEN, supra note 2; LIGHT &
BONACICH, supra note 17; WALTER ZENNER, MINORITIES IN THE MIDDLE (1991); Howard
Aldrich & Roger Waldinger, Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship, 16 ANN. REV. SOC. 111 (1990);
Edna Bonacich, A Theory of Middleman Minorities, 38 AM. Soc. REV. 583 (1973).
28. See, e.g., Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm
for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 47-56, 62-63 (1998).
29. For examples of academics supporting affirmative action in the United States, see
John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality ofReverse RacialDiscrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723
(1974); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism and Preferential Treatment: An Approach
to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581 (1977). For examples of academics opposing affirmative
action, see ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975); William Van Alstyne,
Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775
(1979).
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orjudicially, and in furtherance of legitimate liberal objectives such
as integration, assimilation, and equality.
As I argue in this Article, this emphasis has crowded out other
forms of "affirmative action" or preferential practices engaged in
by members of the disadvantaged groups themselves-a fourth
category of preferential policy in addition to the three briefly
mentioned at the beginning of the Article. The liberal consensus in
modern, developed countries assumes, indeed expects, immigrants
and/or ethnic minorities to uncluster and disperse in pursuit of
individual economic opportunities offered by the mainstream labor
market-where modern, contractual, and more "objective" criteria
prevail over the pre-modern, ascriptive bases of affiliation that
define the very essence of the separate ethnic economy. In the
mainstream universe away from the ethnic economy are the
promises of equal treatment, perhaps government-mandated
preferences for certain government-designated ethnic groups, and
perhaps even protection from other groups' more insular, efficient,
and productive ethnic economies.
Accordingly, there are several reasons why ethnic economies have
not been comprehensively addressed in U.S. legal scholarship.
First, intellectual support for ethnic economies may be viewed as
favoring segregation and interfering with the objectives of inte-
gration. Second, in this modern age, clannishness and tribalism
have generally been viewed as taboos by the outside world. Third,
even among supporters of ethnic economies, there is a degree of
anxiety and perhaps embarrassment about projecting a sense of
"separateness" or "foreignness" to the mainstream or native popu-
lation. Fourth, a focus on ethnic economies might also highlight a
more complex picture of race and ethnicity, especially in a country
such as the United States, because it would force one to look beyond
the black-white dichotomy-where whites are viewed as the group
against which coalitions of united minority groups must struggle,
or alternatively, the group to which minorities are expected to
assimilate. Indeed, studying ethnic economies may mean studying
intergroup relations and competition among minority ethnic groups
as each constructs its own ethnic economy and prefers "its own."
1530 [Vol. 44:1521
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There is a venerable corpus of scholarship that holds assimilation
up as a liberal or constitutional value.30 But for some ethnic groups,
minority status, especially if coupled with visible ethnic differences
and hence the presumption of "foreignness,""' makes assimilation
difficult, if not impossible, especially in the first few generations.
Furthermore, from an economic standpoint, assimilation into the
general labor market is unlikely to provide enough jobs for all
seekers. Most likely then, in the United States, the "burden of
scarcity falls most heavily upon the less assimilated or acceptable
white groups, visible minorities, non-Christians, refugees, and
immigrants."32 For members of these transitional or marginal
groups especially, who may lack mainstream advantages, turning
inward and utilizing available ethnic resources to engage in
community ethnic preferences within the ethnic economy will be
crucial for their economic well-being.33
30. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Constitutional Value of Assimilation, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 87,87-88,102-03 (1996) (viewing assimilation as a constitutional value that
reconciles pluralism with justice); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution
and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303 (1986) (favoring recognition of group identity as
a way of assimilating cultural minorities into American society); Kenji Yoshino,
Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of 'Don't
Ask, Don't Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 485, 487 (1998) (describing the bias in favor of assimilation
in equal protection jurisprudence).
31. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, Race, Citizenship, and the Search for Political Community
Among "We the People : A Review Essay on Citizenship Without Consent, 76 OR. L. REV. 233,
249-52 (1997) (describing the imposition of perpetual "foreignness" on Americans of certain
ethnic groups); Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism,
81 CAL. L. REV. 863, 869-875 (1993) (describing historical and current movements to limit
immigration and exclude those considered racially and culturally "foreign"); Kevin R.
Johnson, Fear of an "Alien Nation". Race, Immigration, and Immigrants, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 111, 112-13 (1996) [hereinafter Johnson, Alien Nation]; Kevin R. Johnson, Racial
Hierarchy, Asian Americans and Latinos as "Foreigners," and Social Change: Is the Law the
Way to Go?, 76 OR. L. REV. 347, 352-58 (1997) (describing the Latino and Asian-American
experiences as "foreigners" in the United States).
32. LIGHT& GOLD,supra note 7, at 52; see also John Sibley Butler, Myrdal Revisited: The
Negro in Business, 124 DAEDALUS 199, 205-06 (1995) (describing the rival strategies that
African Americans adopted following the Civil War: one, which recognized the reality of
discrimination and segregation and focused on the development of independent black
business enterprises, and the other, which emulated European ethnic groups by integrating
with and joining the American workforce).
33. See SOWELL, supra note 1, at 90. This fourth type of preferential policy need not
depend on governmental action, nor "await other people's conscience rather than group self-
interest." Id. Indeed, an economic development strategy that focuses on a "jobs-only model
will place residents in a situation where the jobs might once again leave their community.
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Part I briefly surveys the wide range of government-mandated
preferential schemes adopted by a number of countries in the world.
Because Category One (majority preferences in majority eco-
nomies) is no longer practiced as official policy by any country, I will
limit my discussion to the other forms of government preferences
still widely used today. First, I will describe minority preferences
in majority economies as illustrated by examples drawn from
the United States and India. 4 Second, I will discuss majority
preferences in minority economies with examples drawn from
Malaysia 5 and Nigeria. 6 A comparative perspective is useful to
contrast the preferential practices adopted by other countries with
those in the United States, and to view them not singularly but
comparatively, as part of an international continuum. The pre-
ferential policies described in this Part are those undertaken or
promoted by the state to favor certain designated ethnic groups,
whether ethnic majorities or ethnic minorities.
As a contrast to Part I, Part II examines preferential policies that
are practiced by and among the ethnic groups themselves-outside
the state's formal framework. These group preferences underlie and
essentially define the ethnically homogeneous economy and its
subvariants-the ethnic enclave economy and the ethnic niche (the
ethnic economy generally). Where appropriate, Part II also takes a
comparative perspective and looks at such ethnic trading networks
in the United States and other countries, developing and developed.
Using theories developed in political science, sociology, and anthro-
pology, and applying new institutional economics that examine the
Also, jobs are associated with a degree of credentials. Entrepreneurship, on the other hand,
levels the playing field by placing an emphasis on the entrepreneurial spirit." John Sibley
Butler, Entrepreneurship and the Advantages ofthe Inner City, 24 REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON.
39, 40 (1996).
34. I have chosen India because it is the first country to have adopted minority
preferences both under the British colonial government and upon independence, as explicitly
provided for in its constitution. SOWELL, supra note 1, at 91.
35. Malaysia was chosen because the "Malaysian program is as extensive as any, and it
has its roots, though not all of its branches, in the Malaysian constitution." HOROWITZ, supra
note 3, at 654. The claim for preference is based on "indigenousness."
36. Nigeria was chosen because it is the most populous country in Africa. Its preferential
policy is also worth studying because it is framed in territorial terms (Northernization),
although the preference is really based on indigenousness and ethnicity. See SOWELL, supra
note 1, at 69-76.
1532 [Vol. 44:1521
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ways social network structures-the tribe, clan, or kin-facilitate
economic exchanges, Part II explores how an ethnic group, as a
"culture-bearing unit [],3 and its members may create an efficient,
self-governing economic order and produce cooperative outcomes
despite their marginal status in the mainstream economy. To the
extent that such group practices have led to the creation and
maintenance of certain dominant entrepreneurial ethnic mi-
norities, recent law and development scholarship has advocated the
use by governments of ethnically conscious "corrective" measures to
restrict their dominance. This Article critically questions the use
of government-mandated preferences for government-designated
groups to constrain the entrepreneurial tendencies of certain ethnic
groups-either by destroying their ethnic economies (in the name
of integration) or by restricting their entrepreneurial activities to
achieve a semblance of economic parity. 8
Although law and development scholars have argued in favor of
government preferences for ethnic majorities in economies domi-
nated by minorities, and although constitutional scholars have
argued for and against the use of government preferences, 9 neither
has addressed the sort of private, intra-ethnic-group preferences
examined in this Article. Part III asks how the law should deal with
the preferential practices that inform and underlie the ethnic
economy. The economic leverage that members of an ethnic group
exert depends on the existence of the ethnic boundary dividing
insiders from outsiders, with insiders being treated better, more
specially than outsiders. Although the discussion in Part III and the
37. Fredrik Barth, Introduction to ETHNIC GROUPS AND BOUNDARIES 11 (Fredrik Barth
ed., 1969). For a definition of the term "culture-bearing unit," see id. at 11-13.
38. Although this Article does not directly ddress works that support the use of
ethnically-targeted preferences in developing countries, for example, through government
constraints against the Chinese and government preferences for the Malays, see Chua, supra
note 3, this Article would not be in favor of such governmentally-imposed discrimination on
the basis of ethnicity or race. A strong case may be made, on the other hand, for policies that
work alongside the market to reduce ethnic disparities in wealth. These policies include
general investment in education, health care, and progressive taxation. This is different from
preferential policies that aim to restructure the market activities of certain groups because
of their identity as members of an ethnic group. Additionally, when corruption or predatory
collusion has resulted in the creation and perpetration of unfair monopolies, these practices
may be addressed through ethnic neutral remedies, such as antibribery laws or antitrust
laws.
39. See supra notes 28-29.
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sketch of alternative approaches provided therein bear relevance
generally to the issues that are common among other countries with
ethnic minorities, I will focus for purposes of illustration on the
laws of the United States for two reasons. First, it is not feasible for
an Article of general scope to delve into the laws of many countries,
each with different historical and cultural backgrounds. Second, a
focus on the United States in Part III allows the Article to discuss
economic development generally and ethnic capitalism particularly
outside of its more conventional, developing-country context.
What may be termed "mutual self-help" might also be deemed
"nepotism," "favoritism," or "communalism." Part III looks at a
variety of approaches that a country may adopt in dealing with the
ethnically-conscious practices of certain ethnic groups, ranging from
holding that such practices are "beyond the pale" in the sense of
being beyond acceptability, or alternatively, "beyond the pale" in a
different sense-that such practices should be left alone, not
necessarily supported by the law, but certainly beyond the reach of
the law. Overall, the Article aims to demonstrate the following: (1)
There is a wide range of ethnically-conscious preferential practices
that currently exist in many countries, without government support
and hence outside the framework of the law; and (2) these practices,
engaged in by private groups, should, for the most part, be allowed
to exist within the "pale" twilight of the law. Indeed, strictly
applying the antidiscrimination laws that exist in many countries
would break up such practices and erode the very ethnic economies
that, historically and presently, have provided marginal groups
with a degree of economic comfort and stability. On the other hand,
explicitly legalizing such practices by bringing them within the
protective jurisdiction of the law might also create its own set of
problems, such as promoting ethnic rivalries and threatening ethnic
balkanization of the country.
I. A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT GOVERNMENT-MANDATED
PREFERENTIAL POLICIES
This Part briefly examines preferential policies such as those
practiced in the United States and India to help minorities in
majority economies, and those adopted by countries such as
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Malaysia and Nigeria, to help majorities in minority economies. As
history has shown, ethnicity ° and ethnic relations can all too easily
become a problem politically and economically.41
Even as the world has become economically integrated and more
transnational, it has also become increasingly susceptible to the tug
and pull of subnational forces, including those posed by ethnic
conflicts and divisions. Countries with significant minorities have
adopted a range of government policies to manage ethnic or racial
relations. Certainly, the adopted policies--"affirmative action" in
the United States, power-sharing and governmental set-asides in
India, and various arrangements to achieve majority preferences
and restrain minority-group economic dominance in Malaysia
and Nigeria-are developed within the particular context of the
countries involved. These policies may be based in part on economic
and political factors, legal traditions, ethnic group aspirations and
fears, and the country's historical legacy, including the presence or
absence of slavery or colonialism. My purpose in including this dis-
cussion is to juxtapose and contrast the better-known preferential
policies enacted by governments to benefit groups designated for
40. The Article uses a broad definition of ethnicity. An ethnic group "is a human
population that has a name and thinks of itself as a group; possesses a common ancestry,
historical ties, and historical memories; and shares a culture, which can be based on a
combination of race, language, religion, laws, customs, institutions, dress, music, crafts, and
food." Michael E. Brown & Sumit Ganguly, Introduction to GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND
ETHNIC RELATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 13 (Michael E. Brown & Sumit Ganguly eds.,
1997). As used in the Article, "ethnic groups will include both majority and minority
communities, ... immigrants and migrant workers." Id.; see also HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at
53 (describing ethnicity as embracing "groups differentiated by color, language, and religion;
it covers 'tribes,' 'races,' 'nationalities,' and 'castes'").
41. By some estimates, there are as many as 9000 ethnic communities in the world.
JAMES MINAHAN, NATIONS WITHOUT STATES: A HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY
NATIONAL MOVEMENTS xvi (1996). Approximately ninety percent of the states in the
international system are ethnically heterogeneous, that is, with ethnic minorities
constituting more than five percent of the total population. David Welsh, Domestic Politics
and Ethnic Conflict, in ETHNIC CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 45 (Michael E.
Brown ed., 1993). Of the 127 largest states, seventy-five percent contain significant minority
groups within their borders. TED ROBERT GURR, MINORITIES AT RISK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF
ETHNOPOLrTCAL CONFLICTS 10-11 (1993). This figure only includes groups with at least
100,000 members or whose members constitute more than one percent of the population of
a country in which they reside. Id. at 8. It has been estimated that at least 200 minority
groups are suffering systematic discriminatory treatment, demanding political self-
determination, or both. Id. at 6-8; MINAHAN, supra, at xvi-xvii.
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differential treatment with preferential policies maintained by
some ethnic groups to benefit themselves, as described in Part III.
A. Minority Preferences in Majority Economies
1. The United States
In the United States, there is essentially an economically and
politically dominant majority (whites) on the one hand, and less
dominant ethnic minorities on the other.4'2 Although the United
States is increasingly diverse ethnically, ethnic relations in the
country are framed primarily in terms of blacks and whites. 3 The
emotionally powerful legacy of slavery and Jim Crow segregation
has meant that the African-American experience has dominated the
way ethnic relations are viewed, analyzed, and understood in the
United States. Other ethnic groups that wish to have preferential
policies also apply to them have usually analogized their situations
to that of blacks. Further, affirmative action as understood today in
the United States was designed to address the disadvantages and
subordination of African Americans particularly, to counteract the
long-lasting effects of the institution of slavery and the failure of
Reconstruction.""
42. Data provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce demonstrate that as of 1993, the
median household income was $32,960 for whites, $19,533 for blacks, and $22,886 for
Hispanics. The sole ethnic minority group whose median household income surpasses that
of whites is Asian/Pacific Islanders with a median household income of $38,347. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1995,
at 472; see also MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH:
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 85-86 (1995) (describing the disparity in income
and personal wealth between blacks and whites in the United States).
43. When the Indian Trinidadian writer Shiva Naipaul made his East African journey
in 1978, he observed the race relations there, and noted that the Indian presence, though
deeply rooted and significant, is more or less neglected by scholars and commentators: "The
assumption has always been that it is only the relationship between black and white that
really matters.... Marginality was thrust upon the Asian. Both black and white could regard
him as an outsider intruding into their special relationship." SHIVA NAIPAUL, NORTH OF
SOUTH 109 (1979). And it is similarly so in the United States.
44. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 42, at 12-15, 35-37. It was "common knowledge
that the [Reconstruction] Amendments were designed to ameliorate the condition of Blacks"
who were "a special object of protection." Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism
in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1295 (1982).
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Perhaps in part because of long-established antidiscrimination
norms,45 and "unlike preferential policies in some other countries-
commencing on a specific date for specific benefits in specific
sectors-group preferences in the United States have emerged
gradually and unevenly, and not always openly."46 In 1965, with
Executive Order 11,246, President Lyndon Johnson created the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) to ensure
that private firms doing work for the federal government comply
with the principle of "nondiscrimination" and not engage in any
racial discrimination. 7 In addition, the Executive Order stated
that "[tihe contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that
applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during
employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or na-
tional origin. "4 Over time, however, the original use of the term
"affirmative action" evolved to mean something different. It is no
longer treatment without regard to race, but rather treatment with
full regard to and consciousness of race. 9
45. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,643 (1993) (declaring that racial classifications
"threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group ....");
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) ("Distinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions
are founded upon the doctrine of equality."). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, enacted in 1964,
provides that "[n]o person ... shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in ... any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2000).
46. SOWELL, supra note 1, at 103.
47. See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2000).
48. 3 C.F.R. 340. This order was amended in 1967 to change "creed" to "religion" and to
include sex as an impermissible basis for discrimination in government contracting. Exec.
Order No. 11,375,3 C.F.R. 684,685 (1966-1970), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)
(2000).
49. For an insightful discussion of the evolution of this original meaning of affirmative
action to the current understanding, see William W. Van Alstyne, Affirmative Actions, 46
WAYNE L. REV. 1517,1527-30 & n.10 (2000). This position has many ardent supporters. Some
believe that policies founded on race consciousness now are necessary to the attainment of
color blindness in the future. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In order to get beyond
racism, we must first take account of race."); Reva B. Siegel, In the Eyes of the Law:
Reflections on the Authority of Legal Discourse, in LAW'S STORIES 225, 230 (Peter Brooks &
Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race
Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 954
(1993); Martin J. Katz, Note, The Economics of Discrimination: The Three Fallacies of
Croson, 100 YALE L.J. 1033, 1045-48 (1991).
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Over the years since Executive Order 11,246, distinctions and
preferential treatment on the basis of race have been part of the
understanding of affirmative action in various areas of life in the
United States. 0 For example, organizations have identified and
classified by race to determine who is eligible first for on-the-job
training;"' who can be promoted; 2 who will be laid off first;13 who is
eligible for public housing;5 4 and for admission to a state university
medical school 5 or a state university law school."
The federal government has used racial classifications to
determine which firms would be entitled to participate in public
works projects. One program in particular, struck down by the
Supreme Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,7 was
50. For a critique of this evolution, see Van Alstyne, supra note 29, at 809 ("We shall not
now see racism disappear by employing its own ways of classifying people and measuring
their rights.").
51. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). The Supreme Court held that the
employer had acted lawfully under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in preferring black
employees for admission to training programs, on the grounds that such preference was
voluntary and benign--even if the employer's plan was in fact adopted by the employer only
after a government agency had threatened to remove the employer from eligibility to bid for
federal contracts if it did not increase its skilled minority representation. The Court
interpreted Title VII to permit programs voluntarily adopted by employers because the
statute only stated that it did not "require" such programs. Id. at 207. There was no
constitutional issue because the case did not involve a challenge to an affirmative action
program undertaken with state action. Id. at 200.
52. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986). The Court
held that § 706(g) of Title VII did not preclude a federal court from entering a consent decree
between the city and an organization of black and Hispanic firefighters requiring a city's fire
department to divide promotions between minority and nonminority firefighters. Id. at 504,
515.
53. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (overturning lower
court orders that had required a city to lay off white workers before black workers more
recently hired and with less seniority and holding that Title VII allowed employers to use a
seniority system that had an adverse impact on minority employees, absent proof of
discriminatory intent).
54. Otero v. New York State Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
55. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Four of the nine Justices held
that the university's use of race resulting in Bakke's exclusion was forbidden. Id. at 417-21
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1083 (1996).
57. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). The case was remanded to the lower court to decide whether the
race-based component of the Department of Transportation's Disadvantaged Business
Enterprise could meet the strict scrutiny standard of review. Id. at 237. The Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit had found that the program was constitutional under the Department's
new regulatory framework. Id. at 210. In 2001, the Supreme Court again granted certiorari
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established pursuant to section 520 of the Small Business Act
(SBA), in which federal agencies are "to set agency-specific goals for
participation by businesses controlled by socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals. "8 The program involved the applicable
Subcontracting Compensation Clause of the SBA, which provides
that "'[mionetary compensation is offered for awarding subcon-
tracts to small business concerns owned and controlled bysocially
and economically disadvantaged individuals ... ,,59 If a contractor
requests payment and furnishes evidence of the subcontractor's
certification as a disadvantaged business enterprise, the contractor
will be paid an amount equal to "'10 percent of the final amount of
the approved ... subcontract, not to exceed 1.5 percent of the
original contract amount." The Supreme Court reversed the lower
courts and required that strict scrutiny be used to evaluate race-
based federal programs and ensure they are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests.6'
Affirmative action programs, as Justice O'Connor noted in
Adarand, "implicate a complex scheme of federal statutes and
regulations." 2 Indeed, in addition to the SBA at issue in Adarand,
there are several other federal laws and regulations that use race
or ethnicity as a basis for decision making.3
inAdarand, but subsequently dismissed the case after argument. See Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Minetta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted.
58. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 206 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 644(gXl)). The SBA "defines 'socially
disadvantaged individuals' as 'those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or
cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a group without regard to their
individual qualities.' Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5)). It defines "'economically
disadvantaged individuals' as 'those socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to
compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit
opportunities as compared to others in the same business area who are not socially
disadvantaged.'" Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6XA)).
59. Id. at 209 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(aX6XA)). Contracts awarded by Department of
Transportation agencies are required to include the Subcontracting Compensation Clause
and the following provision: "The contractor shall presume that socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans,
Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities, or any other individual found to be
disadvantaged by the [Small Business] Administration pursuant to section 8(a) of the Small
Business Act." Id. at 205 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(dX3)(CXii)).
60. Id. at 209.
61. Id. at 226.
62. Id. at 206.
63. The Federal Acquisitions Regulations (FAR), for example, are concerned with
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Following Adarand, however, various branches of the federal
government assessed the case's impact on existing preferential
policies. The Department of Justice issued a memorandum to
general counsels in June 1995 to reevaluate federal programs that
use race or ethnicity as a basis for decision making to ensure
compliance with the Adarand directive." In May 1996, the
providing small businesses and small businesses owned by "socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals' (including women) the opportunity to participate in federal
contracts. 48 C.F.R. § 52.219-8(a) (1995). Businesses that qualify as disadvantaged are those
with at least fifty-one percent ownership and control by disadvantaged individuals, or an
economically disadvantaged Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian Organization. Id. § 52.219-8(c).
The Department of Defense has also established a five percent annual contracting goal for
disadvantaged concerns, such as historically black institutions of higher education and other
minority institutions. Id. § 219.000. Other Department of Defense programs include the so-
called"rule of two' set-aside policy for small, disadvantaged businesses which was suspended
afterAdarand. See Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, 60 Fed. Reg. 54,954
(Oct. 27, 1995) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 219,252) (suspending disadvantaged business
set-asides effective October 23, 1995). The "rule of two" policy means that if two or more
qualified disadvantaged businesses were available to bid for a defense prime contract, then
that contract must be set aside for award to a disadvantaged business, as long as the price
was not more than ten percent above fair market price. National Defense Authorization Act
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3973-74 (1986) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §
2301 (2000)).
The Department of Transportation's Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of
1991 (ISTEA), Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914, 1919-20 (1991) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of titles 23, 49, and other titles of U.S.C.), requires that ten percent of
transportation contracts be allocated to disadvantaged enterprises. 49 C.F.R. § 23.61(a)
(1995).
There are also specific preferences for Native-American-owned businesses that have been
incorporated into various federal regulations. The SBA presumes Native Americans to be
socially disadvantaged and thus eligible for participation in the 8(a) Program. 13 C.F.R. §
124.105(b) (1995). Native Americans may also participate in the minority subcontracting
programs set forth in the FAR. 48 C.F.R. § 19.703 (1995). The Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act provides that any contract or grant made under the Act shall
require that preferences in the award of subcontracts be given to Native-American
organizations and Native-American-owned economic enterprises. 15 U.S.C. § 450e(bX2)
(2000). The Indian Incentive Program, 48 C.F.R. § 26.1 (1995), provides additional
compensation to federal contractors-an amount equal to five percent of its subcontractors'
cost if those subcontractors are Native-American-owned. 48 C.F.R. § 26.1 (1995)
(implementing 25 U.S.C. § 1544 (2000)).
64. See Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to General
Counsels (June 28,1995), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 125, at E-1 (June 29, 1995).
The Department of Justice sets forth six factors for agencies to consider: (1) whether the
governmental entity considered race-neutral alternatives before deciding on using race-based
criteria; (2) whether the program allows for a flexible waiver mechanism for individualized
consideration of a minority contractor's bid; (3) whether the program uses race as just one
factor among many to be considered; (4) the appropriate method used to compare numerically
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Department of Justice followed with a comprehensive set of
"Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement"
designed to tailor race-based affirmative actions to the require-
ments of Adarand.65 The Proposed Reforms state that even in a
post-Adarand world, "[ulnder the reformed structure, the federal
government will generally have authority ... to use several race-
conscious contracting mechanisms ... 66 The Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) released its "Notice
Reaffirming Affirmative Action Goals in Light of Adarand
Decision,6 7 stating:
This Notice reaffirms the longstanding policy of the [OFCCP]
that affirmative action program goals under Executive Order
11246 are to be used as a tool to aid in breaking down barriers
to equal employment opportunity for women and minorities
without impinging on the rights and expectations of other
members of the workforce. Affirmative action program goals are
not to be used as quotas which must be achieved through race-
based and gender-based preferences.'
Thus, race-based policies are alive and well in the United States.
Although the Court in Adarand held that any law using a racial
classification, including the benign use of racial classification in a
federal affirmative action program, would be invalid under the Fifth
the targeted objective with the number of minorities in the field; (5) the duration of the
program; and (6) the degree and type of burden imposed on nonminority groups. Id.
65. 61 Fed. Reg. 26,042 (May 23, 1996).
66. Id. at 26,046.
67. Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, U.S. Dep't Labor Employment
Standards Administration, OFCCP Notice Reaffirming Affirmative Action Goals in Light of
Adarand Decision, Administrative Review (Aug. 2,1995), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 155, at E-1 (Aug. 11, 1995).
68. Id. According to the OFCCP, however, the Office's use of numerical goals in
affirmative action programs under Executive Order 11,246 remains valid after Adarand:
Adarand established the judicial standard of review applicable to governmental
programs that use racial and ethnic classifications as a basis for
decisionmaking. Because the Executive Order program does not require
decisionmaking based on race or ethnicity, the standards established in
Adarand do not apply to the use of goals in Executive Order 11246 affirmative
action programs.
Id. The OFCCP asserts that to the extent numerical goals are used, they are "not designed
to be ... quotas,* but rather, are only part of "the goal-setting process ...." Id. at E-2.
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Amendment unless the government could show that the classi-
fication was narrowly tailored to promote a compelling interest, it
expressly left open the possibility that certain race-based programs
would be upheld. A strict scrutiny test, the majority wrote, is not
"strict in theory, but fatal in fact,".P9 so that race-based policies
undertaken within the constitutional constraints set out by the
Court would survive strict scrutiny.
2. India
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Constitution of India explicitly
allows an exception from the principle of equality "for the reser-
vation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class
of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately
represented in the service under the State."7" The Constitution of
India continued the preferential policies begun under the British
colonial government,71 in which reservations in public service posts
for certain minorities, such as Muslims, Christians, Anglo-Indians,
and other communal groups, 72 were pursued by the British to
achieve political balance among the different castes and religious
groups,7 and to pacify Muslims. 74 Critics viewed British policy as
an extension of Britain's "divide and conquer" strategy, aimed at
pitting different segments of India against one another.
7 5
Article 15 of the Indian Constitution prohibits discrimination
on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth.76 Article
69. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
70. INDIA CONST. art. 16, § 4; see also id. arts. 341-42.
71. See MARC GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE BACKWARD CLASSES OF
INDIA 18-40 (1984) (discussing British colonial policies and the extension of similar policies
in the Indian Constitution); SOWELL, supra note 1, at 91-103 (same); Samuel M. Witten,
Comment, 'Compensatory Discrimination" in India: Affirmative Action as a Means of
Combatting Class Inequality, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 353, 359 (1983) (discussing
preferential treatment based on group membership under British rule and the inclusion of
various constitutional provisions after independence to incorporate the goals of compensatory
discrimination begun during colonial times).
72. See PARMANAND SINGH, EQUALITY, RESERVATION AND DISCRIMINATION IN INDIA 82
(1982).
73. See Witten, supra note 71, at 359.
74. SINGH, supra note 72, at 82.
75. Witten, supra note 71, at 359.
76. INDIA CONST. art. 15, § 1.
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15(4), added to the Constitution in 1951 by the Constitution (First
Amendment) Act," however, states that "[niothing in this article...
shall prevent the State from making any special provision for
the advancement of any socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes."7" The Constitution supports an extensive policy of minority
preferences in education, civil service positions, and legislative
seats for the designated Scheduled Castes and Tribes. India thus
recognizes the notion of group rights and explicit affirmative action
quotas known as "reservations."" Article 16(4) contains two re-
quirements a person must meet to be included in the government's
reservation plan: the person must be from the "backward class" and
must be part of a group "which, in the opinion of the State, is not
adequately represented in the services under the State."' Among
the divisions that mark Indian society historically, such as linguis-
tic and religious divisions, caste divisions between the caste Hindus
as a whole8" and the Scheduled Castes (outcastes or untouchables)82
remain severe. There is a long history of discrimination against
the untouchables." Although untouchability has been officially
77. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 6 n.1 (Rakesh Bagga ed., 1987).
78. INDIA CONST. art. 15, § 4.
79. Article 332 of the Indian Constitution provides that "[sleats shall be reserved for the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes ... in the Legislative Assembly of every State."
Id. art. 332. Article 330 provides that "[s]eats shall be reserved in the House of the People
for-a) the Scheduled Castes; b) the Scheduled Tribes." Id. art. 330. The House of the People
is the lower House of Parliament. Id. art. 79. Article 46, for example, provides that "[tihe
State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker
sections of the people, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes,
and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation." Id. art. 46.
80. Id. art. 16, § 4.
81. The caste system in India consists of four castes or "varnas": Brahmin (priests and
scholars), Kshatriya (rulers and warriors), Vaishya (merchants and farmers), and Sudra
(menial and servant classes). In addition, there are also the outcastes (outside the four-tier
caste system). GALANTER, supra note 71, at 7-17.
82. Untouchables are considered polluted and assigned menial tasks such as cleaning
toilets. DECLAN QUIGLEY, THE INTERPRETATION OF CASTE 10 (1993).
83. At one point, questions were raised as to whether untouchables could even be
considered Hindus, because many were in occupations that brought them into contact with
animals slaughtered in violation of Hindu rules. GALANTER, supra note 71, at 26 n.24. During
the independence movement, however, Hindu leaders, wary of the balance of power between
Hindus and Muslims, chose to include the untouchables as Hindus. SOWELL, supra note 1,
at 94-95.
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outlawed by the Indian Constitution, 4 social stigmatization
remains acute in many parts of the country.85 The reservation
system is designed to compensate for this through an elaborate
quota regime for the untouchables along with other disadvantaged
groups within Indian society. 6 "Politically and administratively, the
operative caste divisions are upper and middle castes, 'other back-
ward classes,' and scheduled castes and tribes,"8 7 all administered
by the Commission for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
India's policy, referred to by scholars as compensatory dis-
crimination, protective discrimination, progressive discrimination,
or special treatment,88 is pursued to remedy historic injustices
suffered by the lower castes and the outcastes. In accordance
with the constitutional provision that the president may appoint
commissions to investigate the conditions of the Backward
84. INDIA CONsT. art. 17 ("'Untouchability' is abolished and its practice in any form is
forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of 'Untouchability' shall be an
offence punishable in accordance with law.").
85. Local custom may prohibit an untouchable from commingling in any way with a caste
Hindu, so that caste taboos persist. In certain places, untouchables must comply with certain
social restrictions that keep them from, for example, dressing or behaving in any way that
suggests a dignity beyond what others deem they are to be accorded or entitled, such as
wearing sandals or riding horses. GALANTER, supra note 71, at 15. In 1979, according to the
government's report, a riot was unleashed because "[w]hile taking water from a tap, a
Scheduled Caste woman put her water pot on the pot of a caste Hindu woman." REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION FOR SCHEDULED CASTES AND SCHEDULED TRIBES SECOND REPORT 297 (Apr.
1979-Mar. 1980) (New Delhi, 1981).
86. To complicate matters, neither untouchables nor the castes are a homogeneous group.
Within each caste there are several sub-castes, or pan-varnas. GALANTER, supra note 71, at
11, and some untouchables are deemed untouchables in some parts of India but not in other
parts, and some subgroups of untouchables themselves practice "Untouchability" towards
other subgroups of untouchables. Barbara R. Joshi, "Ex-Untouchable": Problems, Progress,
and Policies in Indian Social Change, 53 PAC. AFF. 193, 196-97 (1980). The latest data show
that there were 104,755,000 persons deemed to be Scheduled Castes, making up 15.8% of the
population. INDIA: OBSERVER STATISTICAL HANDBOOK 55 (B.N. Uniyal & Kumaresh
Chakravarty eds., 1992).
87. Kanti Bajpai, Diversity, Democracy, and Devolution in India, in GOVERNMENT
POLICIES AND ETHNIC RELATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, supra note 40, at 35; see also
GALANTER,supra note 71, at 147-53. Scheduled Tribes are Indians who are spatially, socially,
and culturally separate from the majority of the population. The designation of a group as
a Scheduled Caste as well as a Scheduled Tribe eligible for reservations is made by
presidential order. INDIA CONST. art. 341, 342.
The Other Backward Classes are those Indians who are neither of the Scheduled Castes
nor Scheduled Tribes but are also disadvantaged. See George H. Gadbois, Jr., Affirmative
Action in India: The Judiciary and Social Change, 8 LAW & POL'Y 329, 331 (1986).
88. See, e.g., GALANTER, supra note 71, at 2-3.
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Classes,89 the Indian Central Government appointed the first
Backward Classes Commission on January 29, 1953,90 which pre-
sented a list of 2399 groups it considered backward and offered
various recommendations to improve their status. 9' Subsequently,
a second Backward Classes Commission, the Mandal Commission
(Commission), was appointed in 1978.92 Finding that the 3000-year-
old caste system remains deeply entrenched in Indian society,
the Commission determined that equal treatment of the weak and
strong would result in a "mock competition" that would only
perpetuate inequality.93 The Commission also set forth its criteria
for identifying the Other Backward Classes, based on a mix of social
and economic indicators.94 The Commission recommended that in
addition to the existing 22.5% of reservations for the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes already set aside by the Consti-
tution,95 an additional 27% of federal government jobs should be
reserved for the Other Backward Classes.96 The Commission had
originally requested that 52% of government jobs be set aside for
the Other Backward Classes, because they make up 52% of the
population.97 However, due to a Supreme Court ruling holding that
89. INDIA CONST. art. 340.
90. See Sawhney v. Union of India, 80 A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477, 506, for a discussion of the
Commission. The Commission's recommendations were ultimately rejected by the
Parliament on a variety of grounds. See GALANTER, supra note 71, at 173.
91. GALANTER, supra note 71, at 169.
92. MANDALCOMMISSION REPORT: MYTHAND REALITY 7 (KL. Chanchreek & Saroj Prasad
eds., 1991) thereinafter REPORT OF THE MANDAL COMMISSION].
93. Id. § 6.2, at 269.
94. These factors include: (1) whether most members of society considered the caste or
class to be backward; (2) whether they came from a region generally considered to be
backward; (3) whether the caste or class relied on manual labor for its livelihood; (4) whether
twenty-five percent of the females and ten percent of the males were married by age
seventeen; (5) whether the student drop-out rate was twenty-five percent above average; (6)
whether total family assets were twenty-five percent below the state average; and (7)
whether drinking water was more than hafa kilometer from their homes. Id. § 11.23, at 296.
95. Id. § 13.10, at 280 (noting that the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes make up
approximately 22.5% of India's population and hence 22.5% of government jobs had been
reserved for them).
96. Id. § 13.11, at 280; see Bajpai, supra note 87, at 53; Tim McGirk, Indian Caste War
that Made a Man Set Himself Alight, INDEP. (London), Sept. 28, 1990, at 14, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Indpt File; David Wigg, High-Caste Fury at Plan to Help
"Untouchables," INDEP. (London), Aug. 27, 1990, at 9, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Indpt File.
97. REPORT OF THE MANDAL COMMISSION, supra note 92, § 13.11, at 280.
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the total amount of reservations permissible under Article 15(4) of
the Constitution must be less than 50%,98 the percentage that could
be set legally must be a figure (27%) which, when combined with
the 22.5% already reserved for the Schedule Castes and Tribes,
would remain below the constitutional ceiling of 50%."9 The
reservation policy would be applicable to not only the government
but also to all private sector organizations that receive government
financial assistance, 100 including colleges and universities.'
01
For many years, the recommendations were ignored because they
were too controversial.' 2 But in 1991, the government of Prime
Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao's Congress Party announced its
support of the reservation policy.'" 3 In 1993, the Supreme Court
held that the government's implementation of the Mandal
Commission Report was indeed constitutional. 104
98. Balaji v. Mysore, 50 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649, 663 (holding that the State of Mysore's
order reserving sixty-eight percent of the admissions to the engineering and medical colleges
and other technical institutions for the Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled
Tribes violated Article 15(4) of the Constitution); see also Rajkumar v. Gulbarga Univ., 77
A.I.R. 1990 (Kant.) 320, 332 (holding that reserving thirty-three of the thirty-five professor
positions for the designated groups at a state university was excessive).
99. REPORT OF THE MANDAL COMMISSION, supra note 92, § 13.11, at 280.
100. Id. § 13.15, at 281.
101. Id.; see Bajpai, supra note 87, at 56 (noting that the original proposals set forth by the
Commission were later modified to exempt the defense, science, technology, and space
sectors).
102. Tim McGirk, The Battle of the Haves and the Have-Nots: In a Bid to Win Favour
Among India's Lower Classes, V.P. Singh Has Dragged the Country to the Brink of a Caste
War, INDEP. (London), Oct. 20,1990, at 25, available at LEXIS, News Library, Indpt File. But
in 1990, Prime Minister V.P. Singh announced his government's decision to implement the
Commission's recommendation. Barbara Crossette,A Question Unanswered: Where Is India
Headed?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1990, at 18. "[Tlhe emergence of the backward classes as an
increasingly cohesive electoral bloc changed the government's political calculations." Bajpai,
supra note 87, at 55. Singh was later removed from office by Parliament, following the rise
of Hindu fundamentalism and widespread negative public reaction to the government's
decision to implement the Commission's recommendations. See Crossette, supra.
103. See Indian Government Increases Job Quotas for Poor, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept.
25, 1991, available at LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
104. Sawhney v. Union of India, 80 A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477, 578. Reservations, the Court
held, may be supplemented by other means also available under the Constitution, such as
concessions, exemptions, and other relaxations, to advance the Backward Classes. Id. at 540.
Overall, the Indian Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to affirm preferential
policies for the designated disadvantaged groups. In the landmark case, Kerala v. Thomas,
63 A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 490, the Court upheld the State of Kerala's order granting a two-year
temporary exemption allowing certain disadvantaged employees to be promoted to higher
positions even if they were unable to pass a promotion test. Id.; see Witten, supra note 71,
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Outbursts of violence broke out all across India after the
government announced its decision to implement the Mandal
Commission Report. Waves of self-immolation by students were
repeated as protest grew over the implementation of the Report.'05
The protests were fueled further when Indian police fired tear gas
into students surrounding the Indian Parliament building in New
Delhi. 0 6 The mass demonstrations were the worst to strike India
since the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984,107
causing some to observe that the ensuing violence would prove
to be the most formidable in India's history of epic struggles.'
After supporters of the government's policy set a train on fire,
forty people were massacred on the same day, near the city of
Hyderabad."°9
Caste cleavages and class divisions remain severe in India. It is
not entirely clear whether the reservations policy has reduced
group friction or even has had a significant positive impact on the
disadvantaged groups. Indeed, as noted by the preeminent scholar
on ethnic conflicts, "the way the preferred group is defined dictates
the direction of what might be called the politics of preferential
inclusion and exclusion.""0 Hence, as preferences are reserved for
Backward Classes, so have claims of backwardness increased. In
the state of Karnataka, for example, every caste except Brahmin
was officially designated Backward, including those from the
at 382-83 (noting that "Thomas was the first case to test the validity of classifying citizens
for the purposes of compensatory discrimination where the State did not act under explicit
constitutional authority").
105. Michael Byrnes, India: Government at Risk as Crisis Engulfs Country, AUSTL. FIN.
REV., Oct. 15, 1990, at 1; Mark Fineman, Students Sacrifice Selves to Protect Caste Privilege,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1990, at Al; David Housego, A Retreat from Modernisation, FIN. TIMES
(London), Sept. 29, 1990, at 6; Indian Government Increases Job Quotas for Poor, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 25, 1991, available at LEXIS, News Library, AFP File; McGirk, supra
note 96; Christopher Thomas, Hindu Marchers Step Up Pressure on Prime Minister, TIMES
(London), Oct. 15, 1990, available at LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File; Christopher
Thomas, Job Quotas Scheme in India Stirs Caste Hatred, TIMES (London), Aug. 25, 1990, at
9 [hereinafter Thomas, Job Quotas Scheme].
106. Thomas, Job Quotas Scheme, supra note 105; see also Wigg, supra note 96.
107. Fineman, supra note 105.
108. Michael Byrnes, India: Reeling Under a Wave of Violence, Nihilism and Bitter
Fragmentation, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Oct. 19, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws
File.
109. See Ian Burma, A Nation Divided, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 27.
110. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 657.
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wealthy landowning class, until that determination was struck
down by the Supreme Court."' More, rather than less, awareness
of divisions and differences seems to result as each group elbows
the other in order to make itself fit the governmentally set and
defined preferences. In certain states, "employment preferences
may also have aroused more ethnic conflict than they assuaged,
particularly because proposals for preferences often emanate from
'politicians not as a response to popular demands, but as a means
of mobilizing political support.'' 1 2
Furthermore, the extent to which preferences have yielded
benefits to the disadvantaged groups is unclear."' Those who have
in fact gained have been from a small elite within the Schedule
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 114 This group has tended to reproduce
itself because the children of those receiving benefits have gone on
to claim 'reservations themselves." 5 Moreover, those who have
occupied reserved positions in the country's legislative bodies have
failed to represent effectively the interests of their groups, as those
who favored the preferential policies had hoped." 6
The Mandal Commission recommended that the entire system of
reservations be reevaluated after twenty years. 117 Indeed, as noted,
"[viirtually everywhere, policies of ethnic preference are regarded
as exceptions, temporary expedients, often with a specified time
111. Id.; see also SOWELL, supra note 1, at 15-16 ("Fraudulent claims of belonging to the
designated beneficiary groups have been widespread and have taken many forms in various
countries."). Where preferences were set for tribes, for example, non-Christian tribals in the
State of Bihar insisted that Christians be excluded because the latter had been able to claim
a disproportionate share of the reserved slots. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 657.
112. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 671 (quoting MYRON WEINER & MARY FAINSOD
KATZENSTEIN, INDIA'S PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: MIGRANTS, THE MIDDLE CLASSES AND ETHNIC
EQUALITY 134 (1981)). As noted, in the State of Andhra Pradesh, for example, preferences
were reserved for Telanganas. These preferences, adopted as a political response to the rise
of a separatist movement in Telangana, have in turn provoked a reactive, separatist demand
among the Coastal Andhras. Id. at 672.
113. Id. at 669.
114. Bajpai, supra note 87, at 54. Thomas Sowell made the same observation about
preferential policies around the world. SOWELL, supra note 1, at 15 ("[W]ithin the groups
designated by government as recipients of preferential treatment, the benefits have usually
gone disproportionately to those members already more fortunate.").
115. Bajpai, supra note 87, at 54.
116. Id.
117. REPORT OF THE MANDAL COMMISSION, supra note 92, § 13.40, at 288.
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limit.""' But rarely have preferential programs in any country,
including India, been truly temporary. 119
B. Majority Preferences in Minority Economies
1. Malaysia
As historians, economists, and sociologists have long observed,
"[iun a number of countries, neither the demographic majority
nor the political majority is dominant in the economy, which is
largely in the hands of one or more ethnic minorities ....""o
These minorities, unlike the Europeans in South Africa, for
example, did not achieve economic dominance as colonizers or as
part of any foreign conquest. Rather, many arrived in the new
countries as "powerless or even persecuted minorities,"' as
coolies or indentured servants,'22 or sometimes, as part of a
phenomenon referred to as the "middleman minorities"'23 and
118. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 657.
119. SOWELL, supra note 1, at 15. As Sowell stated:
Preferential programs, even when explicitly and repeatedly defined as
"temporary," have tended not only to persist but also to expand in scope, either
embracing more groups or spreading to wider realms for the same groups, or
both. Even preferential programs established with legally mandated cut-off
dates, as in India and Pakistan, have continued far past those dates by
subsequent extensions.
Id.
120. Id. at 41; see also JANET TAi LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY: BEYOND THE
NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF ETHNIC TRADING NETWORKS, CONTRACT LAW, AND GIFT
EXCHANGE 112 (2001) (discussing the ethnically homogeneous middleman groups such as
"the East Indians in East Africa, the Syrians in West Africa, the Lebanese in North Africa,
the Jews in medieval Europe, and the Medici merchant-bankers in fifteenth-century
Florence"); THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE: A WORLD VIEW 2 (1994) (noting the
dominance of India's Gujaratis in the economy of the countries to which they migrated). See
generally THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIGENOUS TRADE AND MARKETS IN WEST AFRICA (Claude
Meillassoux ed., 1971) (discussing the emergence of minority trade diasporas in West Africa);
ESSENTIAL OUTSIDERS (Daniel Chirot & Anthony Reid eds., 1997) (studying the role of the
Chinese and Jews in Southeast Asia and Central Europe); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, PEDDLERS AND
PRINCES: SOCIAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION INTWO INDONESIAN TOWNS (1963)
(discussing Chinese traders and networks in Indonesia); Bonacich, supra note 27 (discussing
middlemen minorities).
121. SOWELL, supra note 120, at 2.
122. COHEN,supra note 2, at 59-62; THOMAS SOWELL, MIGRATIONS AND CULTURE: A WORLD
VIEW 310-14 (1996).
123. See generally SOWELL, supra note 120, at 27 ("[Mliddlemen facilitate the movement
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"trade diasporas."124 Historically, specialized, entrepreneurial
minorities have established an important economic presence in
their adopted countries, contributing to the "development of trade,
money management, and capital accumulation in most of the Old
World."125 Though deemed pariah capitalists by kings and rulers,
they were nonetheless tolerated and on occasion even encouraged
to take on crucial "middleman" roles in "protocapitalist activities
(moneylending, petty trade, tax farming) denounced by the
guardians of social morality."126 Although the Jews in Europe and
the Chinese in Southeast Asia are two of the more well-known
specialized minorities, many other ethnic groups have migrated
from their homeland and through their newly established trading
networks, grown to become economically significant in the host
countries-for example, the Indians, especially the Gujaratis and
Chettyars, as well as the Lebanese and Armenians.127
To counteract the economic dominance of these minorities,
governments concerned about the "indigenous" majority have
adopted majority preferential policies on the following grounds:
they require little expenditure and are inexpensive alternatives to
ethnic conflicts; they are necessary to achieve equality among
different ethnic groups; and economic disparities constitute the
underlying causes of ethnic conflict.1 28 In Malaysia, for example, the
of goods from the producer to the consumer, without necessarily physically producing
anything themselves."); Bonacich, supra note 27.
124. COHEN, supra note 2, at 83. Trade diasporas constitute
an interrelated net of commercial communities forming a trade network, or
trade diaspora-a term that comes from the Greek word for scattering, as in the
sowing of grain.... Trade communities of merchants living among aliens in
associated networks are to be found on every continent and back through time
to the very beginning of urban life.
Id. at 83-84 (quoting PHILIP D. CURTIN, CROSS-CULTURAL TRADE IN WORLD HISTORY 2-3
(1984)). Diasporic traders were also found in Africa, Anatolia, Mesopotamia, America before
Columbus, Armenia, and China. Id. at 84.
125. Anthony Reid, Entrepreneurial Minorities, Nationalism, and the State, in ESSENTIAL
OUTSIDERS, supra note 120, at 33, 34.
126. Id. at 35.
127. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 8-9,14-25; FRANK H. GOLAY ETAL., UNDERDEVELOPMENT
AND ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 210-11,220-23,251-54 (1969); HOROWITZ,
supra note 3, at 117-18; J.S. MANGAT, A HISTORY OF THE ASIANS IN EAST AFRICA 1-26 (1969);
SOWELL, supra note 120, at 46-47.
128. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 659 ("Beneath preferential policies lies a mind-set that
sees ethnic conflict as the product of economic differences and ethnic harmony as the result
of proportional distribution of all groups at all levels and in all functions of a society.").
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government has adopted a "national affirmative-action program"
and "effectively segregated the economy between the indigenous
majority, known as bumiputras or 'sons of the soil' and non-
bumiputras, primarily ethnic Chinese who dominated the economy
for generations"'29 and the Indians, 3 ° whose presence predated
British colonialism to at least the fifteenth century.13 ' The expan-
sion of commercial activities during British colonialism brought
laborers from southern China to work in tin mines132 and those
from India to work on rubber plantations. 3 An ethnic division of
labor developed, with particular ethnic groups overwhelmingly
represented in certain occupational categories, as "[o]ccupational
segregation ... conspired with residential, cultural, religious,
educational, and language differences to maintain strong ethnic
identities that inevitably limited any deep sense of national
identity." 34 Over time, the success of the Chinese entrepreneurs 3 5
in particular provoked deep-seated resentment from the indigenous
population. 3 '
129. Steve Glain, Malaysian's Grand Social Experiment May Be Next Casualty of Asian
Crisis, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1998, at A15.
130. Sumit Ganguly, Ethnic Policies and Political Quiescence in Malaysia and Singapore,
in GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND ETHNIC RELATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, supra note 40,
at 233.
131. See KS. Jomo, A Specific Idiom of Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia, in
ESSENTIAL OUTSIDERS, supra note 120, at 237-38.
132. SOWELL, supra note 120, at 36-37; Ganguly, supra note 130, at 238; Jomo, supra note
131, at 238-39.
133. Ganguly, supra note 130, at 239; Jomo, supra note 131, at 238-39.
134. Jomo, supra note 131, at 240. "Ethnic identities were strengthened and shaped by
colonial policies toward the various communities, and the identities were in turn reinforced
by ethnic mobilizations." Id.; see also Ganguly, supra note 130, at 239-40 (discussing the
impact of British colonial education policies).
135. See SOWELL, supra note 120, at 83 ("The Chinese in colonial Malaya often began as
unskilled laborers on the rubber plantations or in the tin mines. The savings from their
earnings on such jobs later enabled them to begin small, precarious businesses which
eventually prospered.").
136. SOWELL, supra note 122, at 182. It is not accurate to point to British preferences for
the Chinese as an explanation for indigenous resentment against the Chinese. According to
Professor Sowell, the Chinese "in fact had fewer rights and less government-provided
education available than did the Malays." SOWELL, supra note 120, at 153; see also Ganguly,
supra note 130, at 240-41 (noting that the Chinese and Indians, viewed by the British as
transient, "received an even less beneficent dispensation from the British" who "felt little
obligation to educate the members of these communities for professions other than those in
which they were engaged").
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At independence in 1957, the Malay Constitution, a product of
the "grand bargain" with the British who had proposed citizenship
for the Chinese and Indians, accorded citizenship to all residents
born after Independence Day,137 but "also enshrined the special
position of the Malays."' The Malays' claim to legitimacy is based
on assertions of indigenousness, like that of other groups, such as
the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, the Assamese in India, the Fijians in
Fiji, the Muslims of Southern Thailand, the Kannadigas of
Karnataka state in India, and the Bakonjo and Baamba of Western
Uganda."19
The Malay Constitution authorizes reservations in public service,
education, land, and business permits for the Malays, because of
their status as Bumiputras' 40 and in order to compensate for the
economic backwardness of the Malays vis-a-vis the Chinese."'
The basis for the Malays' claim for preferences changed over time,
so that by the late 1980s, with the growing Malay majority, due
to higher fertility and lower emigration rates, preferences were
based on the need to achieve "an equivalent share of the country's
economic wealth."" 2 Although "special rights" for Malays were
incorporated into the 1957 Constitution, they were seen by
many Malays as feeble and inadequate to correct economic in-
equality. 4 3 The government created a special Malay Bank, the
Bank Bumiputra, to break Chinese control of the banking industry,
and the Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority, to offset the
power of rural middlemen,"" but the Chinese continued to exercise
dominance in different sectors, such as retail business,"' capital
137. Independence Day was August 31, 1957. Ganguly, supra note 130, at 246.
138. Id. at 245-46; see MALAY. CONST. art. 89 (reserving Malay land rights); id. art. 153
(safeguarding special positions for Malays).
139. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 202. In fact, however, the Malays are not quite
indigenous. The Orang Asli are the aboriginals who arrived before the Malays. Id. at 203.
140. HOROwITz, supra note 3, at 654; Ganguly, supra note 130, at 246.
141. Ganguly, supra note 130, at 246; Jomo, supra note 131, at 241.
142. Jomo, supra note 131, at 242. The Malays' status as the majority was assured as well
when Singapore, where ethnic Chinese constituted the majority, was ousted from the
Malaysian federation on August 9, 1965. Ganguly, supra note 130, at 251.
143. Gordon P. Means, "Special Rights' as a Strategy for Development: The Case of
Malaysia, 5 COMP. POL. 29, 29-61 (1972).
144. Ganguly, supra note 130, at 251.
145. The Chinese own more than four-fifths of all retail businesses in Malaysia. SOWELL,
supra note 1, at 46.
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investment, 4" and education.'47 The average household income of
the Chinese remained approximately twice that of the Malay. 14 8
The National Operations Council (NOC), formed to deal with the
aftermath of an ethnic riot in 1969,' determined that the roots
of the violence were to be found in the continuing economic back-
wardness of the Malays. 5 ° An ambitious New Economic Policy
(NEP) was announced in 1971s' with two objectives to be achieved
over a twenty-year period--first, "to reduce and eventually
eradicate poverty," and second, to "accelerat[e] the process of re-
structuring Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance, so as
to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with
economic function."" 2 To achieve the second objective, employment
had to be restructured by sector to eliminate the ethnic division of
labor; ownership of wealth also had to be altered, so that Malays,
who owned less than 1.5% of capital assets at the time, 53 were
targeted by the government to increase its holdings to 30% of
corporate sector assets by 1990, with the percentage owned by
foreigners decreasing from 65 to 30%. 15
146. Foreigners owned three-fifths of the total corporate equity capital investment in
Malaysia in 1970, and the Chinese owned approximately three-fifths of the remaining
domestically owned investment. Id.
147. If determined on the basis of examination results alone, Malays constituted only
twenty percent of those admitted, with the Chinese filling up the remaining eighty percent.
The Chinese also received a disproportionate share of science and engineering degrees.
During the 1960s, the Chinese received 1488 Bachelor of Science degrees and 408 Bachelor
of Engineering degrees, and the Malays 69 and 4, respectively. Id. at 46-47.
148. See DONALD R. SNODGRASS, INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN MALAYSIA
82(1980).
149. Donald R. Snodgrass, Successful Economic Development in a Multi-Ethnic Society:
The Malaysian Case 6 (1995), at http://www.hiid.harvard.edu/pub/pdfs/503.pdf. One of the
primary causes of the violence was resentment over Chinese support for opposition political
parties, such as the new DAP, that favored dismantling of preferential policies. Ganguly,
supra note 130, at 253-57. Riots againstthe Chinese resulted in approximately 800 killed and
6000 homeless. Id. at 254.
150. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 659; Ganguly, supra note 130, at 255-56.
151. As it was due to expire, the NEP was replaced by the National Development Plan
(NDP) in 1990. Although the NDP is not significantly different from the NEP, it strategically
emphasized privatization, with the benefits of privatization to be mainly distributed to the
Malays. Ganguly, supra note 130, at 257 n.70.
152. GOVERNMENT OF MALYAYSIA, SECOND MALAYSIA PLAN 1971-1975, at 1 (1971)
[hereinafter SECOND MALAYSIA PLAN].
153. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 667; Ganguly, supra note 130, at 261.
154. SECONDMALAYSIA PLAN, supra note 152, at 40-42; see Snodgrass, supra note 149, at 7.
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Under a mandatory corporate restructuring scheme, Malaysian
Chinese companies had to set aside 30% of their equity for Malays
-"on financial terms very generous to the new shareholders"'55 and
usually with no choice about the identity of the Malay recipient of
the set-aside.' 5 This policy of compulsory corporate restructuring,
part of the overall economic "affirmative action" to favor the
Malays, meant that any company that sought permission to expand
or to apply for import or export licenses must sell 30% of its existing
shares to Bumiputra-controlled entities or in the alternative,
issue new Bumiputra shares to ensure a 30% Bumiputra share
ownership.'57 Additionally, "[clompanies seeking a listing on the
local stock exchange are required to have a bumiputra shareholding
of at least 3 0 %. 158
To accomplish the creation of a new business class, the govern-
ment established several new government agencies. The National
Corporation, or Pernas, was created to buy assets to be held in trust
to distribute to Malays,'59 and the Urban Development Authority
was created to grant Malays a share in development in cities. 0 In
addition, the Ministry of Works and Public Utilities, the primary
contractor for government construction, must reserve at least 30%
of its contracts for Malay firms, defined as those with at least 51%
155. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 667.
156. JAMES V. JESUDASON, ETHNICITY AND THE ECONOMY: THE STATE, CHINESE BUSINESS,
AND MULTINATIONALS IN MALAYSIA 137, 141 (1989).
157. Donald L. Horowitz, Cause and Consequence in Public Policy Theory: Ethnic Policy
and System Transformation in Malaysia, 22 POLY SCI. 249,266-68 (1989).
158. CHRISTOPHER ADAM ET AL., ADJUSTING PRIVATIZATION: CASE STUDIES FROM
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 228 (1992); see also Glain, supra note 129.
159. Ganguly, supra note 130, at 261 (discussing government investment in public
corporations operated and managed by Malays and government investment schemes to
attract private Malay investment to such enterprises); Jomo, supra note 131, at 242; see also
JESUDASON, supra note 156, at 72 (discussing the role of the state in increasing "the economic
capacity of the Malay group"). But there are problems associated with this plan. First, lack
of capital among Malays may result in only a few Malays being able to purchase the shares,
resulting in a concentration of wealth among the Malays. Second, if the shares are
distributed at a price below market, the likelihood that they will be quickly resold to non-
Malays for capital gains is high. Consequently, "[s]ome state enterprises have transferred
their holdings to a national equity corporation, which sells shares to individual Malays in a
closely controlled national unit trust." HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 668-69; see also FONG C.
ONN, THE MALAYSIAN ECONOMIC CHALLENGE IN THE 1990S: TRANSFORMATION FOR GROWTH
79 (1989) (describing various government agencies created to bolster economic participation
of Bumiputras).
160. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 667.
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Malay ownership.'61 Government-run banks, such as the Bank
Bumiputra, and other newly created development banks, increased
their lending to the Malay community, so that lending to Malays,
which was at 4% in 1968, increased to 20.6% in 1980 and 28% in
1985.162
The results have been mixed. While loans have increased to
Malays, so have default rates. For example, the government
organization created to provide credit to small businesses, the
Council of Trust for the Indigenous People, reported that of the
55,000 loans made to Malay businesses, only 6000 had been
repaid.163 The Bumiputra share of corporate stock at par values, for
example, have also increased, from 1.5 to 15.6% between 1969 and
1982, to 19.3% in 1990 and 20.6% in 1995.164 At the same time,
however, to bypass the requirement that Malays and Malay
businesses be preferred, Malay front men, through "Ali Baba"
schemes, have been used in license application, land conveyance,
share issuance, and contract bids, although their primary involve-
ment in the project is limited to the collection of a fee in exchange
for the use of their name.6 5 Indeed, the ethnic Chinese have found
ways to adjust and at times even benefit from such ethnically
targeted restructuring.1
66
Preferential policies in areas other than corporate restructuring,
such as educational admissions and employment quotas, have had
161. Ganguly, supra note 130, at 261-62.
162. Id. at 262.
163. Id.; SOWELL, supra note 120, at 110 (noting that the incidence of default is high for
government loans made to indigenous Malays). Even a government bank created to lend to
Malays in fact extended loans primarily to the Chinese, Indians, and foreigners. Id. Many
of the loans extended by MARAs, the Indigenous People's Trust, are also in default, as are
many of the Urban Development Authority's rents. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 668; Glain,
supra note 129 ("Nonperforming loans are estimated by private economists at about 20% of
total assets, well above the government's official 8.7% figure.").
164. Jomo, supra note 131, at 244.
165. HORoWITZ, supra note 3, at 666; SOWELL, supra note 120, at 52 (explaining Ali Baba
schemes as Ali standing for the Bumiputra front man and Baba the Chinese businessman).
166. For example, because the new Malay shareholders in Chinese firms are often
politically influential, the firms have benefitted from their political connections. Similarly,
participating in joint ventures with the Urban Development Authority and Pernas have
helped Chinese firms obtain approval for projects they might not otherwise have received.
HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 667-68; see also Jomo, supra note 131, at 250 (hinting at a
Chinese-Malay collaboration).
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a significant impact. 67 Following the 1969 riots, the legislature
amended the Malaysian Constitution to allow government control
over university admission, resulting in an increase of 39.7%, to
52.7% Malay enrollment in degree-level courses from 1970 to
1973.16 To benefit Malays, English-language schools were con-
verted into Malay-language schools, and to increase the number of
Malays in higher education, different standards for Malays and
non-Malays were set. 69 Educational preferential policies have
indeed boosted the number of Malays in secondary and graduate
schools,'170 but they have also resulted in a sharp increase in the
number of Chinese students who departed for universities in the
West. 171
As the NEP extended preferences in employment, once confined
to the public sector, to the private sector as well, the government
established quotas for Malay employment in commercial and
industrial firms. 172 Foreign corporations too must comply with such
regulations because investment in Malaysia was conditioned on the
creation of quotas for Malays. 71
Again, although these preferential policies were intended to be
temporary, like those of India, they have "become more and more
permanent." 174 As "preferences for Malays were made a permanent
part of the country's constitution ... [, they] did not merely persist;
they grew stronger in higher education and spread to other sectors
of the society."175 The Malaysian policy, however, had to be modified
when the realities of an economic crisis hit the country in 1998 and
forced it "to sacrifice programs and policies once considered
unassailable."176 Faced with a heavy debt burden, the government
167. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 660.
168. Id.
169. Ganguly, supra note 130, at 257-58; see also HOROWITZ,supra note 3, at 662 (showing
that for the Lower Certificate of Education examination for admission to technical high
schools, 91.7% of non-Malays (Chinese and Indians) scored 3.4 or better in math compared
to 37.1% of Malay students).
170. Ganguly, supra note 130, at 260.
171. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 661; SOWELL, supra note 1, at 50.
172. Ganguly, supra note 130, at 260.
173. Id.
174. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 678.
175. SOWELL, supra note 1, at 51.
176. Joseph Kahn, Ethnic Chinese in Malaysia Can Buy Big Equity Stakes, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 1998, at D4.
1556
BEYOND THE PALE
eased restrictions on Chinese equity ownership and allowed the
ethnic Chinese to acquire big stakes in companies with government
ties. 177 In fact, the government announced in the midst of the crisis
that "it may repeal the spirit, if not the letter, of affirmative action
by permitting nonbumiputra companies to acquire a substantial or
a controlling interest in bumiputra companies." 78
2. Nigeria
Once deemed "Africa's bastion of democracy and stability,
" 179
Nigeria has been marred by ethnic conflicts. i 0 Although Nigeria
has no national ethnic majority, the Muslim Hausa-Fulanis of
the north are the largest group, making up approximately thirty
percent of the population, with the Yoruba of the southwest and the
Ibo of the southeast being the next largest.' 8' The Hausas were
bound by a common religion, Islam."8 2 The Yorubas, who shared a
common ancestry, prided themselves on their successful resistance
to Fulani attempts at conquest, and were organized by chiefdoms."'
The Ibos were made up of more than 200 subgroups of culturally
and linguistically similar communities. 84 These were all disparate
African groups who lived in the West African regions that the
British consolidated into the colony of Nigeria.
The Muslim groups that controlled the North, the Hausa-Fulanis,
had swept south to conquer and convert local people 8 ' until the
177. Id.
178. Glain, supra note 129.
179. ARTHUR A. NWANKWO & SAMUEL U. IFEJIKA, BIAFRA: THE MAKING OF A NATION 125
(1970).
180. See generally NNOLI OKWUDIBA, ETHNIC POLITICS IN NIGERIA (1978) (analyzing ethnic
tension in Nigeria and the link between ethnicity and class systems).
181. SOWELL, supra note 1, at 69.
182. Islam was adopted at the beginning of the nineteenth century, during the holy war
of 1804, when the Muslim Fulanis conquered the Hausa Kingdom. JAMES COLEMAN, NIGERIA:
BACKGROUND TO NATIONALISM 39 (1958). The Muslim Fulanis were led by Usman Dan Fodio,
who used the military machine at his disposal and Islam to establish a centralized
administrative structure. The Emirs governed different parts of northern Nigeria. See E.D.
MOREL, NIGERIA: ITS PEOPLE AND PROBLEMS 99-102 (1968).
183. See generally A. AKINOYE, REVOLUTION AND POWER POLITICS IN YORUBA LAND 1940-
1983, at 5-6 (1971); ROBERT SMITH, KINGDOM OF THE YORUBAS (3d ed. 1988).
184. NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY xvi (Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1992).
185. Gwendolyn Mikell, Speech,Ethnic Particularism and the Creation ofState Legitimacy
in West Africa, 4 TULSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 99, 105-06 (1996).
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arrival of the British halted their conquest.'8" Under British rule,
the North and South were treated as two separate protectorates,
each with different administrative apparatuses, with indirect rule
in the North and direct rule in the South.'87 Because the British
ruled the North only indirectly through the Muslim Emirs, the
North remained under Muslim control while the southern regions
of the colony were subject to the influence of Christian mis-
sionaries. 8 8 During British rule, many southern Yorubas became
civil servants in the state bureaucracy, and the Ibo Christians
became merchants. 89 The northern Hausa-Fulanis, contained
within the separate Muslim community of the North, became
increasingly marginalized. 90
Consequently, institutions established by the British, such as
schools and hospitals, were overwhelmingly located in the South. 9 '
There were proportionately few children in primary or secondary
schools'92 and few adults in universities in the North.19 After
independence in 1960, seventy-five percent of the army's riflemen
were from the Hausa-Fulani region, and by 1965, half of the officer
corps were of the Ibo group, as Ibos had the education needed to
fill such positions.' 9 ' Even in the North itself, there was a "'near-
monopoly by Ibos of clerical and semi-skilled jobs in the postal
service, banks, and railway.'""'95 Southerners, primarily Ibos, also
dominated the private sector in the North, as merchants, traders,
186. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 30 n.87.
187. COLEMAN, supra note 182, at 54-56.
188. SOWELL, supra note 1, at 70-71.
189. Mikell, supra note 185, at 106-07.
190. Id.
191. SOWELL, supra note 1, at 71-72. By 1950, for example, among the 160 physicians in
Nigeria, seventy-six were Yorubas, forty-nine were Ibos, and only one was Hausa-Fulani,
although the latter was the largest group in Nigeria.
192. Id. at 72. As of 1926, there were only 5210 children from the North among the
138,249 Nigerian children in primary school; among the secondary school students, none
were in the North.
193. OKWUDIBA, supra note 180, at 117-18, 189. As late as 1951, of the sixteen million
people in the North, there was only one person with a full university degree, and almost all
Nigerian students in colleges and universities overseas were southern Nigerians. Id. at 117-
18.
194. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 448, 451.
195. SOWELL, supra note 1, at 71 (quoting ROBERT MELSON & HOWARD WOLPE, NIGERIA:
MODERNIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF COMMUNALISM 127 (1971)).
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factory workers, and artisans.196 The North and the Hausa-Fulanis
thus were politically and demographically dominant, but econom-
ically and educationally far behind the South and the southern
ethnic groups such as the Ibo and the Yoruba.
At the time of independence, northern political leaders pushed
for a full-blown campaign to "Nigerianize" the country, which in
reality, became a "Northernization" policy. 97 Northern Nigerians
feared that "in a self-governing Nigeria the north would in effect be
a backward protectorate governed by southerners.... [Tihe threat of
southern domination, fancied or real, was the major stimulant in
the northern awakening."19 In the First Nigerian Republic, the
Public Service Commission of the Northern Region declared in 1957
that "'[it is the policy of the Regional Government to Northernise
the Public Service: if a qualified Northerner is available, he is
given priority in recruitment; if no qualified Northerner is avail-
able, an Expatriate may be recruited or a non-Northerner on
contract terms."" 99 Regional quotas were also used to recruit the
officers corps of the army and to give out scholarships in higher
education.20 0 The policy meant in practice that European ex-
patriates were preferred over southerners in the service of the
northern government.2 ' Indeed, "this fits a more general inter-
national pattern of modestly successful middleman minorities being
hated more virulently than genuinely privileged nobility or multi-
n202
millionaires.
"Northernization" has yielded dramatic results. In 1959, only
one senior civil servant in eight in the North was a Northerner,
but by 1965, Northerners outnumbered European expatriates and
Southerners combined.03 Preferences also spread to the federal
196. Id.
197. Id. at 73.
198. COLEMAN, supra note 182, at 188.
199. SOWELL, supra note 1, at 73 (quoting THE NIGERIAN POLITICAL SCENE 108 (Robert 0.
Tilman & Taylor Cole eds., 1962)); see also HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 655. The objective of
the program, which was vigorously supported by northern businessmen, was to sever
northern dependence on southern civil servants and merchants by granting preferences in
"employment, contracts, scholarships, land, and loans to Northerners." Id. at 116.
200. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 655.
201. SOWELL, supra note 1, at 73.
202. Id. at 74.
203. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 655.
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government, so that Northerners were favored in appointments
and promotions as well as in admission to federal schools and
universities.0 4 In 1966, when Ibo military officers overthrew the
government and announced the adoption of national norms for all
applicants without regard to ethnicity, they were in turn over-
thrown by northern Muslim military officers.20' These events were
followed by the systematic massacres of Ibos in the North, the
expulsion of Ibos from the region and their exodus to the South,
followed by efforts to secede from Nigeria through the declaration
of the independent nation of Biafra.2'
The ensuing civil war, in which one million people died, did result
in the modification of preferential policies in Nigeria. 7 The
military regime repealed state policies that granted preferences
in employment to "indigenes of a state."20 8 Nonetheless, the
constitution of the Second Republic provided generally that public-
sector positions should "'reflect the federal character of the
country'" so that "'there shall be no predominance of persons from
a few States or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups'" in
central government agencies.20 9 In other words, although no group
is now singled out and systematically excluded, the policy is
designed to "give something to every group or region, to have
federal appointments and university admissions, for example,
reflect 'the federal character' of Nigeria."
210
II. PREFERENCES FOR "ONE'S OWN"
In contrast to Part I, which examined government ethnic pref-
erences, this Part examines the sort of underlying in-group
preferences that may explain the existence of different types of
ethnic economic activities, that is, economic activities concentrated
along ethnic lines. An international perspective that emphasizes
comparative, multi-country analysis will show that throughout
204. Id.
205. SOWELL, supra note 1, at 75.
206. Id.
207. HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 655.
208. Id.
209. Id. (quoting NIG. CONST., §§ 14(3), 157(5)).
210. SOWELL, supra note 1, at 76.
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history, various groups "have become prominent or predominant in
particular occupations in countries all over the planet,"211 that is,
established ethnic economies.1 2
Some groups have also become predominant in certain economic
niches.213 For example, although the dominance of Jews in New
York's garment industry might be explained by pointing to the
influx of Jewish immigrants into the city during that period of U.S.
history, an international perspective will reveal that
Jews have been prominent, if not predominant, in the apparel
industry over a period longer than the entire history of the
United States, and in countries ranging from medieval Spain to
modern Australia, from the Ottoman Empire to the Russian
Empire, as well as in Argentina, Brazil, Germany, and Chile.214
Ethnic group predominance in certain economic sectors-for
example, the concentration of Koreans in particular retail
businesses in the United States, such as liquor and wig stores
-might be due to factors found in the host country.215 Or perhaps
such predominance "reflects their traditional positions in the
occupational hierarchies of their homeland prior to migration,"
which explains why "[m]igrants from 'commercial cultures' ... like
211. SOWELL, supra note 120, at 2.
212. See supra note 7.
213. See supra text accompanying note 11. Group differences, "'disparities,'" or
"'imbalances,'" SOWELL, supra note 120, at 3, have been the norm despite claims that "there
will be less ethnic conflict if all groups are proportionately represented at all levels in all
sectors of the economy. One reason the truth of this proposition remains elusive is that few,
if any, societies have ever approximated this description." HOROWITZ, supra note 3, at 677.
The fact is that many ethnic groups, in countries all over the world, have produced,
recreated, and perpetuated certain [glroup occupational patterns," or as some have charged,
"taken over," "monopolized," or acquired a "stranglehold" in certain sectors, even under free
market conditions. SOWELL, supra note 120, at 3; see also id. at 17-18; Bonacich, supra note
27, at 590. To this extent, I agree with the claim that increased marketization may enhance
the economic dominance of certain ethnic minorities and the entrenchment of certain ethnic
economies, although my proposal to "solve" this problem would differ from Chua's. See supra
note 38; cf Chua, supra note 28, at 29-33. There are, of course, other explanations for this
pattern-the imposition and assignment of certain niches to certain ethnic groups on the
basis of societal stereotypes. See SOWELL, supra note 120, at 11-12.
214. SOWELL, supra note 120, at 2.
215. See infra notes 286 and 291; see also Nancy Rivera Brooks, The Trouble with Big
Wigs, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1988, pt. 4 (Financial Desk), at 1; Jen McCaffery, Rapunzel's
Offspring Are Cashing In, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000, § 14 (City Weekly Desk), at 4.
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the Parsis, the Banyas, the money lending Bhatias, the Memons,
the Bohras, the Khoj as-all Gujarati groups-long dominated trade
and commerce in West India and later in East Africa as well."216
Similar observations may be made about Chinese retailers, India's
Gujarati merchants, German farmers, Jewish middlemen, and
Lebanese peddlers in numerous diverse countries.217
Besides the establishment of occupational niches, other group
patterns span across countries: the clustering of newcomers 21s
and, consequently, the creation of ethnic economies and ethnic
enclaves.219 In all three instances (ethnic economies generally,
ethnic enclaves, and ethnic niches), the ethnic group generally
exhibits certain basic characteristics, such as a tendency towards
"clannishness;"220 adherence to group norms and hence the main-
tenance of group boundaries separating insiders from outsiders,
allowing the group to leverage its reserve of social capital 221 into
economic capital for group members.222 Again, examples of such
insular proclivities abound among widely varying ethnic groups in
different countries: the Hasidic Jews in New York City's jewelry
industry, Lebanese traders in the interiors of Sierra Leone, the
Chinese across Southeast Asia, the Indians in Uganda, the ethnic
Marwari in India's state of Assam, the ethnic Chettyars from India
in rural Burma, and more recently, the Koreans and Indians in the
United States,223 the Turks in the garment industry of Paris and
216. Ivan Light et al., Migration Networks and Immigrant Entrepreneurship, in
IMMIGRATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: CULTURE, CAPITAL, AND ETHNIC NETWORKS 25, 40
(Ivan Light & Parminder Bhachu eds., 1993) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP].
217. SOWELL, supra note 120, at 2, 11, 12, 47; see also COHEN, supra note 2, at 170.
218. SOWELL, supra note 120, at 39.
219. See supra note 6.
220. SOWELL, supra note 120, at 49.
221. The concept of social capital has long been studied by sociologists, and involves an
inquiry into a group's social and cultural characteristics and how these characteristics
influence the group's economic performance. See, e.g., James S. Coleman, Social Capital in
the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. SOC. S95, S97-101 (Supp. 1988); infra notes 382,
383, 406-20 and accompanying text.
222. SOWELL, supra note 120, at 49-55.
223. Id. at 50-52. For a discussion of the economic role played by the ethnic Marwaris in
Assam, see SOWELL, supra note 1, at 54-59.
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Berlin,224 the Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians in retail com-
merce in France, and so on.225
It is important to note, as the discussion above reveals, that this
pattern is not limited to developing countries only, where the
absence of formal institutions, the rule of law, a credible judiciary,
and competitive markets, it is often assumed, explain the existence
of ethnic economies and ethnic networks. 226 Even in advanced,
industrialized economies like the United States, there are parallel
pockets of economic activities that lie outside the scope of formal
laws 227 as well as activities within ethnic economies that rely more
on common ethnicity than on the universal law of contract. The
tendency of certain minority groups to be dominant in certain
economic activities prevails in both developing and developed
countries.2
28
Thus, to the extent that minority ethnic economic dominance is
not due merely to legal or institutional underdevelopment, but
may be correlated to some other factors, such as the prevalence
and resilience of informal, personalized exchanges and in-group
preferences, the relevant policy prescriptions would need to expand
beyond the standard proposal for legal and institutional reform.
Indeed, the law and development movement would need to confront
directly whether minority ethnic economies are a positive or
negative phenomenon and determine what the response of the legal
system should be. As I discussed above, some have been concerned
that there is undue "overrepresentation" of certain minority groups
in certain entrepreneurial activities and consequently disparities in
wealth among ethnic groups, especially in developing countries,
224. Mirjana Morokvasic, Immigrants in Garment Production in Paris and in Berlin, in
IMMIGRATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 216, at 75, 76-82.
225. Gildas Simon, Immigrant Entrepreneurs in France, in IMMIGRATION AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 216, at 125, 132-34.
226. Davis et al., supra note 3, at 332 (describing the claim by some that "low quality
institutions play a large role in explaining reliance on truncated intra-ethnic group
contracting networks ... "); see also DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 67 (1990) (demonstrating that ethnic occupational
patterns or segregation, and the entrenchment of ethnic minorities in certain
entrepreneurial activities, are causally related to institutional underdevelopment).
227. In 1994, the Yale Law Journal sponsored a symposium issue on the informal
economy. Symposium, The Informal Economy, 103 YALE L.J. 2119 (1994).
228. Cf Davis et al., supra note 3, at 350 (discussing disparities in various ethnic groups'
economic performance).
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resulting in an exacerbation of ethnic conflicts. The proposed
solution is governmental "affirmative action" policies, through eth-
nically targeted corrective measures aimed at favoring economically
weak ethnic majorities.229 Others have argued the opposite, that
"disproportionate representation of minorities in entrepreneurial
activities is not an appropriate index of those disparities."2 °
However, neither has studied how ethnic economies work, whether
in economically developing or developed countries, and neither has
confronted head-on the role of law in facilitating, accommodating or
breaking up private, intra-group preferences that underlie ethnic
economies.
A. The Ethnic Economy Generally
1. Introduction
Ethnic economies, like traditional capitalism, are based on
personal relationships or ethnic ties. For Max Weber, certain
groups, such as Jews and the outcaste, are ethnically insular and
segregated from the majority by their observance of "taboos, [and]
hereditary religious obligations in the conduct of life,"23 ' and
therefore, not sufficiently rational or free of communal sentiments
to engage in bourgeois capitalism. Instead, according to Weber,
"Jewish capitalism was speculative pariah-capitalism, while the
Puritan was bourgeois organization of labour."23 2 The pariah status
of Jews also instilled in them a "dual ethic," that is, the adoption of
one set of ethics for dealing with other Jews and a separate set for
229. See, e.g., Chua, supra note 3, at 347-62; Chua, supra note 28, at 62-63 (arguing that
market development will create distributional conflicts along ethnic lines and should thus
be tempered by government restrictions on market activities ofeconomically dominant ethnic
minorities); see also Albert 0. Hirschman, The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in
the Course of Economic Development, 87 Q. J. ECON. 544, 544-65 (1973) (arguing generally
along the same line).
230. Davis et al., supra note 3, at 360 (emphasis added). The remedy is not ethnic
targeting, but public investment in education, health care, and other social and legal
institutions "that are likely to broaden the economic opportunity set for most members of the
population, without pre-judging the kinds of economic activities the population or sub-groups
should be encouraged or induced to pursue." Id.
231. MAX WEBER, THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 109 (E. Fischoff trans., 1963).
232. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 245 (Talcott
Parsons trans., 1930).
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dealing with non-Jews-a sharp contrast to modern capitalism,
which requires rational treatment of others according to objective
standards rather than irrational attachment to or preference for
one's own.2 3 For Weber, pariah capitalism was inferior to the
rationality of modern capitalism and would be replaced by the
latter.
Other theorists, following the trajectory set by Weber, expanded
on Weber's theory with a wealth of literature on middleman
minorities and trade diasporas. 234 Like pariah minorities, middle-
man minorities and trade diasporas are marginal peoples with
"caste-like attributes"2 35 and shared loyalties 23 16 who continue the
traditions developed in precapitalist societies to engage in trade and
commerce. As outsiders, diasporic traders develop an "aptitude for
economic specialization" because the diaspora's "psychological self-
isolation would prove impossible if those who practised it did not,
at the same time, develop on the economic plane a special efficiency
in the exploitation of such economic opportunities as had been left
open to them."237 Similarly, middleman minorities are viewed as
uncomfortably "lodged between ... any two ethnic groups that stand
in a classlike relation of superordination and subordination. The
dominant elite of the dominant group uses the middleman minority
to foster economic development, but turns it into a scapegoat when
things go wrong.
231
233. MAXWEBER, ECONOMYAND SOCIETY 614 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968).
Jews thus are associated with the primitive, ethnic capitalism of pariah minorities; similar
charges have been directed at the Chinese. Allen J. Chun, Pariah Capitalism and the
Overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia: Problems in the Definition of the Problem, 12 ETHNIC &
RACIAL STUDS. 233,233-56 (1989); Gary Hamilton, Pariah Capitalism: A Paradox of Power
and Dependence, 2 ETHNIC GROUPS 1, 1-15 (1978).
234. See supra note 19.
235. COHEN, supra note 2, at 101.
236. For members of diasporas,
[tihe powerful pull of loyalty exerted by the imagined nation demonstrates that,
even in the age of science, a loyalty system based on romantic myths of shared
history and kinship has a capacity to endure that may be the envy of a state
with the most liberal civil society and patriotic citizenry.
Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and
Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 374 (1996).
237. COHEN, supra note 2, at 103.
238. Id.
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The sociology of middleman minorities, however, has tended to
emphasize the role of the middleman in developing economies,29
whose presence would predictably no longer be needed once
modernization and appropriate institutional reforms were adopted.
The literature's emphasis on the Third World context also implies
that ethnic capitalism does not exist iii developed economies,
although many studies have shown otherwise. Similarly, the focus
in middleman minority scholarship on historic trading peoples
and sojourning minorities such as Jews, Chinese, Armenians and
Lebanese, makes the theory not wholly applicable to African
Americans in the United States,24 ° or more recent merchant groups,
such as the Koreans and Cubans who have had no trading tradition.
In recent years, a new literature that emphasizes the sociology of
ethnic entrepreneurship and the ethnic economy has flourished,
focusing on the study of different types of ethnic economies, how
they emerge, and their social capital foundation. An ethnic econ-
omy is a general concept used to include any ethnic group's self-
employed, its employers, coethnic employees, if any, and their
unpaid family workers.24 ' An ethnic economy may be created by
immigrant entrepreneurship or ethnic entrepreneurship, that is,
"ethnic minority specialization in self-employment without ...
imposing the requirement of foreign-born origin."2
42
Ethnic entrepreneurship may be viewed as "a set of connections
and regular patterns of interaction among people sharing com-
mon national background or migration experiences. 24 ' The ethnic
239. LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 17, at 17-20.
240. In the United States, early proponents of an ethnic market as a solution to
segregation and disenfranchisement included Booker T. Washington, who emphasized
economic independence and stability as an avenue for black progress. For a discussion of
Washington's emphasis on economic empowerment as compared to W.E.B. DuBois'
alternative strategy of civil rights, see Lateef Mtima, African-American Economic
Empowerment Strategies for the New Millenium-Revisiting the Washington-Du Bois
Dialetic, 42 How. L.J. 391 (1999). "No race that has anything to contribute to the markets of
the world is long in any degree ostracized." Booker T. Washington, The Atlanta Exposition
Address, 1895, in JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ISIDORE STARR, THE NEGRO IN TWENTIETH
CENTURY AMERICA: A READER ON THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 88 (1967). Washington
advocated the development of an ethnic economy for blacks. BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, THE
NEGRO IN BUSINESS 14-15 (Afro-Am Press 1969) (1907); see also supra notes 8, 19, 32, 33;
infra notes 245, 246, 328, 331-38.
241. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 9.
242. LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 17, at 18.
243. ROGER WALDINGER ET AL., ETHNIC ENTREPRENEURS: IMMIGRANT BUSINESS IN
[Vol. 44:15211566
20031 BEYOND THE PALE 1567
economy is thus a product created by ethnic minorities themselves,
as distinct from the jobs generated by the mainstream labor
market, and does not include coethnics who work for wages in the
general economy.244 In cases where an ethnic group is an outcast
or a pariah, its ethnic economy becomes all the more important
to the group's economic survival. This was the case, for example,
of Japanese Americans during World War II and free blacks in
the South.245 After the U.S. Civil War, for example, as increased
segregation in southern cities severed ties that had once linked
whites to black businesses, blacks made a concerted effort to
develop what W.E.B. Du Bois called the group economy---"'a co-
operative arrangement of industries and services within the Negro
group such that the group tends to be a closed economic circle
largely independent of the surrounding white world.'"246
In the same way that ethnic economies contributed to the
economic progress of immigrant and minority groups in early U.S.
history,247 the creation of ethnic economies is particularly crucial for
marginal groups now because of recent economic trends. There is
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 33 (1990).
244. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 19.
245. In 1941, the year Pearl Harbor was attacked, 56.2% of Japanese-American men and
44.4% of the women worked in the Japanese ethnic economy, although those numbers are
considered low because among those Japanese listed as wage workers, some had Japanese-
American employers and could have been classified as ethnic economy employees. LIGHT &
GOLD, supra note 7, at 28-29; see also Butler, supra note 32, at 203-04 (describing the
Japanese-American ethnic economy as one steeped in self-help and ethnic solidarity).
Even relatively small ethnic economies contribute to coethnic employment in significant
ways. For African Americans, nearly one million workers worked in the black American
ethnic economy in 1992. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 69. If that ethnic economy were to
disappear, one would have to wonder whether those workers would find jobs in the general
labor market or would become unemployed. Id.; see also Butler, supra note 32, at 204-05
(discussing how African Americans before the Civil War in particular also had a vibrant self-
help tradition that emphasized economic development and independence).
Before the abolition of slavery in the United States, small bases of businesses owned by
free blacks existed, especially in southern cities, such as New Orleans, where black
entrepreneurs had property and businesses valued at more than $9 million. WALDINGER ET
AL., supra note 243, at 58-59.
246. WALDINGER ET AL., supra note 243, at 59 (quoting W.E.B. DU BOIS, ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AMONG NEGRO AMERICANS 179 (1907)); see also W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF
BLACK FOLK 43 (Bedford Books 1997) (1903) (encouraging the Negro people to develop skills
and to strive towards brotherhood).
247. SALO W. BARON ET AL., ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE JEWS 86-89 (1975); BONACICH &
MODELL, supra note 7, at 3-4; IvAN LIGHT, ETHNIC ENTERPRISE IN AMERICA 4-6 (1972).
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evidence that marginal groups with strong ethnic economies may be
more buffered from economic hardship than those without.2 8 With
the economy of the current industrialized countries shifting from
"high-volume" manufacturing to "high-value" information-oriented
and technology-driven services, the mismatch in skills for low-
skilled groups is likely to intensify.249 Ethnic economies will be
necessary for those groups whose skills are in declining demand
from the standpoint of the international economic system be-
cause they will be an important avenue, against the backdrop of
changing economic conditions, for the economic mobility of marginal
groups. 250 Economic data show that small businesses employ
substantial proportions of the population of the United States as
well as Europe, a trend accompanied by the growth of ethnic
entrepreneurship in both regions. 51
The main characteristics that underlie ethnic economies and
their particular subvariants-the ethnic enclave and the ethnic
niche-are described more thoroughly as the Article progresses, and
particularly in Part II.B below. This Part will briefly introduce and
highlight some of the key concepts associated with ethnic economies
generally.
248. The importance of an ethnic economy for coethnics may be illustrated by comparing
the Cuban-Mariel refugee experience with the Haitian refugee experience in Miami. The
Cuban Mariels who fled to the United States in 1979 were for the most part black and
working-class, as were the Haitians. Light et al., supra note 216, at 34. For Haitians, 58.5%
were unemployed, 0.7% were employed in the Haitian ethnic economy, and 40.8% were
employed in the general economy. Id. By contrast, for the Cuban-Mariel refugees, 26.8% were
unemployed, 46.1% were employed in the Cuban ethnic economy, and 27.1% were employed
in the general economy. Id. Thus, although Haitians had a 13.7% higher employment rate
in the general economy than Cuban Mariels, they also had a 31.7% higher unemployment
rate than the Cubans. Id. at 34-35. For the Mariels in Miami, "86 percent lived in Cuban
neighborhoods, 75 percent patronized mostly stores owned by co-nationals, and 82 percent
read exclusively Spanish-language newspapers.'" WALDINGER ET AL., supra note 243, at 77
(quoting Alejandro Portes, The Social Origins of the Cuban Enclave Economy of Miami, 30
Soc. PERSPS. 340, 351 (1987)).
At the same time, however, it is worthwhile to note that the employment numbers might
not be accurate for the Haitians, primarily because "Haitians in Miami operated a very
extensive informal economy that these official statistics did not and could not measure."
Light et al., supra note 216, at 35.
249. WALDINGER ET AL., supra note 243, at 17.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 17-19, 50-51.
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2. Defining Characteristics
In the United States, certain ethnic groups, such as the Israelis
in Los Angeles, the Iranians, and the Koreans, have developed
significant ethnic economies.252 In the United Kingdom, Indians and
Pakistanis have achieved high rates of self-employment, as have
Moroccans, Tunisians, and Chinese in France.
25 3
Depending on market conditions, some ethnic economies serve
the ethnic community's needs (where opportunities for expansion
may be more limited), whereas others "break out" to serve the
greater nonethnic populations (where opportunities tend to be
greater).254 Businesses that cater to their ethnic consumers tend to
be those that deal with ethnic consumer products, such as tropical
goods and "exotic" specialties among Hispanics and Asians in the
United States, Surinamese fruits or vegetables in the tropica shops
in Amsterdam, or ethnic-focused services, such as immigrant-owned
travel agencies, law firms, and realty and accountant businesses
that ethnic clients tend to prefer because of the personalistic ties
that characterize such relationships. 255 The potential for growth for
ethnic economies that are restricted to the ethnic market is likely
to be circumscribed because the ethnic market itself will be smaller
than the general market, and the business conditions will tend
252. For example, data from 1994 show that the Israelis in Los Angeles had a self-
employment rate of 80%; from 1987 to 1988, about 56.7% of Iranians were self-employed,
with another 4.6% of Iranians working for them while 47.5% of Koreans were self-employed,
with another 27.6% working as their employees in 1989. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 29-
30. Most of these firms were small, falling in a category between proprietorships and big
businesses in terms of gross receipts. LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 17, at 165. As early as
the 1980s, 22.5% of Koreans in Los Angeles were self-employed or were.unpaid family
workers-an impressive figure given the fact that only 8.5% of the Los Angeles County labor
force was similarly situated. Id. at 3. For Koreans, 2.2% were unpaid family workers
compared with 0.4% of non-Koreans. Id. at 163.
253. WALDINGER ET AL., supra note 243, at 40.
254. Id. at 21.
255. Id. at 22. In recent years the phone card business has become increasingly
"ethnicized." There is a proliferation of ethnic businesses that specialize in selling prepaid
phone cards to homesick immigrants who use them to place overseas calls to relatives back
home. Generally, Indian-owned companies acting as wholesalers buy minutes from carriers
and"resell them through middlemen to customers in the form of a phone card." Susan Sachs,
Immigrants See Path to Riches in Phone Cards, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, at Al.
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toward overcompetition, often resulting in a high failure rate or low
returns for owners.266
By contrast, those ethnic economies with access to nonethnic
customers often exploit the opportunity by discovering or creating
niches in markets or sectors that are underserved, for example,
those in urban centers where "techniques of mass production or
mass distribution do not prevail."257 Examples include street
peddling in the informal sectors in the United States or Paris and
French towns bordering Italy and Germany, by Senegalese traders
selling toys and art negre; or immigrant retailers who have
carved out a niche in the food retail industry because the urban
corner grocery business tends to be neglected by large suburban
supermarket chains in Paris, London, and cities in the United
States. 58 Where certain industries, for example, the garment
industry, are characterized by stable and unstable demands, larger
firms handle staple products, which allows smaller firms to
respond to the "fluctuating portion of demand"2 9 by leveraging
their high labor-to-capital ratios2 60 and taking advantage of low-
256. WALDINGERETAL.,supra note 243, at 23. Some ethnic economies, such as that of the
Cubans in Miami, might begin in a limited way, serving the ethnic market, and then break
out to serve nonethnic clientele. Id. at 24, 57. Other examples include Chinatowns in cities
such as New York City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. Id. at 68, 107. Black businesses,
which are generally small and concentrated in the personal service sector, such as hair care,
have remained "closed markets" with less growth potential. Id. at 60. For a discussion of the
underdevelopment of black businesses, see id. at 62-65.
257. Id. at 25.
258. Id. at 25, 103; see also Linda J. Wong, The Role ofImmigrant Entrepreneurs in Urban
Economic Development, 7 STAN. L. & POL REV. 75, 76 (1996) (discussing the growth of ethnic
food products). In the predominantly black North Lawndale section of Chicago, for example,
there was, as of 1988, only one supermarket for 60,000 people; North Lawndale has since
attracted Korean and Arab grocers occupying the quintessential "middleman minority"
position. For a discussion of the conflicts between African Americans and Koreans in inner
cities, see Reginald Leamon Robinson, "The Other Against Itself': Deconstructing the Violent
Discourse Between Korean and African Americans, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 15 (1993).
259. WALDINGER ETAL., supra note 243, at 26; Wong, supra note 258, at 77, 80.
260. Reliance by owners on high labor-to-capital ratios for economic viability is one of the
primary defining characteristics ofethnic economies. For example, Korean-owned businesses,
like others in ethnic economies, rely extensively on unpaid family labor and/or coethnics who
work long hours, often for wages lower than the standard wages in the industry. LIGHT &
BONACICH, supra note 17, at 170, 175-76. According to the 1980 U.S. Census, Korean
proprietors worked 16% longer than did non-Koreans and also had approximately 2.7 times
more unpaid family labor than did non-Korean entrepreneurs. Id. at 172-73. About 56% of
Korean firms surveyed reported relying on nuclear or extended kin at work. Id. at 179. For
those who used nonkin employees, the average number of such employees was 3.6. Id. Among
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entry costs."' This means that ethnic economies that have at their
disposal only a small capital base but a large family and kin labor
reservoir have managed to enter the garment trade.262 Chinatown
in Paris, for example, has become a production center for textiles.263
Whether ethnic economies operate in restrictive ethnic markets
or open markets, they are generally characterized by a common
tendency to hire other coethnics, as is the case, for example, with
Koreans2 64 and Cubans in the United States. 265 This tendency of
ethnic entrepreneurs as a whole (especially immigrants) to "employ
coethnics at rates vastly above chance levels"266 and in settings
where their native tongue is predominantly used, is repeated
among many ethnic groups in many countries; such indeed is the
firms that used paid workers, 37.4% said that the workers were all Korean, 20.6% said that
they were "American," 19.6% said that they were Mexican, and the rest reported other
Asians and blacks. Id.
Korean garment contractors, specializing in products that larger firms cannot supply
efficiently, were among the largest employers of Korean workers in Los Angeles, employing
5400 Korean workers in 1979. Id. at 150; see also Pyong Gap Min, Korean Immigrants in Los
Angeles, in IMMIGRATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 216, at 197.
261. WALDINGER ET AL., supra note 243, at 26-27.
262. Id. at 68. Recent Korean immigrants come in "complete family units" and hence have
the advantages of access to a trusted and cheap source of labor. Id. at 72.
263. Id. at 103.
264. Koreans in Los Angeles not only had, even in the early 1980s, a 22.5% self-
employment rate but also employed an additional 40% ofcoethnics; thus, approximately 62%
of Koreans in the county were either self-employed or worked in Korean-owned firms-most
in the service and retail sectors. These sectors are in low income, non-white neighborhoods
neglected by big corporations. ILLSOO KIM, NEW URBAN IMMIGRANTS 258 (1981); LIGHT &
BONACICH, supra note 17, at 3-4, 161, 318-19; SOWELL, supra note 120, at 12; Austin Scott,
Shopping Center Hit by Delay, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1981, pt. II, at 1; Austin Scott, Watts
Shopping for a Supermarket, Can't Find Any Takers, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 1983, pt. II, at 1.
Nationwide, 13.5% of employed Koreans in the United States were self-employed or unpaid
family workers, compared with 7.3% of all employed persons being so situated. LIGHT &
BONACICH, supra note 17, at 7.
265. Along with Koreatown in Los Angeles, Little Havana in Miami too has a significant,
fast-growing ethnic economy. Min, supra note 260, at 190. In 1967, there were 919 Cuban-
owned enterprises in Miami, and by 1976, there were 8000. Wilson & Portes, supra note 9,
at 303.
Twenty percent of Cubans in Miami were self-employed in 1979, and forty-nine percent
worked in Spanish-speaking firms owned by coethnics. Alejandro Portes et al., Six Years
Later: The Process of Incorporation of Cuban Exiles in the United States: 1973-1979, 11-12
CUBAN STUDS. 1, 1-24 (1981-82). Returns, based on their respective human capital level, were
substantially equivalent to those in the mainstream economy. Wilson & Portes, supra note
9, at 314.
266. Light et al., supra note 216, at 37.
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case for one-third of the South Europeans and Chinese in Toronto,
for example.26 7 Here too, it was found that "[flor members of minor-
ity groups with low levels of education, work in settings controlled
by their own group is quite attractive from the standpoint of
income opportunity."268 Mexican immigrant employers, followed by
U.S.-born Mexicans, for example, were most likely to hire other
Mexicans, including undocumented Mexican workers.269 In Paris,
in 1990 among small garment firms, 22.45% were owned by Turks
and 8.32% owned by Yugoslavs.2 70 There too, ethnic owners hired
illegal coethnic immigrants as part of the industry's informal
sector as well as coethnic legal or documented workers to work in
the ethnic economy.2 71 In France, the economic success of the
Maghrebians (Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians) in a variety of
trades-"[r]outine neighborhood trade" primarily with French
customers, "'[i]ntracommunity' trade" with coethnic customers, and
"'[e]xotic' trade" selling specific products to French customers-can
be similarly explained by their reliance on the ethnic system: family
labor and coethnic workers.2 72 Tunisians in Paris, whether Jewish
or Muslim, are concentrated in the doughnut making business and
run shops that "traditionally employ[I members of the same family
or the same ethnic group exclusively, and outsiders are rare."273 The
Asian Indian ethnic economy, in the United States and elsewhere,
has "clustered in businesses that employ new immigrants from
India, relatives and nonrelatives, and that cater to the needs and
tastes of South Asians."2 74 For many groups, the existence of the
ethnic economy allows group members to evade unemployment
267. JEFFREY G. REITZ, THE SURVIVAL OF ETHNIC GROUPS 154-55 (1980).
268. Id. at 164.
269. Light et al., supra note 216, at 38.
270. Morokvasic, supra note 224, at 81.
271. Id. at 76, 85. To the extent that the ethnic or immigrant economy is partially or
wholly informal, it shares certain characteristics with informal economies generally: lack of
long-term job security for workers, lack of health and pension insurance, and labor law
violations, including health and safety regulations. Id. at 88. See generally Symposium, The
Informal Economy, 103 YALE L.J. 2119 (1994) (describing characteristics of the informal
economy and its political legal and social implications for minority groups).
272. Simon, supra note 225, at 133-34.
273. WALDINGERETAL., supra note 243, at 102.
274. Karen B. Leonard & Chandra S. Tibrewal, Asian Indians in Southern California:
Occupations and Ethnicity, in IMMIGRATIONAND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 216, at 141,
143.
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because they have an alternative to wage employment in the
general labor market.
Consequently, ethnic firms tend to be tightly knit and homo-
geneous "at the core," with family members and kin, either by blood
or marriage, in the inner circle and unrelated coethnics beyond
that."5 For example, among the Iranian firms in Los Angeles, 2.7%
of paid employees were related to the owners; 35.7% were Iranians
and shared the religion of the owner; 19.5% were Iranians who did
not share the religion of the owner; and 42% were non-Iranians.
27 6
Generally, when ethnic businesses mature, however, labor short-
ages will usually compel a change in hiring policy. In the London
garment industry, for example, Greek Cypriot firms had to employ
more Asian and Afro-Caribbean workers when they expanded and
as more Greek Cypriots became business owners.27 7
Thus, generally speaking, the tendency to hire coethnics is it-
self part of the defining characteristic of having an ethnic economy.
One of the main ingredients that provides ethnic economies with
their comparative advantage is the coethnic labor force (whether
kin or non-kin) and its direct connections and attachments to
the ethnic community.2 71 In addition, ethnic economies exist to
create, to perpetuate, and hence, to capture jobs for coethnics.2 79
But preference for one's coethnics, however, also means non-
preference for non-coethnics. Thus, "[tihe Chinese in Southeast
Asia, Indians and Lebanese in Africa, and Vietnamese and Koreans
in America's black ghettoes, are often accused of not hiring local
275. As a result, the bind of ethnicity, clan, and kinship may also mean that the workforce
is very loyal and identifies with the ethnic labor force rather than the host labor force. To the
extent that wages are lower in the ethnic economy, a conflict may arise between the general
labor force and ethnic labor force. For example, when the Retail Food Clerks, Local 770 in
Los Angeles attempted to organize sales workers in the grocery business in 1937, appeals to
Japanese workers to unionize and fight for an American living standard were rejected
handily. Bonacich, supra note 27, at 591. Ethnic employers, however, also incur certain
reciprocal obligations that go beyond the conventional employer/employee context.
WALDINGER ET AL., supra note 243, at 39-47.
276. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 38.
277. Id. at 39.
278. WALDINGER ET AL., supra note 243, at 37-38.
279. Studies show "group members consciously build upon ethnic social networks to find
jobs, to attempt to control access to those jobs ... and to do all the other things that affect
success or failure in the economy." LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 76 (alteration in original)
(citation omitted).
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people for responsible positions. Such complaints against middle-
man minorities are long standing, as well as widespread."28
Although such preferences may be purely personal, or part of a
tradition of "high ethnic attachment,"28' there is also an economic
basis for them. The cost of sorting and screening coethnic workers
may be lower when they are of the same group, "either because of
specific knowledge of the individual or his family available within
the group or because of a greater facility in reading cultural cues
peculiar to the group."282 The ethnic workforce can be replicated
cheaply in the ethnic economy because both the employers and
employees rely on "the use of networks for finding work, for
obtaining a cheap and cohesive work force, for financial support,
and for market transactions."8 ' To overcome the obstacles en-
countered in the general labor market, ethnic workers rely on
informal networks for a competitive edge over other workers-
connections, for example, made through word of mouth or ethnic
and immigrant newspapers28 ' with an established "information
system that channel[s] them into those industrial niches already
dominated by coethnics."285
Besides coethnic recruitment and hiring, ethnic economies may
rely on other forms of economic preferences as well. In nonretail
transactions, for example, in the sale and purchase of liquor
licenses, coethnics also tend to buy and sell to one another. Korean
280. SOWELL, supra note 120, at 51. The Young Baganda Association in 1919 complained
that Indian firms in Uganda did not hire enough Baganda employees; Assamese in India
complained that Marawari businesses did not hire enough Assamese in the state of Assam;
in Senegal, Senagalese complained that the Lebanese businessmen did not hire Africans;
Nigerians complained that certain ethnic Nigerians from certain regions tended to hire
others like them and not the locals. Id.; see also LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 3-4
(describing mob attacks on African-American businesses in Tulsa, Oklahoma in 1921;
Jewish-owned businesses in Germany in the 1930s to punish "Jews for economic crimes";
Korean-owned businesses in South Central Los Angeles in 1992; Chinese shops in Indonesia
in 1998).
281. Min, supra note 260, at 199.
282. SOWELL, supra note 120, at 90; see also Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and
Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 863-92 (1999) (discussing how community norms
emerging from cohesive groups lower the transaction costs of intra-group lending, allowing
members who could not get bank loans to form rotating credit associations).
283. Morokvasic, supra note 224, at 87.
284. Id.; see also Chris Spolar, New Working Class in the Making, WASH. POST, Dec. 15,
1987, at Ai (describing the informal recruitment methods used by immigrants).
285. LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 17, at 187.
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sellers, often relying on information provided by Korean news-
papers, found Korean buyers in 80.4% of license transfer trans-
actions, although Koreans were only 17.6% of all buyers. 8 A
similarly startling degree of ethnic homogeneity can also be seen in
business sales among Indians and Pakistanis in Britain28 7 and in
business co-ownership among Cubans in Puerto Rico.
8
Linkages also exist between the ethnic diasporas of the adopted
country on the one hand and the homeland institutions on the
other. For example, there is a tendency among Korean-owned firms
in the United States for the Korean buying entities to rely on
Korean suppliers from Korea. This is especially common in the
import businesses established by Koreans who deal in Korean
exports, where Korean importers distribute Korean-made products
to coethnic wholesalers, who in turn distribute them to coethnic
retailers2 89 for sale, most likely, to non-Korean customers.290 In the
retail wig business in particular, ninety-five percent of those who
participated in a study on Korean entrepreneurship depended on
Korean suppliers for wigs made in South Korea.29'
286. Id. at 239. In fact, liquor stores, grocery stores, restaurants, and bars (businesses
with a predominant Korean presence) constituted 21.2% of firms advertised for sale in the
Korea Times but only 11.9% of those for sale in the Los Angeles Times; this source of
information, however, is only available to potential buyers who can read Korean. Id. at 240.
287. Cathrine Zimmer & Howard Aldrich, Resource Mobilization Through Ethnic
Networks: Kinship and Friendship Ties of Shopkeepers in England, 30 SOC. PERSP. 422,439-
41(1987).
288. Josd A. Cobas, Ethnic Enclaves and Middleman Minorities: Alternative Strategies of
Immigrant Adaptation?, 30 SOC. PERSP. 143,150(1987). Although Cubans were less than 1%
of Puerto Rico's population, Cuban entrepreneurs had other Cuban entrepreneurs as
partners in 70% of co-owned businesses. Id. at 148, 150.
289. Min, supra note 260, at 196; see also LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 121.
290. WALDINGER ET AL., supra note 243, at 71; see also Wong, supra note 258, at 79
(describing how "immigrant consumers and entrepreneurs maintain cultural, social, and
economic ties with their homelands that dramatically increase export opportunities"). Korean
owners in Los Angeles indicated that between sixty-six and one hundred percent of their
suppliers were Koreans and that a significant portion of the Korean owners were part of "a
vertical distribution network that might originate in South Korea." LIGHT& BONACICH,supra
note 17, at 151.
291. LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 17, at 37, 151. Charging Korean exclusion of non-
Koreans from the wig industry and the raising of prices to consumers, federal prosecutors
initiated suit under the Sherman Antitrust Act. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 20-21; see
United States v. Korean Hair Goods Ass'n of Am., Inc., No. 75-3069, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16497, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1976) (enjoining Korean wig sellers from engaging in
monopolistic business practices).
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When Korean immigrants start new businesses dealing in wigs,
handbags and other Korean-imported merchandise, they have
easy access to information and can very often purchase
merchandise on a credit basis. In operating such businesses,
they receive preferential treatments from Korean wholesalers
in item selections, prices, speed of delivery and credits.292
Aside from the import-export sector, which is dependent on
linkages forged between the diaspora and the homeland, ethnic
vertical integration may also be found between ethnic retailers and
wholesalers. For many Korean business owners, between sixty-six
and one hundred percent of their suppliers were also Koreans.29
Approximately"82 percent of inner-city Korean merchants buy from
Korean wholesalers," who have traditionally helped the merchants
by providing loans, financing, and goods to Korean merchants at
cheaper prices than to non-Korean merchants either because the
Korean buyers tend to order in large quantities, 4 or merely
because of a tradition of mutual aid and ethnic economic solidarity.
Indian hotel and motel owners also deal with each other on a
preferential basis, providing each other with loans without charging
interest or demanding collateral.295 Other groups such as black
merchants who have vertical links to African-American suppliers
have also used them to their advantage-hence the success of black-
owned barber shops and beauty parlors with links to the large,
black-owned beauty products firm of Johnson Products, Inc. of
Chicago.296
Group solidarity and preferences extend beyond hiring decisions
and preferential sales and purchases to include general social
and economic assistance as well. A study of Ismaili-Pakistani
292. WALDINGER ET AL., supra note 243, at 71 (citation omitted).
293. LIGHT &BoNAcIcH,supra note 17, at 151. The study found that in the service sector,
there was no dependence on Korean suppliers.
294. R.C. Longworth, On One Street, Two Different Paths of Success, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 17,
1992, at Cl.
295. McDowell, supra note 12.
296. Longworth, supra note 294. Johnson Products, the first black-owned firm to be listed
on the American Stock Exchange, has had a tradition ofpromoting black businesses by hiring
black models and other black enterprises, such as advertising agencies, and by advertising
in black avenues such as Soul Train. Karen Springern, So Much for Family Ties, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 23, 1992, at 49.
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immigrants in the southwestern United States revealed that within
this community, differentiated not only by its ethnicity but also by
its religion of Ismaili, a Muslim sect, a new immigrant will usually
contact a community coordinator or sponsor, often a business
owner, who will provide the new arrival with a full-time job,
training, and financing help as part of his sponsorship activities.297
Similarly, the development of Greek business activities, especially
in the restaurant business, also rests on the sponsorship model.298
It is this very affinity for members of one's group as well as the
reliance on ethnic connections to lower the cost of doing business
that have allowed a disesteemed minority group to overcome its
labor market disadvantage and build up the group's ethnic network
so necessary to the maintenance of an ethnic economy.
There is some evidence that ethnic economies pay lower wages
than the general labor market. For example, at one end, the Puerto
Rican ethnic economy, though small in size, paid high wages,
reaching 96.5% of the expected level; at the other end, the African-
American ethnic economy's payroll was 72.8% of what it would have
been had the African-American ethnic economy paid wages at the
average level of the mainstream labor market.299 The comparison
with the general market may not be wholly accurate unless it takes
into account the possibility that employees in ethnic economies may
be among the least skilled and educated of coethnics. But even if
the wage comparison is undertaken after adjusting for productivity
differentials, an argument could still be made that "the low wages
297. The immigrant works as an apprentice for about two years, during which time he is
expected to set aside funds for the purpose of eventual business development. The Ismaili
community assists the immigrant in the search for a business opportunity, and the
immigrant is also eligible to borrow from a community investment fund raised from local
sources. Patricia G. Greene, A Resource-Based Approach to Ethnic Business Sponsorship: A
Consideration ofIsmaili-Pakistani Immigrants, 35 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 58, 64-65 (1997).
298. Greek immigrants with relatives are sponsored into the United States. "The sibling
tie ... becomes the primary relationship by which various nuclear families are united into
clans. Moreover, ... the sibling tie also becomes the most important kinship bond within
which Greeks fashion their economic adaptation." Lawrence A. Lovell-Troy, Clan Structure
and Economic Activity: The Case of Greeks in Small Business Enterprise, in SELF-HELP IN
URBAN AMERICA: PATTERNS OFMINORITYBUSINESS ENTERPRISE 58,63 (Scott Cummings ed.,
1980). The collective, clan-based entrepreneurial pattern is even stronger for the Chinese and
Japanese who "operate[] businesses which [are] tied together by a strong network of
collective, ethnically based morality." Id. at 85.
299. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 70.
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and the job itself represent contributions of the ethnic economy
to employment of coethnics, and the low wage exceeds the general
labor market's counteroffer, zero.""00 It is conceivable that the choice
for many of those from marginal or transitional groups may be
between unemployment or employment in their groups' ethnic
economies, even if not under the most optimal of conditions.
3. The Ethnic Enclave Economy
The term "ethnic economy," with intellectual linkages to the
literature on middleman minorities, generally carries no as-
sumption about the location or clustering of the ethnic-owned firms,
or about whether the customers are coethnics. °1 The term "ethnic
enclave economy" or "immigrant enclave economy" has a different
intellectual tradition; it is derived from dual labor market theories
developed in the 1960s, which explored how and why certain
disadvantaged groups were segregated into a lesser, secondary
labor market separate from the superior, primary labor market.
30 2
Even as the world's economy has become increasingly globalized,
transcending the boundaries of the nation-state,303 a parallel shift
has also occurred, leading to "the revival of the small-business
economy"0 4 and the importance of the local-whereby "local social
networks associated with family, community, or ethnic tradition of
skills, are particularly central in revitalized craft production
complexes" such as those that have emerged in central and
northeastern Italy. °5 The enclave economy is characterized by
spatial or locational clustering of business firms that tend to employ
coethnic workers"c linked by an "ethnic entrepreneurial network,
300. Id. at 70-71.
301. Id. at 10.
302. Id. at 11-12. For an examination of labor market analysis, which focuses on the idea
of market segmentation and dual economies to explain persistent poverty and income
inequality, see ROBERT T. AVERITr, THE DUAL ECONOMY: THE DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1968).
303. See generally Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy:
Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REV. 401 (2002).
304. Eran Razin, Immigrant Entrepreneurs in Israel, Canada, and California, in
IMMIGRATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, aupra note 216, at 97, 100.
305. Id. at 100.
306. Alejandro Portes, Modes of Structural Incorporation and Present Theories of Labor
Immigration, in GLOBALTRENDS IN MIGRATION 279,290-91 (Mary M. Kritz et al. eds., 1981);
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reflecting both ethnic attributes and location characteristics."3 °7
It usually arises as a result of "[cihain migration[]," whereby
newcomers tend to congregate in the same areas where the ethnic
group is already present.308
Ethnic neighborhoods have been part of the immigrant land-
scape of countries all over the world: Germantowns, Little Italys,
Chinatowns.0 9 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, the Jewish quarter in Manhattan was served by ethnic trade
on the Jewish East Side, and New York City's clothing industry
developed alongside the Jewish immigrant workers and owners
clustered there, kept close to the factories due to the lack of mass
transit. South Asians in Britain occupy certain geographical
clusters; migrants from Northwest Africa and southern Europe are
concentrated in the older quarters of cities such as Berlin,
Frankfurt, Rotterdam, Brussels, and Paris. Opportunities to create
ethnic economies arise in such ethnic neighborhoods with a critical
mass of consumers with distinctive ethnic tastes and needs that
ethnic businesses can serve. 10 In recent years, immigrants from
PORTES & BACH, supra note 6, at 203.
307. Razin, supra note 304, at 101.
308. LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 17, at 153-54; Razin, supra note 304, at 101. Despite
the attempt of the U.S. government to disperse Southeast-Asian refugees in the 1970s, the
refugees themselves gravitated towards each other, resulting in concentrations of various
ethnic groups in certain states. Edna Bonacich, Asian and Latino Immigrants in the Los
Angeles Garment Industry:An Exploration of the Relationship between Capitalism and Racial
Oppression, in IMMIGRATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 216, at 51, 59-62. The
Vietnamese, for example, clustered in Orange County, California. Id. at 62.
309. The existence ofethnic enclaves, whether residential or business, is common in many
countries all over the world. German congregation in certain locations resulted in the
creation of whole towns overseas, for example, Hermann, Missouri, in the United States,
Blumenau in Brazil, and Hahndorf in Australia. The Welsh have done the same in Bryn
Mawr, Pennsylvania, and Scots in Dunedin, New Zealand. The Chinese have founded
Chinatowns in places ranging from Melbourne to Toronto, New York, and San Francisco.
Italians congregate in Little Italys in Buenos Aires, New York, and Toronto. SOWELL, supra
note 120, at 103-04. One of the more recent immigrant groups, the Koreans, have created
Koreatowns not only in Los Angeles, but also in North Jersey, with approximately 130
churches, real estate markets, thirty restaurants, 270 dry cleaners, nail salons, groceries,
thirty fraternal and business groups, and five newspapers. Lisa Rein, Immigrants Move
Warily Across Cultural Barriers, THE RECORD, Nov. 24, 1991, at AI; see also LIGHT & GOLD,
supra note 7, at 184-85.
310. WALDINGER ET AL., supra note 243, at 108, 115. This linkage between work and
residence can be seen currently in the Chinatown garment industry of New York City. In
Providence, Rhode Island, where Italian immigrants made up fourteen percent of the city
population by 1914, a local retail enclave provided employment to more than ten percent of
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Liberia, Nigeria, and other West African countries have carved an
ethnic enclave in Staten Island, New York City, "bringing new
merchants, vendors, a church and other institutions that cater to
their tastes and needs." '311
Often reinforced by residential segregation,312 "ethnic neighbor-
hoods were the spatial anchor of the communities," often part of, or
close to, coethnic economic enclaves. 1 3 Historically, for some ethnic
groups such as the Chinese, the existence of an ethnic enclave
such as Chinatown was reinforced by repressive laws mandating
segregation of the Chinese.1 4 Chinatowns across the United States
thus became residential as well as an economic enclaves, where the
Chinese established homes, businesses, associations, and schools
based on common geographic origins and clans.315 Indeed, small
businesses were particularly vital to the development of San
Francisco's Chinatown because although some Chinese searched for
jobs as laborers or domestics outside of Chinatown, most stayed
the Italian male immigrants. Id. at 109.
311. Raymond Hernandez, The Feel ofAfrica is Transplanted to Staten Island, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 1993, at A30.
312. See generally Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography
in Legal Analysis, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1843, 1845 (1994) (describing how political geography
promotes "racially identified space" and racial segregation).
313. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 184 (citation omitted). In contrast to West Indian
business activities in the United States, some suggest West Indians business activities in
Britain are not as numerous precisely because the West Indian in Britain is not segregated.
WALDINGER ET AL., supra note 343, at 110.
314. Though later declared unconstitutional, the California legislature, for example,
enacted a law in 1879 requiring towns and cities to remove the Chinese from city limits. BILL
ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850-
1990, at 49-50 (1993). Landlords and realtors refused to rent and sell to Chinese outside the
boundaries of Chinatown. Id. at 50. In Tucson, a widespread campaign was begun in 1885
urging that the Chinese be forced into a Chinatown so they could be monitored. Id. at 50,
186, 283 n.55.
315. Id. at 50,77,84. In response to increasing demands by Chinese parents fortheir U.S.-
born children to attend public school, the San Francisco School Board allowed the Chinese
School to be officially opened as a "separate but equal" public school in San Francisco
Chinatown in 1859. Joyce Kuo, Excluded, Segregated and Forgotten: A Historical View of the
Discrimination of Chinese Americans in Public Schools, 5 ASIAN L.J. 181, 191 (1998). When
the Chinese School was closed in 1871, Chinese Language Schools were organized and run
by the Chinese Six Companies, an organization of Chinatown merchants. As the violence
against the Chinese increased systematically by the 1870s, the California legislature revised
the School Law of 1860, which had established separate public schools for the Chinese, along
with other minority groups. The Chinese were excluded from the all-white public school as
well as the separate schools until 1883. Id. at 192-94.
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within to avoid racial antagonism and found employment in family-
run enterprises.316 For many recent Asian immigrants to the
United States who either face English language barriers or
possess few marketable skills, Chinatowns constitute one of the
few places where work can be found. Reciprocally, newcomers
have reinvigorated Chinatown, replacing declining industries such
as the hand-laundry business-developed in Chinatown "bachelor
societies" due to anti-Chinese exclusionary laws which prevented
Chinese males from bringing wives 317-with the burgeoning res-
taurant business that caters to both the Chinatown market and the
nonethnic market.318
As the Chinatown experience shows, the existence of an ethnic
neighborhood with proximity to a coethnic economy has allowed
group members who are lesser-skilled, less educated, and those
lacking job-seeking connections to gain access to group resources
to achieve upward mobility, often within the ethnic enclave econ-
omy.3 19 Ethnic businesses that are an integral part of the ethnic
community play a vital role in community development-for
example, an ethnic enclave economy "can make a poor but active
area safer and more attractive than a more affluent but less
trafficked neighborhood."32 ° Business concentration within an
economic enclave in proximity to ethnic neighborhoods produces a
synergistic relationship between the businesses and the residences
in at least three ways. First, the "agglomeration of economies" is
likely to encourage the proliferation of ethnic businesses and attract
additional customers, drawn by the size and diversity of the
enclave. Second, it is also likely to further the cultural presence of
the area, and thus promote its visibility as an ethnic market that
ethnic shoppers wish to frequent both for the products and services
available as well as for the cultural symbol that the enclave
represents. Third, the agglomeration effect may also create an
"export" base from which ethnic firms can expand beyond the ethnic
customer base.
316. HING, supra note 314, at 52.
317. HIMILCE NOVAS & LAN CAO, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNow ABOUT ASIAN AMERICANS 27-
28, 30-32 (1996).
318. WALDINGER ET AL., supra note 243, at 68-69.
319. Id. at 66; see also LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 186.
320. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 187.
2003] 1581
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Locational aggregation also gives the ethnic enclave economy
certain added benefits 21 that a general ethnic economy might not
have. 22 The authors of a comprehensive study of ethnic enclave
economies observe that "[elnclaves can be composed of a group
of relatively independent firms which compete with each other
for supplies and minority consumers, or minority firms can
theoretically be arranged in a fairly unified system of vertical and
horizontal integration .... In the latter case, the ethnic enclave,
though a competitive sector, may nevertheless confer some of the
economic advantages of a "monopoly sector." 2" For example,
because of vertical and horizontal integration325 of businesses along
ethnic lines, coethnic firms manage to keep their business
exchanges, whether with suppliers or customers, within the ethnic
enclave, allowing such firms to "suck value out of each stage of a
product's movement toward the market, losing little or no value to
noncoethnic firms."3 2' Thus, territorial clusters allow the ethnic
economy to capture a higher proportion of sales than it otherwise
would. When an ethnic firm buys from other neighborhood coethnic
firms, the flow of money recirculates within the ethnic enclave
economy. These "localized ethnic entrepreneurial enclaves" also
provide an easy setting "for recruiting labor, gathering information,
transmitting entrepreneurial skills, and in some cases also forming
input and output linkages." 27
321. WALDINGER ETAL., supra note 243, at 113-15.
322. Added benefits include "the ability of the enclave economy to generate more money
for participants than the participants would have been able to obtain without that enclave
structure to support them." LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 15.
323. Kenneth L. Wilson & W. Allen Martin, Ethnic Enclaves: A Comparison of the Cuban
and Black Economies in Miami, 88 AM. J. SOC. 135, 138 (1982).
324. Wilson & Portes, supra note 9, at 306-07.
325. As Light and Gold stated:
Horizontal integration involves ethnic business owners cooperating to choose
store location, avoid competitive pricing, pool information, and engage in
collective buying. Vertical integration occurs when a whole package ofbusiness
services-ranging from credit, wholesale goods, and maintenance to parking,
transportation, real estate, manufacturing, and import-export concessions-are
provided by coethnics.
LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 122.
326. Id. at 12-13.
327. Razin, supra note 304, at 99. The Maghrebian merchants of Algeria, Morocco, and
Tunisia who have settled in enclaves in France have also maximized the benefits to be
derived from the ethnic system-"resale of establishments into the co-ethnic circuit." Simon,
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Although the tradition of promoting economic independence
for African Americans is overlooked today, 8' there has been,
historically in the United States, black businesses in African-
American economic enclaves, in northern cities such as Chicago's
South Side, New York's Harlem, and Cleveland's Hough District,
and in southern cities such as Durham, North Carolina and Tulsa,
Oklahoma. As blacks from the South moved north in the 1900s,
black-owned businesses were formed to cater to the tastes and
needs of the southern newcomers.3 29 In the late 1930s, two-thirds of
businesses in Harlem were black-owned; by 1915, Chicago had a
"black market.".From Cleveland's segregated neighborhoods, a base
of economic ventures, of newspaper publishers, realtors, under-
takers and other business owners, was launched.3 '
During the Jim Crow era, African Americans were forced to
create a "self-sustaining support apparatus"3 ' consisting of hos-
pitals, banks, insurance companies, restaurants, inns, hotels, and
supra note 225, at 134.
Along Calle Ocho, the main commercial street of the Cuban enclave economy in Miami,
for example, Cuban-owned firms bought semifmished products from other Cuban-owned
firms, added value to the products, and passed the transformed products to other Cuban
retail businesses for sale. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 13. Indeed, several studies found
that the Cuban enclave economy's "hyperefficiency" is derived from vertical and horizontal
integration and preferences for ethnic self-dealing between suppliers and consumers. Wilson
& Martin, supra note 323; Wilson & Portes, supra note 9, at 301-02. In some instances,
shared ethnic identity, plus the "agglomeration effects of the ... ethnic enclave," LIGHT &
GOLD, supra note 7, at 15, may result in "the likelihood of cartelization in defiance of market
competition." IVAN LIGHT & CAROLYN ROSENSTEIN, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN URBAN AMERICA 20 (1995). Of course, if these arrangements cause
antitrust concerns or violations, then antitrust laws should be applied. See supra note 291.
Analogous scenarios can be found in San Francisco, when Italian fishermen sell their catch
to the Italian restaurants on Fisherman's Wharf. LIGHT & GOLD,supra note 7, at 13 ("In this
manner, San Francisco's Italian ethnic economy monopolizes the whole value of the
restaurant business even though the tourist industry has a competitive, small business
structure.").
328. See Butler, supra note 33, at 41 ("The fact that business enterprise once stood at the
center of black communities is an historical fact that has been lost and neglected by scholars
and commentators."). In fact, some studies found that -in 1910 African-Americans were more
likely than white Americans to be employers, and almost as likely as Whites to be self-
employed.'" Id. (citing Margaret Levenstein, African American Entrepreneurship: The View
from the 1910 Census, 24 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 107 (1995)).
329. WALDINGER ET AL., supra note 243, at 109.
330. Id. at 110.
331. Robert L. Woodson, The State of the Union: Civil Rights: Race and Economic
Opportunity, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (1989).
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other enterprises.332 "Segregation gave to the black professional a
virtually protected market .... If they profited economically by
avoiding intense competition from their white counterparts, ... they
also suffered from being unable to practice their professions in the
best institutions and in the best atmosphere."3 3 As some have
observed, "[u]ntil the mid-1960s, black businesses operated in
sheltered markets, spatially isolated and relegated to the black
community by the white community. Black businesses were
protected in those markets by the same racial animus that excluded
them from the mainstream."33
Durham, for example, was a thriving black economic enclave
around the turn of the twentieth century.3 ' The central business
332. Indeed, blacks had had a history ofentrepreneurship before the American Revolution
and before the Civil War. See BUTLER, supra note 8, at 34-78; Woodson, supra note 331, at
1021, 1031.
333. BUTLER, supra note 8, at 203 (citation omitted).
334. Robert E. Suggs, Economic Justice in America's Cities: Visions and Revisions of a
Movement: Bringing Small Business Development to Urban Neighborhoods, 30 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 487,490 (1995). Desegregation mandated by the 1964 Civil Rights Act destroyed
the protected markets of black firms and forced them to compete with national chains with
extensive economic resources because black customers had greater access to goods and
services provided by the mainstream economy. Id. at 491. In the meantime, "black-owned
firms were still inconveniently located, under-capitalized, and overpriced. Thus, at the high-
water mark of the civil rights revolution, the small retail and personal service firms that had
been the mainstay of black business activity began a sustained and inexorable decline." Id.
Additionally, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 made it possible for blacks and the black middle
class in particular to leave segregated neighborhoods for better housing. Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, which bars employment discrimination, allowed blacks greater access to
jobs outside black economies. "These twin factors eliminated whatever advantages had
accrued to black firms from their location in black neighborhoods and accelerated their
decline. With this decline of black business and the dispersal of the black middle class, the
black community's former central city neighborhoods deteriorated." Id. at 492; see also
Butler, supra note 32 (describing how the segregated market protected black jobs, which
were destroyed when integration resulted in whites replacing blacks in the public school
systems throughout the South); Woodson, supra note 331, at 1022; Joel Kotkin, The Color
of Freedom is Green, THE RECORD, Oct. 5, 1986, at 01; Kotkin, supra note 19, at 81.
335. The discussion below about Durham as a black economic enclave is drawn from
BUTLER, supra note 8, at 165-96. With its array of economic and financial institutions owned
by African Americans, Durham became known as a "City of Enterprise" for blacks, with
major black enterprises such as the Durham Textile Mill, the Durham Commercial and
Security Company, the National Negro Finance Corporation, and the North Carolina Mutual
Life Insurance Company, one of the largest and most historically celebrated African
American companies in the United States. Formed in 1898, the company had become, by
1939, the largest African-American insurance company in the world. The Mechanics and
Farmers Bank, established in 1907, was instrumental in the development of a black middle
class in Durham.
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section of the African-American community in Durham, Hayti, was
fully developed, with a vibrant business section along Fayetteville
Street. By the 1940s, more than 150 businesses flourished--cafes,
movie theaters, barber shops, groceries, boarding houses-and
Parish Street, referred to as the Negro Wall Street, attracted an
impressive concentration of successful black-owned businesses.
Tulsa too was once an economic enclave dominated by African
Americans. 36  Although slavery was abolished when the
Confederacy was defeated, it continued until 1866 in the Indian
Territory (land west of the Mississippi set aside for Eastern Indian
tribes forced westward) when the U.S. government entered into
treaties with the slave-owning Indian tribes. From 1866 to 1886,
the government entertained the possibility of setting aside central
Oklahoma as a permanent home for former slaves of the Indian
tribes. Although this idea was never formally instituted, African
Americans nonetheless migrated to Oklahoma and settled several
all-black towns. Tulsa, in particular the Greenwood section,
became a center of black economic development and was some-
times called "Little Africa." "Deep Greenwood," the heart of Tulsa's
black business community, was home to an array of commercial
establishments, ranging from groceries, restaurants, rooming
houses, and hotels to law offices, medical establishments, and other
professional groups.337
In his efforts to promote African-American ethnic economies,
Fred Moore, one of the organizers of Booker T. Washington's Negro
Business League, once remarked:
Although an expressway now goes through the center of what was once Hayti-as one
commentator noted, a "testimony to the destructive program of urban renewal, brought in
by politicians, that hit Durham during the decade of the 1960s-the city itself is being
revitalized. Id. at 193, 195.
336. The discussion on the development of Tulsa as a black economic enclave is drawn
from id. at 197-226.
337. In 1921, riots broke out after a black man was rumored to have engaged in attempted
rape of a white woman. The Tulsa riots resulted in the destruction of the Greenwood
business and residential district, with 18,000 homes and businesses burned, $2 to $3 million
in damage, and 300 people dead. Id. This incident, indeed, may be understood as part of the
unfortunate tradition of middleman groups who face hostility precisely because of host
country or third party resentment of their economic success. Since 1979, there have been
efforts to reconstruct the Greenwood section; black businesspeople have proposed a number
of financing packages to the city. Id. at 209-25.
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[Wie must ... require every person who joins a local league to
pledge himself to support all worthy enterprises managed by
men and women of the race .... How can we otherwise succeed?
Some would say that this was drawing the color line. I do not
believe it. Jews support Jews; Germans support Germans;
Italians support Italians until they get strong enough to
compete with their brother in the professions and trades;
Negroes should now begin to support Negroes."'8
4. Ethnic Niches
As mentioned briefly above, an ethnic occupational pattern is
common among different ethnic groups in different countries.
This has been referred to as "ethnic hegemonization," "industrial
clustering," or the creation of "entrepreneurial niches,33 9 where "a
certain ethnic group becomes entrenched in a clearly identifiable
economic sector, working at jobs for which it has no evident
cultural, geographical or even racial affinity."34 0 In Los Angeles,
Korean merchants whose businesses were inside Koreatown had
the benefit of an ethnic enclave--"an institutionally complete
business environment in which Koreans could buy a wide range of
goods and services from coethnics."3" Those with businesses outside
the Koreatown enclave and thus more dependent on non-Korean
customers were more likely to be niche-centered in order to receive
the benefits of industrial specialization.4 2 Koreans were heavily
represented in Los Angeles County's retail liquor industry-
representing 3.5% of firms although they were only 0.8% of the
population in 1980.3"s Ensconced in the informal sector of New York
338. Id. at 70 (citation omitted).
339. ROBERT M. JIOBU, ETHNICITY AND ASSIMILATION 223 (1988) (defining and discussing
"ethnic hegemonization"); LIGHT& BONACICH, supra note 17, at 183-84 (discussing"industrial
clustering"); Eran Razin & Ivan Light, Ethnic Entrepreneurs in America's Largest
Metropolitan Areas, 33 URB. AFF. REV. 332 passim (1998) (analyzing "entrepreneurial
niches").
340. Tunku Varadarajan,A Patel Motel Cartel?, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1999, § 6 (Magazine),
at 36.
341. LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 17, at 209.
342. According to Los Angeles Times estimates, "70 percent of customers in Koreatown's
Korean stores were Korean, 10 percent were other Asians, and 20 percent were non-Asian."
Id.
343. Id. at 227.
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City are Senegalese merchants who sell knockoff or counterfeit
designer watches 3"4 and other Africans who form an "efficient ethnic
network" of street vendors. 45 Koreans have become a dominant
presence in the fruit and vegetable business in New York City.3 6
The Guyanese congregate in the city's pharmacies and machinery
repair shops,347 and Afghans in the fast-food chicken restaurants
where even their carpenters and chicken suppliers are Afghans. 4
Thais dominate the city's hand-rolled bagel stores, many of whom
follow the example of a Thai pioneer bagel roller who owned a store
in Queens. 49 In New York City and New Jersey, Colombians and
Dominicans have captured the discount phone parlors or calling
centers business first started by Dominicans for immigrants to
call home.35 ° In Seattle and cities in Orange County, California,
nail salons are predominantly owned and run by Vietnamese, 5'
who also dominate the shrimping industry on the Texas coast.352
Palestinians in San Francisco have a strong presence in the small
groceries business.53 South Asians have a "virtual ethnic monop-
oly"' in the newsstand business 55 and gas stations in New York
City56 and have developed a powerful national presence in the
344. Thomas Goetz, Why New York Taco Stands Are Chinese, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1997,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 59.
345. Deborah Sontag, Unliensed Peddlers, Unfettered Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, June 14,1993,
at Al.
346. Richard Levine, Young Immigrant Wave Lifts New York Economy, N.Y. TIMES, July
30, 1990, at Al (describing how Koreans have replaced Italians and Jews as owners of
neighborhood fruit stands); Robert Reinhold, Flow of 3d World Immigrants Alters Weave of
U.S. Society, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1986, at Al.
347. Lorch, supra note 15.
348. Id. (noting also that Afghans own more than 200 fast-food chicken restaurants).
349. Goetz, supra note 344, at 59.
350. Id.
351. Ferdinand M. De Leon, Entrepreneurs from Southeast Asia Finding Success in the
Art of Acrylics, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 13, 1995, at Li.
352. John Greenwald, Finding Niches in a New Land, TIME, July 8, 1985, at 72, 74.
353. Id.
354. Jonathan Foreman, Bombay on the Hudson, 7 MANHATTAN INST. CITY J. 14 (1997),
available at LEXIS, News Library, Cityjr File; see also Reinhold, supra note 346.
355. Indians operate an estimated 300 of the city's 330 street newsstands. Foreman,supra
note 354.
356. An estimated forty percent of gas stations in New York City are owned by South
Asians, particularly Indians. Lorch, supra note 15. According to estimates by the New York
City Department of Consumer Affairs, Sikhs from India own nearly half of New York's gas
stations. Foreman, supra note 354.
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diamond industry, as diamond cutters, polishers, and importers,357
and the hotel/motel business.358
In other countries, Britain, for example, Chinese and Cypriot
immigrants have created an economic niche in the traditionally
English fish and chips business.3 5 ' Indians and Pakistanis are
concentrated in certain distinct sectors in retail trade, such as
chemist shops, small groceries, and discount airline tickets.
Cypriots and Asians dominate what was once a dying clothing trade
in the East End of London. In Amsterdam, Hindustani, and Turkish
entrepreneurs have revived the garment manufacturing business.
The niche, once occupied by an ethnic group, tends to
perpetuate itself, due to path dependency-a type of "chain
migration,"360 involving those who pioneered an economic path
and those coethnics who followed, whether they are Indian motel
owners, Korean green grocers, Chinese laundromat operators,36'
or historically,. German beer makers and Jewish tailors.6 2
Additionally, access to businesses in a particular niche often
"depended upon ethnic homogeneity in business transfers, which
tended to advantage coethnics while excluding outsiders."363 In
357. This sector is dominated by the Hasidic Jews and the Jains, members of an Indian
religion noted for vegetarianism and nonviolence. Foreman, supra note 354.
358. Gujaratis from northwestern India are predominant in the neighborhood store
business. They have also dominated the hotel/motel business. Id. According to the Asian-
American Hotel Owners Association, more than half of all motels in the United States are
owned by Asian Indians, seventy percent of whom are of Gujarati Hindu subcaste, although
Indians are less than one percent of the U.S. population. Varadarajan, supra note 340, at 36;
see also McDowell, supra note 12.
How the Indians came to occupy the motel niche is in many ways similar to how other
ethnic groups made their niches. Some have explained their domination in terms of cultural
affmity-that is, their inclination towards being hospitable, as reflected in the ancient
Sanskrit phrase, "The guest is God," Varadarajan, supra note 340, at 36, combined with
opportunity provided by white motel owners who were looking to sell or retire. One of the
Indians interviewed noted that he got into the hotel business when he saw how "our people'
were buying motels." Id.
359. The examples in this paragraph are taken from WALDINGER ETAL., supra note 243,
at 19-20.
360. LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 17, at 153-54.
361. Varadarajan, supra note 340, at 36.
362. Greenwald, supra note 352, at 72.
363. LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 17, at 242; see supra notes 289-92 and accompanying
text. Ethnic niches provide an "insider's edge on the profession" so that "once a niche is
found, it creates a snowball effect, gathering in labor from that ethnic group and expanding
exponentially." Lorch, supra note 15.
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other words, ethnics tend to sell their businesses to other coethnics
and thus reproduce the ethnic character of a niche. Information
about potential sales and purchases is passed along an ethnic
exchange, as 'in the case of the Korean liquor stores for sale
advertised in Korean language newspapers or the "network of
Indian moteliers [that] often relays breaking news of properties for
sale to other members of the same community . Often
newcomers who are trained by coethnics in the business perpetuate
the niche by starting their own enterprises, as in the case of Indians
in the newsstand business and Afghans in the fried chicken
business.365
In some instances, control of a niche may allow the minority
group to exercise a significant degree of market power. The
Japanese in California, for example, were able "to hegemonize an
entire economic area, both horizontally and vertically""' because
they were clustered in agriculture. As a result of their membership
in farmers' organizations and prefectural associations, the Japanese
farmers ensured that resources were distributed primarily within
the Japanese niche through informal preferential purchasing and
credit arrangements-hence "the tendency to spend one's money on
goods and services provided by the ethnic economy; in exchange, the
consumer would receive a favorable credit arrangement"36 7 not
364. Varadarajan, supra note 340, at 36; see supra note 290 and accompanying text.
365. The Indians and Pakistanis who control an estimated seventy percent of the
newsstand kiosks in New York City regularly employ fellow coethnics or help them get jobs
in other newsstand companies; many of these employees go on to start their own newsstand
businesses. Greenwald, supra note 352, at 73. The Afghan fried chicken niche began in 1979,
when an Afghan student from Kandahar, Afghanistan got his first job at Kansas Fried
Chicken and subsequently opened the first Kennedy's Fried Chicken; there are now
approximately forty unfranchised restaurants in New York City, all with that name and all
owned by Afghans who got their start through an informal apprenticeship with other
established Afghan fast-food restaurant owners. Lorch, supra note 15; see supra notes 297-98
and accompanying text.
366. JIOBU, supra note 339, at 224. In this respect, being part of an ethnic niche may
confer similar economic advantages as being part of an ethnic enclave-the ethnic niche
providing market power through industrial clustering and the ethnic enclave through
locational clustering and linkages. Vertical integration within the ethnic niche, similar to
that within the ethnic enclave, see supra notes 321-27 and accompanying text, meant that
Japanese produce growers would sell to wholesalers who in turn sold to Japanese retailers.
The Japanese growers would turn to the wholesalers for financing, in exchange for a promise
that they would sell their produce to the wholesalers, thus assuring the wholesalers of
reliable supply sources. BONACICH & MODELL, supra note 7, at 56.
367. BONACICH & MODELL, supra note 7, at 56.
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available to non-coethnics. By vertically integrating and restricting
competition8. within the ethnic niche,
Japanese entrepreneurs were able to charge lower prices on the
open market and offer higher bids on purchases and rentals of
such assets as farmland. Consequently, Issei [first generation
Japanese] business was able to expand rapidly and even to
move into a "monopolistic" position in certain spheres of the
economy. 69
Interestingly, this quasi-monopolistic power is conferred on an
ethnic group by virtue of its niche occupation whether the group
dominates the niche as owners of business or as workers. Where
coethnic employees (as opposed to coethnic business owners),
through "their numerical clustering, their numerical prepon-
derance, their organization, government mandates, or all four," are
able to exert economic influence or power to secure preferences
for coethnics, this has been referred to as an "ethnic-controlled
economy." 7° Italian, Irish, and Jewish immigrants in New York
City had long relied on coethnic hiring networks to obtain municipal
employment. 7' These immigrants created ethnic niches in certain
industries, sectors, or occupations within the government-the Irish
had the construction niche, Italians the sanitation niche, and Jews
the school teaching niche. Craft unions had once required that
employers hire only union members, and membership was limited
to applicants related by blood or marriage to current or past union
members.372 In the government sector currently, African Americans
368. Prewar Japanese-American organizations ensured that Japanese small businesses
"did not underbid each other or unnecessarily push up purchase or rent prices... [or] impinge
on each others' territories." Id. at 57.
369. Id. at 58. Korean business owners cooperated in much the same way. LIGHT &
BONACICH, supra note 17, at 192-203 (discussing "industrial cooperation" among Korean
entrepreneurs). These practices may be deemed antitrust violations. See supra notes 291,
327.
370. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 25.
371. Id. at 21; see also ROGER WALDINGER, STILL THE PROMISED CITY?.: AFRICAN-
AMERICANS AND NEW IMMIGRANTS IN POSTINDUSTRIAL NEW YORK 302 (1996).
372. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 74. An Irish contractor in Boston routinely found
workers in Irish pubs. Id. at 21. Or, as the leader of a predominantly black clerical workers'
union remarked, "'My people have an excellent communications system: they know that jobs
are available; they refer cousins, sons, daughters. People walk into personnel and drop off
resumes like there's no tomorrow.'" WALDINGER, supra note 371, at 234 (quoting a labor
1590 [Vol. 44:1521
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have become a formidable presence. Studies have shown that
Asians and Hispanics, many of whom are immigrants and without
political influence, have a much smaller share of government jobs
in Los Angeles than do non-Hispanic whites, whose share of
government employment is only half that of blacks. 7 ' "At this point,
business ownership and job control become equivalent in respect to
the hiring advantage they convey."37 4 Preferential policies adopted
by the government to build African-American clusters in the public
sector could be viewed as an attempt to correct the absence of
strong ethnic niches among African Americans.375
B. The Boundary: Disadvantage and Reactive Solidarity
1. Introduction
The emergence of an ethnic economy is based on both external
and internal factors and the interaction of supply and demand.376
Disadvantage is the oldest explanation for minority entre-
preneurship. Although Max Weber emphasized the connection
between bourgeois capitalism and the Protestant ethic, he also
acknowledged that Protestants, excluded from the civil service
and the armed forces because of religious tests, turned to entre-
preneurship partly because of a labor force disadvantage caused by
religious discrimination. 7 7 Werner Sombart similarly attributed
Jewish dominance in business to their exclusion from medieval
relations manager in a large agency).
373. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 22.
374. Id. at 22. "An ethnic-owned firm that employs 99 coethnics provides the same
employment to coethnics as a state agency that employs 100 coethnics even though the
employees do not own the state agency." Id. at 22-23.
375. See id. at 75.
376. Roger Waldinger et al., Trend Report: Ethnic Business and Occupational Mobility in
Advanced Societies, 19 SOC. 586 passim (1985).
377. WEBER, supra note 232, at 5-7. Weber thus was perplexed by the fact that Catholics,
a traditionally oppressed religious group, did not have a strong tradition of business
enterprises. "National or religious minorities which are in a position of subordination to a
group of rulers are likely, through their voluntary or involuntary exclusion from positions
of political influence, to be driven with peculiar force into economic activity." Id. at 6. Karl
Marx explained that Jews were disliked because they were not Christians and because their
propensity towards "huckstering" gave them an economic advantage, causing them to be
further despised. Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELs READER 26, 48
(Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).
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trade guilds." ' Subsequently, scholars who have studied ethnic
economies have advanced disadvantage-an external factor-as the
reason for high rates of entrepreneurship37 9 among minorities
denied "access to majority-controlled paths of economic advance-
ment."80 Disadvantages include being subject to de jure or de facto
segregation, being undocumented, lacking English skills, having
little formal education, and not knowing American or mainstream
work practices.38" '
Other scholars studying ethnic entrepreneurship have looked at
group characteristics-an internal factor---consisting of ethnic
resources and ethnic social capital." 2 These may include personal
378. SOMBART, supra note 10, at 300-01.
379. See, e.g., Howard Aldrich et al., From Periphery to Peripheral: The South Asian Petit
Bourgeoisie in England, in 2 RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF WORK: PERIPHERAL WORKERS
1, 8 (Richard L. Simpson & Ida Harper Simpson eds., 1983) (explaining that "because of
natives whites' prejudice and hostility," Asians in Britain must "seek employment below their
skill level or else create their own employment opportunity by forming a small business");
LIGHT & ROSENSTEIN, supra note 327, at 161 (explaining that labor market abuses caused
middleman minorities to turn to "defensive self-employment"); Annie Phizacklea,
Entrepreneurship, Ethnicity, and Gender, in ENTERPRISING WOMEN: ETHNICITY, ECONOMY,
AND GENDER RELATIONS 21 (Sallie Westwood & Parminder Bhachu eds., 1988) (viewing
entrepreneurship as an escape route for minority men confined by racism to dead-end jobs);
Pyong Gap Min, From White-Collar Occupations to Small Business: Korean Immigrants'
Occupational Adjustment, 25 SOC. Q. 333, 344 (1984) (attributing "disadvantages in the
American job market" as a principal cause of Korean entrepreneurship in Atlanta); Lloyd L.
Wong & Michele Ng, Chinese Immigrant Entrepreneurs in Vancouver:A Case Study of Ethnic
Business Development, 30 CAN. ETHNIC STUDS. 64, 73 (1998) (reporting that racial
discrimination caused many Chinese immigrants to abandon plans to enter the non-
ethnic/open market and open a business in the Chinese ethnic enclave instead); Chua Lee
Hoong, The Business of Race in the Race for Business, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), June 29, 1996,
at 34, available at 1996 WL 14659458 (describing how ethnic networks were formed as a
reaction against discrimination; in the case of the Chinese, banks refused to lend to
"Chinamen").
380. Greene, supra note 297, at 59.
381. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 211.
382. LIGHT & ROSENSTEIN, supra note 327, at 22. Light and Rosenstein define ethnic
resources as:
sociocultural and demographic features of the whole group that coethnic
entrepreneurs actively utilize in business or from which their business
passively benefits .... Typical ethnic resources include entrepreneurial
heritages, entrepreneurial values and attitudes, low transaction costs, rotating
credit associations, relative satisfaction arising from nonacculturation to
prevailing labor standards, social capital, reactive solidarities, multiplex social
networks, and a generous pool of underemployed and disadvantaged coethnic
workers.
Id. For a study of the efficiencies of rotating credit associations as a community market for
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and class resources, for example, money or advanced degrees, but
need not, because ethnic resources emphasize instead sociocultural
factors that allow groups to "convert social characteristics of their
group into economic resources, thus creating employment and
income independent of class resources."88 ' This intellectual tradition
emphasizes collectivism rather than individualism and studies the
role ethnic resources and institutions have contributed to the
economic stability of certain ethnic groups.
Other scholars use an interactive model, emphasizing both
cultural analysis and the structural economic environment, and
focusing on the "congruence between the demands of the economic
environment and the informal resources of the ethnic population."""
For example, in an effort to understand why, despite discrimination
and hostility, certain groups have been able "to create success out
of hatred,"385 some scholars have focused on the interaction between
host hostility and the reactive solidarity such hostility provokes,
which produces in turn group boundaries that distinguish minority
insiders from nonminority outsiders.
2. Boundaries, Social Capital, and Ethnic Economies
Thus, ethnic economies emerge when ethnic minorities face
"labor market disadvantage," receiving "below-expected returns on
their human capital for reasons unrelated to productivity,"386 and
are able to tap into their reservoir of ethnic resources and social
capital to create alternatives to mainstream employment,3"7 or
"compensatory entrepreneurship." 8 Generally, scholars have
savings among ethnic minorities, see Cao, supra note 282.
383. LIGHT & ROSENSTEIN, supra note 327, at 24.
384. Waldinger et al., supra note 376, at 589.
385. Bonacich, supra note 27, at 584.
386. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 200 (explaining that labor market disadvantages
under such circumstances means that "qualified workers get no job at all or they do not get
a job commensurate with their experience and education").
387. Factors of an economic environment that may facilitate entrepreneurship includes:
"coethnic consumer products, underserved or abandoned markets, markets with low returns
to economies of scale, markets with unstable or uncertain demand, and markets for exotic
goods." LIGHT & ROSENSTEIN, supra note 327, at 74.
388. Id. at 160.
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emphasized two interactive factors to explain how ethnic group
membership produces economic resources.
The first perspective stresses the unique skills and resources
shared by members of an ethnic group-the "'tool kit' of symbols,
stories, rituals, and worldviews that people may use in varying
configurations to direct action and solve different kinds of
problems." 89 If there is a market demand for these unique cultural
resources, those who possess such resources will be competitively
advantaged. For example, the Chinese are more likely to possess
unique skills in cooking Chinese food than non-Chinese, Mexican-
origin entrepreneurs may have unique resources to supply Mexican
demand in southwestern towns, 390 and Israelis may be better
equipped to teach Hebrew.39 ' Historically, for a certain period before
the Civil War, black artisan businesses thrived, partly because "as
a result of almost two and a half centuries of slavery, up to the
outbreak of the Civil War, the knowledge of [certain] skills was
concentrated almost exclusively in the hands of the Negroes, free
and slave." 92 Blacks also possessed unique skills such as barbering,
which was originally developed on plantations,393 blacksmithing,
and carpentry.394
The second perspective stresses the ways in which ethnic
minorities establish boundaries (or have had boundaries es-
tablished against them), producing cooperation and solidarity
among members. Historically, ethnic groups that have resisted
assimilation or have been deemed "unassimilable" have been viewed
with suspicion. 395 In response, groups that encounter external
389. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 107.
390. LIGHT & ROSENSTEIN, supra note 327, at 85, 123.
391. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at 107.
392. BUTLER, supra note 8, at 44 (citation omitted).
393. WALDINGER ET AL., supra note 243, at 58.
394. STERLING D. SPERO & ABRAM L. HARRIS, THE BLACK WORKER: THE NEGRO AND THE
LABORMOVEMENT 16-17 (1931) (discussing the concentration of blacks in certain occupations,
such as blacksmithing, gunsmithing, cabinetmaking, shipbuilding, brickmasonry, and
engineering).
395. In the United States, for example, during the congressional debates on the Fifteenth
Amendment, Senator George H. Williams of Oregon made the following remarks about the
Chinese: "They are a people who ... will not adopt our manners or customs and modes of life;
they do not amalgamate with our people; they constitute a distinct and separate nationality
.... ALFRED AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 358 (1967). The apparent
separateness and distinctiveness of the Japanese Americans contributed to the perception
[Vol. 44:15211594
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hostility or anti-immigrant sentiments39 6 have sought to turn ethnic
boundaries into an advantage.
As sociologists have long noted:
[Tihe ethnic boundary canalizes social life-it entails a
frequently quite complex organization of behaviour and social
relations. The identification of another person as a fellow
member of an ethnic group implies a sharing of criteria for
evaluation and judgement.... On the other hand, a
dichotomization of others as strangers, as members of another
ethnic group, implies a recognition of limitations on shared
understandings, differences in criteria for judgement of value
and performance, and a restriction of interaction to sectors of
assumed common understanding and mutual interest. 97
Although there may be other criteria on which boundaries could be
drawn,9 ' ethnicity is an especially potent basis for boundary
drawing.399
Those two dimensions of culture-providing specific ethnic
resources and delineating bonds of mutual identification and
identity-are crucial to the creation and maintenance of ethnic
economies. Outside the ethnic economy boundary, the "law of
indifference" might very well prevail-it may be a matter of
indifference to the seller and buyer the identity of the other, if the
same commodity is obtained at the same price,4" as "transactors
interact in markets on the basis of most favorable price and in so
that they are, as Justice Frank Murphy noted in his dissent in Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1994), an "'enemy race' whose 'racial strains are undiluted.'" Id. at 236
(Murphy, J., dissenting) (quoting the Commanding General's Final Report on the internment
of Japanese Americans).
396. For an examination of anti-immigrant periods that have recurred in U.S. history, see
Johnson, Alien Nation, supra note 31, at 111.
397. Barth, supra note 37, at 15.
398. Research has shown that even when a group is formed on a purely random basis or
on trivial criterion, members identify with and prefer their own groups. See Henry Tajfel &
John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, in PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 13-14 (Stephen Worchel & William G. Austin eds., 1986).
399. This is because ethnicity "is regarded as biological in origin, is reflected in social
stratification, shapes numerous elements of social life, is frequently institutionalized (in
religious practice, language, nationality, residential location, group myths, and government
policy), and often constitutes a basis of personal identity." LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 7, at
108.
400. See generally WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS, THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1871).
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doing, ignore relationships of status, kinship, caste, and so on.
Nepotism is not a significant determinant of transaction-prices
....,,401 Within the boundary of common ethnicity, however, is a
different set of rules altogether. Price is still relevant, of course, but
other factors are brought to the foreground-identity and
cooperation, in fact, identity as an essential coordinating device for
cooperation itself. Conversely, "discrimination of others may be
among the most important ... because it allows one to handle
interactions with any individuals without having to treat them all
the same ...."402
This explains the prevalence and strength of ethnically
homogeneous trading groups, for example, the East Indians in East
Africa, the Syrians in West Africa, the Chinese in Southeast Asia,
the Jews in Europe, and the pockets of ethnic economies in the
United States and other countries. 4 3 A central component of such
groups is "the idea that a trader will discriminate among potential
partners in order to economize on the cost of enforcing contracts."40 4
Along the same lines, some have suggested that members of groups
that share easily observable traits, such as language, race, or other
physical characteristics, will use their common observable charac-
teristics as cost-effective proxies for inferring other potentially
relevant information.405
There is a large body of scholarship exploring the ways that
group solidarity promotes cooperation, minimizes defection, and
solves collective action problems.40 6 Social science scholarship has
401. Axel Leijonhufvud, Schools, "Revolutions", and Research Programmes in Economic
Theory, in METHODS AND APPRAISAL IN ECONOMICS 75 n. 17 (Spiro J. Latsis ed., 1976).
402. Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCI. 1390,
1392 (1981).
403. Robert Cooter & Janet T. Landa, Personal Versus Impersonal Trade: The Size of
Trading Groups and Contract Law, 4 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 15, 15 (1984).
404. Id.
405. McAdams, supra note 24, at 1021.
406. See JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 126 (1989). A collective
action problem exists thus: "Suppose that each member of a group has the choice between
engaging in a certain activity and not engaging in it. The group has a collective action
problem if it is better for all if some do it than if nobody does it, but better for each not to do
it." Id. For scholarly sources that study how decentralized groups utilize group norms to
produce efficiency and order, see Cao, supra note 282, at 863-74.
Early works by Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons studied how humans, embedded in
social institutions such as the family, clan, ethnic, tribal, religious and other groups,
internalized the norms of their respective groups. See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION
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also in recent years recognized the role of social capital in
enhancing order. Groups with a "social capital" base of "networks,
norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation
for mutual benefit"407 are well-equipped to achieve a certain level of
economic productivity. Social capital, however, exists in the
relations among persons, not in the individuals themselves or in the
physical elements of production.0 8 Members of the group must be
interconnected for the group's social capital to function in three
crucial areas: obligations and expectations, information channels,
and norms accompanied by effective sanctions.0 9
Trust is integral to these interactions, and without the members'
common ethnic ties, "elaborate and expensive bonding and in-
surance devices would be necessary--or else the transaction could
not take place."410 Indeed, the level of trust which is based on a
commonality of external and internal circumstances, such as labor
force disadvantage and a shared cultural foundation of values and
beliefs, "[is] not easily duplicated in any artificial community, and
indeed, [is] rarely found in communities united by geographic
proximity or other demographic characteristics." 41' Trust tends to
OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1893); EMILE DURKHEIM, ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE
(1912); TALCOTT PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION (1937). Later theories rely on
law and economics studies on externalities and transaction costs to explain that norms arise
from social interactions when an actor's actions impose externalities on others, but high
transaction costs prevent a market in rights from being established. According to James
Coleman, "norms arise as attempts to limit negative external effects or encourage positive
ones. But, in many social structures where these conditions exist, norms do not come into
existence" because the social structure lacks closure. Coleman, supra note 221, at S105-08.
The members of the group must be interconnected; otherwise, punishment and sanctions are
not available to penalize a member's wrongdoing. Without closure in the social structure, a
broken obligation can only be enforced, if at all, by the individual to whom the obligation was
owed. Collective sanctions from a community cannot be effectively applied. See id.
407. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J. OF
DEMOCRACY 65, 67 (1995).
408. For a discussion of the distinction between human capital and social capital, see
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST 26-27 (1996). Social capital consists of group-based factors that
enhance group members to work together in groups and organizations, and is usually created
and transmitted through cultural mechanisms like religion, tradition, or historical habits.
Human capital consists of knowledge and skills, and may be acquired through education or
training.
409. JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 300-21 (1990); Coleman, supra
note 221, at 95.
410. Coleman, supra note 221, at 99.
411. Greene, supra note 297, at 67.
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be strongest among transactors of the same household, lineage,
village, subtribe, or tribe, and decreases as the circle of social
distance expands, so that at the edge of the ethnic or tribal
boundary, transactions might even be "consummated by force and
guile."412 Thus, a group must have boundaries and closure in its
social structure in order to achieve and maintain an effective social
capital base of norms such as trust, cooperation, and solidarity.
Increasingly, research has focused on the relationship between
group size and group conduct, and has found that "there are
opposing behavioral implications involved in any extension in the
membership of a community."413 A person's moral-ethical principles
and constraints against self-aggrandizement and interests are
stronger in a small, bounded community than a large, diffuse one.
Once "an individual recognizes himself to be a member of a group
of others more or less like himself," he is more likely to be subject,
not just to the external constraints--"economic, geological, legal,
political, social, technological"-on possible behavior, but also to
internal limits."4 Although one cannot draw broad categorical
boundaries to distinguish those a person considers to be "members
of the tribe," and those deemed "outsiders," the point is that "there
is a difference in an individual's behavior toward members and
nonmembers, and that the membership lists are drawn up in his
own psyche."415
412. Marshall D. Sahlins, On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange, in THE RELEVANCE OF
MODELS FOR SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 154 (Michael Banton ed., 1969); see also ELIZABETH
COLSON, TRADITION AND CONTRACT: THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 25 (1974) ("[Ilf you know a
person's clan, you have a good chance of being able to find out an appropriate kinship term
to signal the etiquette to be used between the two of you and to define the moral imperative
that ought to govern your relationships.").
413. James M. Buchanan, Markets, States, and the Extent of Morals, 68 AM. ECON. REV.
364, 364(1978).
414. Id. at 366.
415. Id. This phenomenon explains why in many instances, as nonexclusion or non-
discrimination rules are introduced to override an individual's personal selectivity and to
increase the size of the sharing group beyond the individual's own narrow universe of
preferences (opening up the club to everyone, for example), the new rules have had
unintended effects, for example, spurring"the formation of smaller clubs." Robert D. Tollison,
Consumption Sharing and Non-Exclusion Rules, 39 ECONOMICA 276, 283 (1972). When
nondiscrimination rules were applied to public facilities in the United States, for example,
in public schools, this led to a "movement out of public schools to the formation of more
exclusive ... private educational facilities." Id. at 289.
For most individuals, there are moral-ethical boundaries and limits, and they may be
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In that case, as a "repository of trust which reduces the
probability of breach on a contract between insiders," the size and
boundaries of a trading group, such as that found in ethnic
economies, would matter."6 On one hand, if the group expands,
members may have the advantage of being part of a larger internal
market, allowing greater possibilities of trade, sponsorship
activities, and preferential purchases among group members. On
the other hand, the larger the group becomes, the greater the
probability of breach becomes as the ability of the group collectively
to sanction violators is itself proportionately weakened." 7
In sum, ethnic economies are embedded in the networks of ethnic
relations and interactions.4"s Economic behavior is explained not by
reference to individualistic behaviors but by reference to embedded
relationships-"value introjection, reciprocity transactions, bounded
solidarity, and enforceable trust.""9 The ethnic economy's ethnic
resources, which are not available to non-group members, provide
the group with a "sustainable competitive advantage." 20 There are
positive implications for ethnic economies, but potentially negative
ones as well, which I discuss in Part III.
III. DIFFERENT APPROACHES: BEYOND THE PALE?
I have discussed in Parts I and II two broad categories of ethnic
preferences. Part I surveyed preferences pursued by governments,
either to favor certain designated minority groups in majority-
dominated economies, or to favor designated majority groups in
reached at any of these levels-the nation-state, the provincial or regional states, the local
community, extended family, clan, race, ethnicity, church, etc. The tension between
individual self-interests and community may be kept within tolerable limits only if "there is
some proximate correspondence between the external institutional and the internal moral
constraints on behavior." Buchanan, supra note 413, at 367.
416. Cooter & Landa, supra note 403, at 15.
417. Group sanctions of norm violators include withholding future business from the
violator, disseminating the violator's negative reputation groupwide, ostracizing the violator,
or banishing the violator from the group. Cao, supra note 282, at 872. A group that is too
large and not close-knit is less likely to succeed in meting out effective sanctions against
violators.
418. See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481 (1985).
419. Greene, supra note 297, at 60.
420. Id. at 61.
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minority-dominated economies. Part II studied preferences pursued
by ethnic groups themselves as they construct ethnic economies
that engage in preferential practices favoring group members and,
by implication, excluding nonmembers in a wide range of economic
arrangements, such as sales and purchases, in wholesale and retail,
access to and terms of credit, and hiring decisions. In this Part, I
offer a number of approaches that a society, whether developing or
developed, might consider as it examines the preferential practices
that underlie ethnic economies. For reasons stated above, where
specific examples are used for purposes of illustration, this section
will focus on the laws of the United States. 21
Essentially, I think we have roughly three choices to consider
regarding notions and uses of "affirmative action" and various
ethnic sets or subsets of persons. Interestingly, each of these choices
plays off from a single expression, but with quite a different variety
of possible meanings. The expression is that of "beyond the pale,"
and the options are: (1) striking down as "beyond the pale" of
acceptability all preferential practices, even those of the intra-group
type adopted by marginal groups as described in Part II; (2) striking
down only certain preferential practices, because they are "beyond
the pale" in the above sense, if they are undertaken by the state to
favor or discriminate against an ethnic group as described in Part
I; or (3) alternatively, accommodating intra-group preferential
practices because these practices, under certain circumstances, are
"beyond the pale," that is, beyond the reach of the law.
A. Beyond the Pale: The Applicability of Antidiscrimination Laws
One may suggest, as a first cut, it might always be regarded as
"beyond the pale"'22-and therefore illegal-wherever it is shown
that B was favored over A because of his or her ethnic char-
acteristics. This could be the first, strong position to take, absolute
421. See supra text following note 39.
422. I refer to "beyond the pale" in the strong dictionary meaning of "irrevocably
unacceptable," i.e., that it is never acceptable, and that the conduct in question is always
appropriately subject to legal sanction. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed.
1990), where "pale" is defined, in the fourth of four identified senses of the word, as "an area
or the limits within which one is privileged or protected (as from censure)." Id. at 847. Hence,
to be beyond the pale is to be beyond the area of privilege and protection, and hence subject
to censure.
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in respect to all commercial arrangements, if not in respect to those
of a merely highly personal and/or merely social nature.
The basic proposition in support of this strong view is simply that
no individual should be regarded as less qualified or less deserving
per se than another by the adventitious characteristics of ethnic
origins, and, accordingly, that "it is wrong to regard another as
more qualified or more deserving per se by either characteristic
merely as such." To take B over A, for example, when it is just the
ethnic origin of A that left him or her regarded as less worthwhile
than B, and nothing else at all, is wrong.
One may add a cautionary qualification to this first proposition.
Insofar as intensely personal choices such as marriage are involved,
the king's writ (i.e., the reach of the law) may not extend so far as
to subject these to legal sanction."' As to all commercial relations
423. Associations of an intimate or even merely of a social nature would thus be "beyond
the pale" in quite a different sense, namely: "beyond the pale of the law," in the sense of
"beyond the reach of the law" (i.e., outside the area enclosed by a boundary or fence-and
thus "beyond the pale"). See id. Another meaning of "pale" is: "a territory or district within
certain bounds or under a particular jurisdiction." Id. "Beyond the pale" under this meaning
would mean "beyond the jurisdiction of the law." This sense of the phrase likely originated
with the English Pale, "the confines or dominion of England, the pale of English law." 11 THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 91 (2d. ed., 1989). At different times and to varying extents,
the English Pale referred to the territory of Calais in France, and to the reach of English
jurisdiction in Ireland and Scotland. Id. The Pale in Russia, "[flrom 1791 to 1917, specified
provinces and districts within which Russian Jews were required to reside." Id.; see also
Robert Hendrickson, THE FACTS ON FILE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORD AND PHRASE ORIGINS 69
(rev. ed. 1997).
Pale or picket fences (we call them palings today) were erected all over Europe
from Roman times to designate territory belonging to a certain country. Later
the 'pale' came to be used figuratively, as in the famous 15th century 'English
pale' portion of Ireland that the English dominated before Cromwell conquered
the whole island. Beyond the Pale first meant simply to be outside the
boundaries or jurisdiction of a nation but by extension, and with the aid of
Kipling's 'Beyond the Pale,' it came to describe a dismal place to which we
assign social outcasts, those regarded as beyond the bounds of moral or social
decency.
Id.
In elaborating this plausible distinction between the merely "social" or "personal"
relations, and relations more conventionally treated as sufficiently "commercial" such that
strict antidiscrimination civil rights laws will apply to forbid discriminatory preferences, it
may be useful to compare three Supreme Court decisions involving the Junior Chamber of
Commerce, the Rotarians, and the Boy Scouts, respectively. See Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (5-4 decision) (sustaining a First Amendment "right of
expressive association" objection to a state public accommodations statute applied to forbid
the Boy Scouts from excluding adult homosexual men in mentoring roles); Bd. of Dirs. of
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(e.g., buying, selling, borrowing, lending, and hiring), however, the
law would discountenance the practice of ethnic discrimination,
whatever label of convenience (e.g., self-help "affirmative action,"
"intra-ethnic" measures of "mutual assistance," etc.) its prac-
titioners presume to give it, and regardless of who they are. The
consequence of taking this view simpliciter, however, would be to
effectively foreclose most of the varieties of intra-ethnic economic
networks and arrangements previously reviewed in this Article.
Indeed, in recent years, in response to the claim made by some
that antidiscrimination laws are unnecessary because the operation
of market forces is sufficient to eliminate discrimination,4 2  a
Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 547 (1987) (allowing state
antidiscrimination laws to be applied to such large scale, quasi-business fraternal
organizations); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,628-29 (1984) (upholding the
state's right to apply its antidiscrimination laws to the Jaycees whose membership policies
excluded women).
Possibly noteworthy too, are cases and discussions involving 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). This
statute, dating from the Reconstruction, provides that "all persons" in the United States
"shall have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens
.... " Id. (emphasis added). It has been held by the Supreme Court to apply to contracts
between or among private parties and not merely those involving the government in some
fashion. Thus, as construed, section 1981 has been interpreted to forbid private parties from
refusing to enter into contracts with an offeror or offeree just because of the refused party's
race or ethnic origin, and applied also to forbid offering less favorable contract conditions or
terms based on the "race" of the other party. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976). Additionally, the statute applies to preclude refusals to deal on the same terms as one
would be willing to extend to another when the distinction turns on differences of any
"ethnically and physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping." St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji,
481 U.S. 604, 607 (1987). And this also includes "whites." McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). Still, far-reaching as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is (as well as is the
companion statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2002), which applies to rights to acquire, hold, and
dispose of "property"), the Supreme Court has never suggested that this act of Congress or
any equivalent state antidiscrimination act could be validly applied to "intimate" contracts
such as offers of marriage, as distinct from more recognizably "commercial" contracts. Section
1981 has been applied to forbid private, state-accredited schools from restricting their
admissions to some preferred race or ethnic group. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 160.
424. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 43-45 (2d ed. 1971)
(arguing that employers who have a taste for discrimination will suffer because minority
employees will find employment with unprejudiced employers who will use the cost
advantage-assuming minority employee wages are depressed-to drive discriminatory
employers from the market); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAws 29-30, 35-37 (1992) (describing race discrimination as
a refusal to deal with members of other races and arguing that because market competition
will drive out discrimination, Title VII infringes on free, competitive markets); RICHARD
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 715 (5th ed. 1998) (describing racial discrimination as
a refusal to associate with members of racial, religious, or ethnic groups different from their
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substantial body of scholarship has emerged that argues the
opposite. This argument would favor strict application of the laws
to eradicate discrimination,'2 whether this discrimination is due to
hostility by the dominant group against minorities or to preferences
extended by minority group members to one another. This approach
would erode intra-ethnic preferences and the ethnic economies that
emerge therefrom.
Proponents of this approach rely on noneconomic factors to
explain the resilience of discrimination and the need for stringent
interpretations of the antidiscrimination laws-hence the claim
that an economics-based analysis fails to "take into account the
intentional, interest-serving dimension of white-over-black prej-
udice."126 Others have noted that group cooperation and solidarity
may result in competition and conflict between and among
groups. 21 Thus, in the context of race discrimination by whites
against blacks, group cooperation and mutual investment in status
production on the part of whites may produce discrimination
against non-whites.' 2' Because this type of in-group cooperation
creates spontaneous orders of discriminatory economic regimes that
survive market competition, the government should destroy these
forms of cooperation through the maintenance and application of
laws that prohibit race discrimination.' 29 Furthermore, under this
view, because discrimination of any kind is difficult to prove and in-
own; however, "by increasing the contact between members of the two races [blacks and
whites] such trade imposes nonpecuniary, but real, costs on those members of either race
who dislike association with members of the other race"). For arguments that
antidiscrimination laws are not efficient and not necessary, see BECKER, supra, at 35-37;
Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513, 514
(1987).
425. But not necessarily to eradicate "affirmative action," as the term is conventionally
used in the United States, to mean actions designed to favor certain out-group minorities
over the dominant white groups.
426. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of Race,
91 MICH. L. REV. 1183, 1189 (1993).
427. McAdams, supra note 24, at 1007. McAdams proposes to understand race
discrimination (particularly by whites against blacks), as "an especially virulent and
pathological form of status production," as group preferences are expressions of status
production for group members at the expense of nonmembers. Id. at 1036, 1044.
428. Id. at 1083-84. Although his focus is on discrimination by whites against blacks,
McAdams believes out-group discrimination (discrimination against those outside the group)
in order to achieve in-group status production has wider implications. Id. at 1036.
429. Id. at 1034.
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group sympathy particularly difficult to detect, the government
should continue to engage in "affirmative action" (and not "merely"
antidiscrimination) in order to counteract in-group favoritism. 3 °
Under these views, in-group sympathy is too easily converted to,
or a mask for, out-group hostility and prejudice, and should be
critically evaluated.431 This is especially so in cases where different
groups compete for scarce resources, particularly in the economic
realm, 4 2 in which case in-group sympathy may have the same effect
as out-group hostility433 because "[pireferential treatment of those
who share a common category membership produces biases that
430. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After
Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1326 (1998) ("Ingroup favoritism manifests itself
gradually in subtle ways. It is unlikely to trigger mobilization of civil rights remedies because
instances of this form of discrimination tend to go unnoticed."); see also id. at 1327-29. For
proponents of this view, in-group sympathy (preferences for one's own) should be subject to
critical evaluation because doing so would allow generalized discrimination to be more
recognizable than focusing simply on out-group hostility (antagonism against others). Clark
Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science Theories Identify
Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between "Different" Minorities, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
313, 363 (2000). For a different view of affirmative actions without the institution of race-
based government preferences, see Van Alstyne, supra note 49.
431. Freshman, supra note 430, at 364-402. Relying on psychological literature,
proponents fear that in-group sympathy constitutes ethnocentricism whereby out-groups are
viewed as "antithetical to the ingroups," and subject to "negative opinions and hostile
attitudes." Id. at 372 (quoting Daniel J. Levinson, The Study of Ethnocentric Ideology, in
T.W. ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORrTARIAN PERSONALITY 104 (1950)). See generally T.W.
ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950); Larry Alexander, What Makes
Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 149, 160 (1992). As Larry Alexander notes:
[O]ne reason why it is difficult to disentangle special concern for "one's own"
from beliefs in others' moral inferiority is because in humankind's primitive
past, these two attitudes were inextricably linked. When we roamed the earth
in small kinship groups, and every tribe but one's own was a deadly enemy, love
of one's kin and hatred and/or suspicion of everyone else were traits necessary
for survival.
Id.
432. Alexander, supra note 431, at 163 (distinguishing between bias in the choice of one's
spouse and "biased economic choices," but acknowledging that even if one limits the inquiry
to economic choices, "in practice it will be very difficult to distinguish immorally biased
economic choices from choices that are not immorally biased and not intrinsically wrong,
such as choices to favor one's family or friends or ethnic group members, or choices based on
negative stereotypes").
433. Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2 THE HANDBOOKOF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 370 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (noting that
interethnic relation "revolves around ingroup favoritism more than outgroup derogation,
although the net effect may be the same in practical terms").
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benefit the ingroup over noningroup members even without any
negative prejudices against outgroups."' 3 ' These arguments,
however, have tended to focus on in-group solidarity by dominant
majorities such as whites and its effect on minorities, 435 rather than
in-group solidarity by minority groups themselves-precisely the
type of solidarity that produces ethnic economies described in Part
II. For proponents of this approach, antidiscrimination laws should
be strictly applied and "affirmative action" favoring blacks and
other minorities should be continued.
Antidiscrimination laws in the United States currently forbid
preferences based on race and other protected criteria,' 3 regardless
of whether the preferences are for or against historically dis-
advantaged minority groups.'37 Courts have thus viewed evidence
of race- and ethnicity-based preference as a violation of Title VII,
for example, where Italian Americans favor other Italian Americans
over non-Italians.3 8' But even business practices that are not
434. MARILYN B. BREWER & NORMAN MILLER, INTERGROUP RELATIONS 48 (1996); see also
Marilyn B. Brewer & Rupert J. Brown, Intergroup Relations, in 2 THE HANDBOOKOF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 433, at 554, 575 ("Many forms of discrimination and bias may
develop not because outgroups are hated, but because positive emotions such as admiration,
sympathy, and trust are reserved for the ingroup and withheld from outgroups.").
435. Freshman, supra note 430, at 351 ("Ingroup sympathy for historically advantaged
groups, such as relatively privileged white, Protestant males, causes great harm to
disadvantaged minorities."). Freshman notes:
Individuals praise the behavior by ingroup members, such as "frugality" by a
Protestant, but condemn the same behavior by outgroup members, such as
Jewish "cheapness." Likewise when outgroup members like Korean Americans
favor their own, they are "clannish," but when members of ingroups, like white
males, prefer their own, this behavior remains invisible and sometimes even
draws praise as "sticking together."
Id.; see John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61, 79-80 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986)
("It is important to note that both the anti-outgroup bias of high authoritarian subjects and
the pro-ingroup orientation of low authoritarians disadvantage blacks relative to whites.");
McAdams, supra note 24, at 1083-84.
436. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000); Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609
(1993) (forbidding treatment where the "employer simply treats some people less favorably
than others because of their race, color, religion").
437. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285-96 (1976)
(holding that a white person has a cause of action under section 1981 for discrimination in
favor ofan African American); Bermudezv. TRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176,1178 (7th Cir.
1998) (holding that a business division that is "managed by minorities" could violate the civil
rights laws).
438. See, e.g., Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297, 1302-04 (9th Cir. 1982)
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themselves forbidden, but that result in the perpetuation of ethnic
preferences, may also be subject to judicial scrutiny. These include
practices that are commonly relied upon by ethnic employers in
ethnic economies, for example, nepotism.. 9 and word-of-mouth
hiring. Courts in a number of circuits have regularly warned that
such seemingly neutral hiring practices may in fact be deemed
discriminatory."0
In EEOC v. O&G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co.,"' for
example, O&G, a small company owned by a Polish immigrant,
relied mainly on word-of-mouth recruiting or walk-ins during
certain hiring windows. The court allowed the use of statistical
evidence 4 2 in the EEOC's case against O&G and found that the
(holding that a preference for Italian Americans in the company's stockholder preference
plan is a violation of Title VII).
439. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 655 n.9 (1989) ("This is
not to say that a specific practice, such as nepotism, if it were proved to exist, could not itself
be subject to challenge if it had a disparate impact on minorities."); Holder v. City of Raleigh,
867 F.2d 823, 827 (4th Cir. 1989) ("The presence of family preferences as a factor in a
promotion might be part of the evidence upon which an inference of invidious motive may
be drawn ...."); Gibson v. Local 40, Supercargoes, 543 F.2d 1259,1268 (9th Cir. 1976) ("Since
the relatives being preferred were disproportionately white, the nepotism discriminated
against blacks whether or not appellees acted with a discriminatory purpose.").
440. In EEOC v. Metal Service Co., 892 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1990), the court found that word-
of-mouth hiring practices are "strong circumstantial evidence of discrimination." Id. at 350;
see also Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 549 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that word-of-
mouth hiring practices are discriminatory because of the tendency of such practices to
perpetuate an all-white work force); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 313 (6th Cir.
1975) ("The practice of relying on referrals by a predominantly white work force rather than
seeking new employees in the marketplace for jobs was found to be discriminatory.");
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421,426-27 (8th Cir. 1970) ("ith an almost
completely white work force, it is hardly surprising that such a system of recruitment
produced few, if any, black applicants.").
441. 38 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 1994).
442. Id. at 876; see also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,339-40 n.20
(1977). As the Supreme Court stated:
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as
this one only because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful
discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily expected that
nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or
less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the
community from which employees are hired.
Id.
For a critique of statistical evidence in EEOC actions, see James Bovard, Job-Breakers,
the EEOC's Assault on the Workplace, AM. SPECTATOR, Mar. 1994, at 32 (describing the
ordeal of the Daniel Lamp Co. on Chicago's southwest side when it was sued by the EEOC
for having twenty-one Hispanic employees and five blacks; according to the EEOC, the
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company intentionally discriminated against African Americans in
recruitment and hiring." 3 The majority rejected the company's
claim that the relevant labor market was disproportionately
composed of recent Polish immigrants and Hispanics because the
company could only offer poor working conditions and low pay, but
in return, did not require the ability to speak and understand
English as a condition to employment."4 Accordingly, the majority
held that the "inexorable zero"-no black workers among the thirty-
five positions in the company's "secondary department" operating
kick and punch presses-was sufficient to support a finding of
intentional discrimination.4 5
Thus, there are a number of facially neutral practices, used by
employers in ethnic economies, such as word-of-mouth hiring, or
perhaps advertising job openings in ethnic community news-
papers, that may run afoul of existing antidiscrimination laws as
deemed by certain circuit courts. If these practices produce an
ethnic workforce that is statistically skewed when compared to the
relevant labor market, this may be sufficient to prove discrimi-
nation.46
business should have had more black employees, 8.4 blacks, to be precise, because of the
area's population); Mike Royko, Update on Businessman and its Downside, HOUSTON
CHRON., Oct. 10, 1993, at 6 (same).
443. The court found that "even the use of the most forgiving variables could not reduce
the calculation of African Americans in the relevant labor market to a level that would
account statistically for O&G's failure to hire any African Americans." O&G, 38 F.3d at 878.
From 1979 to 1985, O&G hired eighty-seven people for the low-skilled "secondary
department" operating kick and punch presses. None were African American. Id. at 874. The
court held that the company must pay some 451 persons who might have applied to the
company more than $378,000 in back pay. Id. at 879.
444. Id. at 877. But as the dissent remarked, the statistical model used to support a
finding of intentional discrimination was flawed because it failed to account for the fact that
the "lack of an English fluency requirement increases the interest of non-English speaking
Polish and Hispanic job-seekers to work at O&G." Id. at 887 (Manion, J., dissenting).
445. Id. at 879.
446. Under Title VII, discrimination may also be proven through disparate impact
analysis. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Disparate impact theory involves
employment practices that (1) are facially neutral but in fact affect one group of people more
harshly than another group, and (2) cannot be justified by business necessity. Disparate
impact theory "focuses on the result of, rather than the motivation for, an employment
practice." Maurice E.R. Munro, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE L. &
POLy REV. 219, 224 (1995). By contrast, disparate treatment, or intentional discrimination,
requires proof of discriminatory motive.
Such proof may be established through a variety of methods, such as "individual
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B. Beyond the Pale: Government Action
The first approach of striking down as "beyond the pale" of
acceptability all preferential practices seems much too unyielding.
It would seem to eliminate virtually all of the economically uplifting
forms of mutual support reviewed in the earlier sections of this
Article. As a less draconian approach, one may propose that it
should be "beyond the pale" in the strong sense for government to
draw distinctions among citizens by race, or for government to favor
some more than others by classifications of race, though not
necessarily for particular persons or groups to do so, in response to
felt common needs.
One may deem this the appropriate universal rule in respect to
government even as a constitutional matter. This rule would apply
not merely in respect to economic or commercial matters and
opportunities, but equally in respect to every other kind of
opportunity as well (e.g., one's eligibility to adopt a child and one's
freedom to marry). This position would correspond with the view
reflected in the Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,""'
that the government of all is not to "know" the race(s) of its cit-
izens in presuming to divide, classify, and dispense on any such
distinction as these.448 That kind of treatment by government is
constitutionally simply "beyond the pale."
inferential proof cases; ... group (or systemic) inferential proof cases, using statistics to
establish that the employer engages in a system-wide 'pattern and practice' of discrimination;
... direct evidence cases, in which an individual or group plaintiff establishes discriminatory
intent through direct evidence." Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in
Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REv. 387, 402 (1996).
447. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
448. Id. at 555-56 (Harlan, J., dissenting). "These notable additions to the fundamental
law [the Reconstruction Amendments] ... removed the race line from our governmental
systems. There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect to civil rights, all citizens are equal before the
law .... " Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). "[Our] destinies ... in this
country are indissolubly linked together, and the interests of [all] require that the common
government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of
law." Id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting). "The sure guaranty of the peace and security of each
race is the clear, distinct, unconditional recognition by our governments, National and State,
of every right that inheres in civil freedom, and of the equality before the law of all citizens
of the United States, without regard to race." Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Adarand
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* What private persons may presume to do on their own, on the
other hand, might be "beyond the pale" in the quite different sense
of being beyond the notice of the law: that here, again, the writ of
the king does not presume to run."49 Only insofar as one would
attempt to impose his own practice upon another (thus to make the
other also engage in the same practice) would the law then draw
the line and disallow the attempt.5
C. Beyond the Pale: Nongovernmental Actions Beyond the Reach
of Law
A third approach is to hold that there are concerns "beyond the
pale" that may be appropriate for racial amelioration when the aim
is to befriend and to try to bring within the community of full and
equal citizenship those who, by race or ethnicity, have hitherto been
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[U]nder our
Constitution, the government may not make distinctions on the basis of race .... Purchased
at the price of immeasurable human suffering, the equal protection principle reflects our
Nation's understanding that such classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on the
individual and our society."); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343-44 (1974) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) ("So far as race is concerned, any state-sponsored preference to one race over
another... is in my view 'invidious' and violative of the Equal Protection Clause.") (emphasis
added). This position has recently been enacted into the state constitutions of California and
Washington by popular referenda. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31 (enacting Proposition
209).
449. See Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. &
POL 'Y REV. 1, 85-86 (2002). Professor Schuck makes a distinction between a preference
mandated by the government and one pursued voluntarily by private entities. Id. at 86-89.
450. For example, if a lender imposed as a condition to making a loan that the borrower
prefer persons of X ethnic origin in conducting the enterprise, the law would draw the line
at the lender's imposition of his preference on others. Here, one might reasonably maintain,
though the law might not forbid the lender to lend preferentially (i.e., to do so consistent with
acknowledged ties within his or her ethnic community, to be of assistance to coethnics), it
would not necessarily also accept as part of his prerogative a legal right to bargain so to
compel the borrower to carry into execution the lender's own ethnic preference in the
employment practices of the borrower's business. There are close analogies for this suggested
distinction. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids state courts from granting enforcement sanctions to racially-restrictive
covenants "running with the land"). Also, certain Commerce Clause cases may be helpful by
way of analogy, such as those holding that although a state may provide a preferred status
for its own citizens in state government lending and procurement the state may not extend
that preference to require that those to whom it lends or with whom it trades shall likewise
grant such a preference with respect to those it employs or to those to whom it resells. See,
e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
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left out.45 1 The concerns "beyond the pale" are not those of the
dominant (white or "pale") race(s), however, or of the dominant,
white ("pale") ethnic nationalities, but rather of all those others:
those "beyond the pale," i.e., persons of color, of various hues and
shades, hitherto unfairly left behind. This application of our
informative phrase would correspond to the dictionary definition
and meaning of "pale" as a person or object of whitish complexion,
thus the claim that all appropriate ethnicity-based affirmative
action is itself concerned with those "beyond"-i.e., other than----"the
pale."45
2
Still, the difficulty to explore here is the presumption that it is
only persons other than those of "pale" complexion who may
appropriately be permitted affirmative self-help measures, no
matter the circumstances. This proposition seems doubtful and may
itself reflect a narrow and particular "racist" view. For example,
Poles from Eastern Europe, as a newly-arrived immigrant group,
though not "persons of color" by literal skin tone, may nonetheless
be reasonably characterized with reference to a relevant time of
U.S. history by their immigrant and outsider status, economic
hardship, and language and culture differences. There is no easy
way to distinguish why the law should tolerate informal networks
of Koreans or Haitians created by way of intra-ethnic mutual
support, but should not permit such arrangements for Poles.
Ethnic economies and the underlying preferences would be view-
ed more benignly under this third approach. Here, a distinction may
be made between "categorical racial preference" and "contextual
racial preference."4 8 To the extent that discrimination is a reflec-
tion of one's biases for or against certain types of people, categorical
preferences are intrinsically problematic because they are ex-
pressed regardless of context. For example, a categorical racial
preference may involve a Nazi who prefers to associate with Aryans
451. This approach would allow the "affirmative actions" of the nongovernmental,
privately-conducted kind recounted in Part II. Here, "beyond the pale" signals the sense of
being "beyond the reach or jurisdiction of the law," or, in accordance with yet another
distinctive sense of the word "pale," in the twilight of the law. See WEBSTER'S NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 422, at 847 (defining "pale" as "feeble or faint").
452. See id. (defining "pale" as "deficient in color or intensity of color"); THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 223, at 91 (defining "pale" as "[o]f persons, their
complexions, etc.: Of a Whitish or ashen appearance").
453. Alexander, supra note 431, at 158.
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and to not associate with Jews in all contexts, whether in marriage
or employment.4 54 By contrast, certain preferences, such as a sense
of greater "concern for the welfare of kin, tribe, community, or
nation than for the welfare of others" is generally less offensive in
some contexts or even laudatory in others. 455 This is especially so if
the group that is preferred is relatively small and the preference at
issue reflects personalistic ties and commitments.456 In other
words, "morally favoring a small group and (relatively) morally
disfavoring the rest of humanity has a different moral quality
from morally disfavoring a small group,"457 especially if such
favoring is undertaken by "a member of a previously victimized
group" for one of its members. 4"5  Accordingly, under these
circumscribed circumstances, favoring"one's own" through in-group
preferences does not have to mean hostility towards out-group
members, though the distinction may become blurry.
In-group preferences or group solidarity may be much less about
biases against others and much more about group identity and one's
sense of self.5 9 Primordial bonds and affinities to family, religion,
and ethnic group are a significant component of the process of self-
definition.4 "6 They "not only provide a tie to other people, but also
offer us our very selves."'61 Historically, these ties are reinforced
when new groups in the United States are faced with nativist
desire to exclude and/or segregate those the nativists deemed
unassimilable, ranging from the Irish and Italian, Chinese and
Japanese to Jews, Mexicans, and others; Jim Crow laws imposed
segregation on blacks in virtually all areas of life in the American
South.62
454. Id.
455. Id. at 159.
456. Id. at 160.
457. Id. "This is so primarily because the disfavoring of a small group is less likely to be
the logical corollary of positive personal commitments and ties to others than it is to be the
manifestation of an ideology that proclaims erroneously that members of the small group are
morally unworthy." Id.
458. Id. at 175.
459. Karst, supra note 30, at 306-10 & nn.15-21.
460. Id. at 307.
461. Id. at 308.
462. Id. at 303-26. 'Virtually every cultural minority in America has had to face exclusion,
forced conformity, and subordination." Id. at 325. These include coercive Americanization,
such as congressional attempts to deport aliens who failed to apply for citizenship or learn
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For non-English speakers especially, the barriers to entering the
general labor force are often quite high. Throughout the United
States, there have been attempts at both the state463 and federal
level'64 to elevate English to "official" status as the language of
government. Private employers have also adopted regulations that
mandate English at the workplace,4"' requiring English regardless
of whether the conversation includes customers, supervisors, or
other employees.66 Courts have rejected plaintiffs' assertions
that workplace English requirements are burdensome and pre-
sumptively violate Title VII. 46  As a result, some commentators
English within a period of time, id. at 314; the ban on teaching foreign languages, id.; Jim
Crow-type measures such as the disenfranchisement of Jews in some states until the mid-
nineteenth century, school segregation of blacks, Asians, Italians, Mexicans, id. at 322; and
private discrimination by unions, employers and landlords, id.
463. Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust:An Essay on American Languages, Cultural
Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269 (1992); Leila Sadat Wexler, Official
English, Nationalism and Linguistic Terror: A French Lesson, 71 WASH. L. REV. 285 (1996).
Arizona, for example, had mandated English as the exclusive language of public services; the
law was struck down by the Ninth Circuit as overbroad and violative of the First
Amendment. Drucilla Cornell & William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic Wrongs
of Nativism: Economics, Freedom, and Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
595, 616 n.74 (1999).
464. Cornell & Bratton, supra note 463, at 611-17 (describing attempts to introduce an
English Language Amendment to the Constitution in 1981 and periodically thereafter); id.
at 614-15 (describing attempts to introduce, through Congress, proposals mandating English
for federal government services and repealing federal laws that require Spanish-language
election ballots and encourage Spanish-language education).
465. Mark L. Adams, Fear of Foreigners: Nativism and Workplace Language Restrictions,
74 OR. L. REV. 849 (1995); Cara D. Helper, Comment, Enforcing the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin: The
Overextension of English-Only Rules in Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 79 MINN. L. REV. 391
(1994).
466. Carol Kieiman, Learning English Opens Doors for Employees, CHI. TRIB., July 9,
1995, § 8 (Jobs), at 1; David Poppe, Batchelor Defends English.Only Rule, MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 29, 1997, at B3. Employers claim, for example, that Spanish at the workplace among
some employees excludes other employees and could create a disruptive atmosphere. See,
e.g., Gutierrez v. Mun. Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1042 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated, 490 U.S. 1016
(1989); Dimaranan v. Pomona Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 775 F. Supp. 338,342 (C.D. Cal. 1991),
withdrawn No. 89 4289 ER (JRX), 1993 WL 326559 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 1993). Employers also
claim that Spanish at the workplace interferes with the ability of non-Spanish-speaking
supervisors to supervise employees. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1980);
Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1043. Similarly, Spanish at the workplace, it is claimed, bothers
customers who cannot understand Spanish. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 267.
467. Cornell & Bratton, supra note 463, at 618-19; see, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998
F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting EEOC Guideline that presumes an "English-only
policy has a disparate impact" on an employee); Long v. First Union Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933,
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have characterized states with official English legislation as "the
functional equivalent of Jim Crow legislation" whereby a privileged
and dominant group uses the law to achieve two objectives: first, to
"retard the operation of market forces" toward an integrated labor
market in order to ensure its continued dominance; and second, to
erect entry barriers designed to discourage the in-migration of
minority language speakers (primarily Latinos). 8'
Under these circumstances, newcomers lacking English language
skills and facing "occupational segregation"469 will rationally resort
to enclave communities47 ° and will move into the mainstream
economy only if it offers better economic opportunities than those
that are available for them in enclaves.47' In this context, it is not
inaccurate to characterize "[plersonalism and nepotism ... as ways
of surviving in a hostile environment."472 As discussed in Part II,
the proximity of ethnic businesses in enclaves generates additional
opportunities for conducting business in the enclave's language,
"creating both employment and trade opportunities for which a
relative disability with English presents no barrier."473 These
preferences could also be viewed as a vehicle through which out-
groups could achieve a degree of economic security necessary for
equal citizenship. 7' Group solidarity, in other words, "is likely to be
seen as a practical necessity for a group that is just emerging from
severe conditions of domination,"475 one of the necessary first steps
942 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd 86 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1996).
468. Cornell & Bratton, supra note 463, at 633.
469. Kevin Lang, A Language Theory of Discrimination, 101 Q. J. EcON. 363,370 (1986)
(explaining that minority-language speakers tend to be faced with occupational segregation).
470. Cornell & Bratton, supra note 463, at 609, 620.
471. Id. at 620.
472. Karst, supra note 30, at 326 n.149.
473. Cornell & Bratton, supra note 463, at 630.
474. Karst, supra note 30, at 329 ("Equal citizenship includes both a measure of
substantive equality and formal equality before the law.... In the long run, a cultural
minority's status goals will be secured only when large numbers of its members have
advanced into the middle class.").
475. Id. at 330.
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leading toward a sense of belonging to the Nation, economic
empowerment, 78 and eventually assimilation.477
Under this approach, existing antidiscrimination laws could be
interpreted in a way that recognizes the special circumstances
surrounding ethnic economies created by historically non-
dominant out-groups. For example, in EEOC v. Consolidated
Service Systems,478 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit concurred
with the district court's finding that statistical data showing eighty-
one percent of the company's hires were Korean in a geographical
area where less than one percent of the work force is Korean
was not due to discrimination. 79 As a small company with annual
sales of only $400,000, it relied primarily on word of mouth for its
employees because "[i]t is the cheapest method of recruitment.
Indeed, it is practically costless." 8 ° According to Judge Posner:
476. Id. at 342-43 ("A group that has been subordinated in the past is unlikely to find that
acceptance until individual members of the group have moved into the middle class in large
numbers.").
477. Id. at 332, 334 (asserting that assimilation is "closely associated with economic
class"); cf Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in Residential
Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053
(1998) (arguing that the right of communities to disassociate themselves from general society
in favor of self-governance is consonant with liberalism).
478. 989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993).
479. Id. at 235 (finding that in the first quarter of 1987, seventy-three percent of the
applicants for jobs with the company and eighty-one percent of the hires were Korean,
although less than one percent of the work force in Cook County, Chicago, was Korean and
no more than three percent of the janitorial and cleaner work force was Korean). The
company, Consolidated, was owned by a Korean, who had bought it from a previous owner
who was also Korean. Id. at 235. Although the court acknowledged that the difference cannot
be attributed to mere chance, it also found that there was neither direct evidence of
discrimination nor circumstantial evidence that would compel an inference of intentional
discrimination or disparate treatment. Id. at 235-37. The EEOC's witness list contained the
names of ninety-nine persons. Id. at 237. Four witnesses were produced at trial to support
the EEOC's position that the owner had refused to hire them because they were not Korean.
The judge did not find them credible. Id. at 235-37.
480. Id. at 235. The owner or current employees were usually approached by people at
work or at social events. Id. The owner advertised once in a Korean-language newspaper and
twice in the Chicago Tribune, but these efforts resulted in no hires. Id. The owner had placed
an ad in the Chicago Tribune in anticipation of a contract which he never got and thus there
was no positions to fill. Id. at 237.
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It is not discrimination ... for an employer to sit back and wait
for people willing to work for low wages to apply to him. The fact
that they are ethnically or racially uniform does not impose
upon him a duty to spend money advertising in the help-wanted
columns of the Chicago Tribune.481
Low-cost word-of-mouth recruiting may indeed be an important
device for companies in highly competitive businesses.8 2 But as
Judge Posner also recognized, such hiring practices adopted by
employers in ethnic economies will likely result in an ethnically
homogeneous work force. "The social and business network of an
immigrant community racially and culturally distinct from the
majority of Americans is bound to be largely confined to that
community, making it inevitable that when the network is used for
job recruitment the recruits will be drawn disproportionately from
481. Id. at 237.
482. Id. at 236. Judge Posner found that word-of-mouth hiring is effective in producing a
good work force for two reasons.
The first is that an applicant referred by an existing employee is likely to get
a franker, more accurate, more relevant picture of working conditions than if
he learns about the job from an employment agency, a newspaper ad, or a
hiring supervisor.... The result is a higher probability of a good match, and a
lower probability that the new hire will be disappointed or disgruntled, perform
badly, and quit. Second, an employee who refers someone for employment may
get in trouble with his employer if the person he refers is a dud; so word of
mouth recruitment in effect enlists existing employees to help screen new
applicants conscientiously.
Id. at 236.
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the community."'m No inference of intentional discrimination 84 may
be drawn, however, based on the pattern just described. 85
Furthermore, if an employer has no English fluency requirement,
this will be an additional factor that makes the employer especially
attractive to members of different ethnic groups. 86 In EEOC v.
Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, the Seventh Circuit found that
"[ciommon sense dictates that a nondiscriminatory employer with
no English fluency requirement will receive a disproportionate
amount of applications from non-English speaking persons."'8 7 Thus
a company's passive reliance on "the natural flow of applicants"
with a preference for a work environment that does not require
483. Id. at 235. Judge Posner continued:
No inference of intentional discrimination can be drawn from the pattern we
have described, even if the employer would prefer to employ people drawn
predominantly or even entirely from his own ethnic or, here, national-origin
community. Discrimination is not preference or aversion; it is acting on the
preference or aversion. If the most efficient method of hiring, adopted because
it is the most efficient (not defended because it is efficient-the statute does not
allow an employer to justify intentional discrimination by reference to
efficiency, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(kX2)), just happens to produce a work force
whose racial or religious or ethnic or national-origin or gender composition
pleases the employer, this is not intentional discrimination.
Id.
484. At the outset, the case was also a disparate impact case, but the EEOC abandoned
its claim of disparate impact. Id. at 236. The court noted that if this were still a disparate
impact case, and if
contrary to EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, [947 F.2d 292,] 304-05
[(7th Cir. 1991)], word of mouth recruitment were deemed an employment
practice and hence was subject to review for disparate impact ... then the
advantages ofword of mouth recruitment would have to be balanced against its
possibly discriminatory effect when the employer's current work force is already
skewed along racial or other disfavored lines.
Id. at 236.
Controlling case law for the Seventh Circuit, as enunciated in EEOC v. Chicago Miniature
Lamp Works, does not find passive reliance by an employer on employee word-of-mouth
recruiting to be an employment practice for purposes of disparate impact analysis. Chi.
Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d at 304-05. To prove disparate impact, "a more affirmative
act by the employer must be shown in order to establish causation." Id. at 305.
485. Additionally, Judge Posner held that even if the motives behind certain hiring
practices were a "mixture of discrimination and efficiency," there would still be no liability
for discrimination if the owner would have adopted the same practices "even if he had no
interest in the national origin of his employees." Consol. Sys., 989 F.2d at 236.
486. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d at 303.
487. Id. at 303 n.9.
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English fluency would not amount to discriminatory intent.488 The
Seventh Circuit held that a determination of the relevant labor
market should take into account factors such as commuting time
89
and "the relative attractiveness of [certain] jobs to different ethnic
groups," especially those with limited English fluency.4 90 Jobs in
ethnic enclaves, especially those that are geographically close to
residential enclaves and do not require English fluency, would in all
likelihood be especially attractive to those coethnics who reside in
nearby ethnic residential enclaves.
The context in which these cases arise is most aptly described
thus:
The United States has many recent immigrants, and today as
historically they tend to cluster in their own communities,
united by ties of language, culture, and background. Often they
form small businesses composed largely of relatives, friends, and
other members of their community, and they obtain new
employees by word of mouth. These small businesses ... have
been for many immigrant groups, and continue to be, the first
rung on the ladder of American success. Derided as clannish,
resented for their ambition and hard work, hated or despised for
their otherness, recent immigrants are frequent targets of
discrimination, some of it violent.
It would be a bitter irony if the federal agency dedicated to
enforcing the antidiscrimination laws succeeded in using those
laws to kick these people off the ladder by compelling them to
institute costly systems of hiring. There is equal danger to small
black-run businesses in our central cities. Must such businesses
488. Id.
489. "Low-paying, unskilled jobs are more likely to be filled by those living closer to the
site of the job, simply because the cost (including the opportunity cost of time lost) of
commuting cannot be justified.... Commuting time is thus especially important in this case."
Id. at 302.
490. Id. at 302-03. In his dissent in EEOC v. O&G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co.,
Judge Manion found the EEOC's statistical model to be flawed because it failed to identify
the interested segment of the labor market:
The lack of an English fluency requirement increases the interest of non-
English speaking Polish and Hispanic job-seekers.... The statistical model also
failed to account for the fact that Polish and Spanish were routinely spoken at
O&G. This would reduce the interest of the English speaking black (and white)
labor market to work at O&G.
38 F.3d at 886 & n.2 (Manion, J., dissenting).
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undertake in the name of nondiscrimination costly measures to
recruit nonblack employees?4 91
CONCLUSION
The Article aims to lay out the various categories of ethnically
based preferential policies that have been pursued in different
countries by government and nongovernment actors. Part I
examined government policies clearly designed to prefer a govern-
ment-mandated ethnic group, as opposed to government policies
designed to prohibit discrimination on the basis of ethnicity. Part
II studied preferential policies that exist wholly outside the
government's mandate and that form the basis for the existence and
proliferation of ethnic economies, and their subvariants, ethnic
enclaves and niches, in many developed as well as developing
countries.
In asking how a legal regime may respond to these types of
nongovernmental preferential policies, it is useful to set up a
comprehensive framework to parse the different types of
nongovernment preferences. The challenge that confronts us is to
restrict the reach of the law to allow some forms of intra-ethnic
mutual support delineated in Part II, and thus preserve their
obvious good, both for the larger society and for the uplifting of
spirits of those struggling to gain some fair footing these networks
and varieties of ethnic energy so frequently provide. The challenge
also extends to how best to reflect a degree of reasonable care and
prudence in measuring the fair scope of such self-referential ethnic-
economic arrangements.
Clearly, antidiscrimination laws are appropriate, even needed, to
open up opportunities for those against whom nongovernmental,
491. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 989 F.2d at 237-38. Note that the court is not saying
that hiring on the basis of preferences for or discrimination against a person on the basis of
race or ethnicity is valid because it is efficient to do so. Id. at 236 ("The statute does not allow
an employer to justify intentional discrimination by reference to efficiency ...."). It is saying
that no inference of intentional discrimination may be drawn from a pattern of behavior that
arises from a particular context-the clustering of ethnic communities, bound by common
culture, language, and background, which in turn encourages the formation of ethnic
economies with similar characteristics. Word-of-mouth hiring and relying on family
members, relatives, and friends in this context should not, without more, constitute proof of
intentional discrimination.
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private discrimination is commonly practiced.492 The "paradigm"
cases are those of business establishments excluding, or
segregating, certain persons altogether; and of employers declining
to employ them, or to employ them only in certain positions, or on
less favorable terms; or of banks "redlining" zones identified by
race and declining to lend for enterprises or homes so located. The
wide range of civil rights legislation-in housing, employment,
insurance, banking, and public accommodations-governing refus-
als to deal with some on the same terms as one's willingness to deal
with others who differ by race and ethnicity is a regime of law to
approve and strongly defend.
At the same time, such a regime of law may also reach refusals
to deal of the various kinds recounted in Part II, and it appears to
reach such practices whether the objected-to-conduct, or the refusal
to deal, is framed in terms of:
(1) discrimination against those who are of X ethnicity, rather
than, for example, in terms of;
(2) a preference for those of Z ethnicity, or;
(3) a preference for others who are merely like oneself,
specifically, like oneself in respect to being of the same
ethnicity, plus, possibly, additional "likeness" characteristics
such as immigrant status, language, customs, a history of
shared hardships.
These forms of Category One "refusals to deal" on the one hand, and
forms of Category Two and Category Three "special preference" or
mutual help on the other, seem to reflect clearly distinguishable
states of mind and policy by those engaged in these practices.
Insofar as they do reflect different states of mind and policy, they
may also tend to cover different practices, albeit with a considerable
field of overlap in terms of certain specific effects.
The differences as well as the overlaps are easily illustrated. The
preliminary listings of practices one through three provided above
may also lend themselves to a kind of "lexical ordering." The first
category ("discrimination against") may constitute the most
exclusionary (and least defensible) practice; Category Two may be
less exclusionary (and perhaps somewhat defensible); the third
category may seem to be least exclusionary (and most defensible).
492. And not merely government discrimination.
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Category One Cases
In a stipulated instance of Category One, the employer Y, (or
banker, public accommodation owner, etc.) simply does not want to
deal with X, perhaps from an animus toward persons of X's
ethnicity. Accordingly, she will refuse to deal with X to an extent
exactly reflecting the intensity of that animus, subject only to
duress of law."93 This is a paradigm case for the application of a
typical antidiscrimination law. As long as one is engaged in what is
essentially a commercial or economic activity, one will not be
permitted to turn away or discriminate against otherwise eligible,
ready, able, and willing persons merely because of their ethnicity.
Laws reaching just these cases may be of the most strongly justified
sort. They aim to prevent flat-out refusals to deal with a given
person just because of that person's ethnicity. In reaching only
these cases, the law would leave relatively less-exclusionary
private-sector practices alone. Moreover, in respect to those
practices, at least some may strike one as not warranting any
strong legal sanction to discourage the practice; indeed, the practice
itself may be seen as not necessarily even constituting a "wrong" at
all, but, instead, even as representing a constructive kind of
"positive good."
A variation of Category One effectively with the same outcome
may involve an employer's refusal to deal which does not spring
from any animus toward persons of X's ethnicity, per se. Y would
readily transact with X and not treat X on any less favorable terms
than she would treat anyone else. Yet, she will routinely turn X
away, and in that respect the case is still within the general
framework of Category One. Rather, Y's refusal to transact with X
is strictly impersonal. It is derived only from impersonal, straight-
forward considerations of profit and loss, from an ordinary concern
that engaging in the proposed transaction with X may lose her more
than she can reasonably expect to gain from that transaction due to
493. Y will refuse transacting with X except to the extent that an antidiscrimination law
compels her otherwise. Cases within Category One would seem to have the harshest
discriminatory impact and effect. This would be the case because in all Category One cases,
X will always be turned away by Y on account of X's ethnicity, or at least accepted by Y only
on more onerous conditions than Y would exact from anyone not of X's ethnicity.
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ungovernable third-party responses. For example, if restaurateur
Y employs Latinos not only as kitchen help but also as maitres d' or
wait persons, Y may stand to lose more business than she will gain,
if non-Latinos will gradually stray off to take their business
elsewhere. This is still a refusal to deal because of X's ethnicity
case, however, in that it is X's ethnicity per se that at once ignites
Y's exclusionary decision not to transact with him.
Still, this case may be different in that the "refusal to deal,"
based solely on third-party concerns, will be somewhat less frequent
than when based on personal animus. That ought to be so because
in the "animus" case, Y will always decline to deal with X 9.unless
compelled to do so by force of law. Y will decline to deal only when
Y is herself vulnerable to third-party reactions adversely affecting
her, in a substantial and material way, and that she is effectively
helpless to avoid.
Typically, however, in neither of these cases of discrimination
against X will Y be excused from liability to X under most anti-
discrimination laws in the United States.'95 And this is generally so,
whether in respect to actions brought by the individual in X's
position or in respect to an enforcement action brought instead, or
additionally, by some public agency.' This Article is not proposing
494. Nonetheless, the effect on persons in X's position may be insignificant. It will be so
if Ys are few, or if the opportunities commanded by Ys are few or command only a small
fraction of transactional opportunities of a kind readily within X's reach. Even so, the Article
does not propose to "excuse" Y from the law operative in Category One cases.
495. This is so although one could argue that compelling Y to transact with X in this
circumstance is no different in effect from compelling Y to "subsidize" X. Even if X will
perform as well as anyone else with whom Y would transact, Y's "costs" associated with the
transaction will be higher, even if due to the reactions of others whose behavior is beyond Y's
(and X's) control.
In theory, there may be a straightforward legal way of dealing with this problem of
"aversive reactions" by third parties to the nondiscriminatory practices of Y. Under a
properly comprehensive antidiscrimination civil rights act, the "switch" by third parties away
from transacting with Y may itself be made to constitute an actionable wrong by them
against Y (and perhaps against X as well). The problem with such cases, of racially "reactive
boycott," is generally not with the theory of the cause of action, but with applying it as a
practical matter. "Running down" those who "switched" away from Y is simply not practical.
496. In this regard, there is no serious possibility that Y could successfully claim that X's
ethnicity disqualifies X for the particular position for which he applied by arguing that being
of some other race (some race to which Y's customers are not averse) should be regarded as
a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for employment. Asserted as a defense, the
claim will fail.
Many state and federal antidiscrimination statutes in the United States, including Title
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to make any change in this regard, 97 so as to excuse Y in either
kind of case, despite the distinctions already noted.
Category Two Cases
In a different scenario, Y, the employer, has no aversion to X or
persons of X's ethnicity. She does, however, have a preference for
persons of some particular ethnicity, ethnicity Z. And here, Y's
preference is not just for Y's own ethnicity. X will thus gain the
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, simply exclude race from ever constituting a BFOQ. Title
VII, for example, provides a bfoq in respect to sex, religion, and even national origin, but not
for race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (2000). Additionally, the requirement for establishing a
characteristic as a BFOQ generally goes to the relevance of the qualifying characteristic to
the essential job skills and tasks as such, and ordinarily to nothing more.
For example, the fact that white customers, constituting even ninety percent or more of
a restaurant's trade, would abandon the restaurant were the restaurant to employ a person
of X's ethnicity as hostess, may be true. Their aversive reaction has nothing to do with such
a person's talents, skill, personability, etc., to be superb in the performance of the position,
and may not, therefore, be taken into account in assessing X's suitability for the position.
Accordingly, that X's employment by Y may induce a gradual boycott of the restaurant which
may then fail in business (at which point X, too, will be out of a job once again), will not
permit Y to treat race as a BFOQ. Some have argued that it should, on the grounds that the
1964 Civil Rights Act was cruelly indifferent to the plight of the small businessperson unable
to control customer flight. See Robert Bork, Civil Rights--A Challenge, NEW REPUBLIC,Aug.
31, 1963, at 21.Some antidiscrimination laws, including Title VII itself, have a "small business"
cutoff-the act may not apply to an employer with fewer than fifteen employees. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e). Indirectly, this exclusion from the reach of the law may recognize the
unfairness of subjecting small enterprises to the full rigor of an antidiscrimination law. But
if so, it is only indirect, since the exemption equally shelters the same business entity that
merely wants to discriminate, even perhaps to maximize profits by discriminating, in exactly
the way it chooses to do so, by refusing to employ some persons just on account of their
ethnicity or race.
497. Relief or exemption from antidiscrimination laws on the basis of adverse third-party
reaction has generally not been provided because it is seen as inviting, or as conferring, upon
such third parties a virtual "heckler's veto" over antidiscrimination laws. Thus, if there were
such an exemption, and one wanted to maintain an unfair ethnic commercial borrowing
advantage as a white person, one would need merely to combine with, or even act in
conscious parallelism with, others of a like desire to signal to a target bank one's resolve to
boycott that bank should it presume to lend on equal terms to non-whites. Currently, under
U.S. law, neither the threat nor the reality of that kind of action may relieve the bank of its
legal obligation under a straightforward antidiscrimination law. Perhaps the correct response
is not to consider relieving the adversely affected bank, employer, or place of public
accommodation, of its obligation of strict nondiscrimination, but to vest a cause of action in
the bank to recover against its ethnically-motivated reactive boycotters. See supra note 495.
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transaction except in the circumstance where a person of the
favored Z ethnicity also applies.'98
This scenario might well be one in which Y, a white person,
harbors no animus toward other whites, Latinos, Chinese,
Malays, etc. Y nonetheless has an affirmative preference for African
Americans. And it is solely the opportunity presented to Y to exhibit
that preference that will bring it into play. This inclination by Y
may arise just from Y's special liking and admiration of Zs, or it
may have arisen partly from a sense of felt moral obligation to help
Zs in particular. 99 Of course, it might also be "preference" arising
merely from a business motive, that to be seen as hiring more
people like Z and/or of extending credit to more people like Z will
itself impress others, and in doing so, redound to the business
advantage for Y herselfY' °
In this second category of cases, both the government itself, as
described in Part I, as well as private individuals and institutions,
have acted to prefer Zs over non-Zs, whether out of genuine desire
or in response to economic motives and incentives.50' This Article
498. Whether this will have a significantly detrimental impact on persons not of Z
ethnicity depends on the circumstances. If all or nearly all Y primary contractors have a
subcontracting preference for Zs, and there is a sufficient supply of Zs to meet the needs of
the primary contractors in respect to a given type of subcontract, then it is highly likely that
a non-Z will lose not just one subcontract, but the next, and after that the next as well. So,
likewise, if all "elite" private universities mimic each other, in having a preference for Zs,
then X, a student characterized by two characteristics (one, that he is an excellent student,
and two, that by ethnicity, he is not-Z), then it is not the case he merely loses the opportunity
to enroll in a particular elite institution. Rather he is excluded (by ethnicity) from all such
institutions.
499. Just this kind of explanation has been offered in defense of one limited kind of
affl-mative action, namely, the kind involving setting aside, preferring, specially
encouraging, or subsidizing, "places" for African Americans. The idea rests on the claim and
observation that persons of that description (blacks in America) have borne uniquely terrible
burdens of a disgraceful history within this country, and thus the case for preference here
is exceedingly strong as a matter of historical justice.
500. Thus, and interestingly, this is the reverse side of the case considered earlier (the
reverse of the case wherein Y will be made to suffer-by third party reaction-should she not
turn away Z); here, the circumstances are such that she may expect specially to prosper-by
third party reaction-should she transact with Z. See supra notes 496-99; infra note 502.
501. For example, the government has acted to provide economic incentives for Zs to be
preferred, by paying a bonus to primary contractors who bypass lower bids by some
subcontractors (usually white) to accept higher bids by others (usually non-white). Or, it may
be that a private university establishes a "preferential" admission policy in respect to Zs,
partly because it has learned that it will not be seen as desirable an institution by others
insofar as it enrolls few, if any, Zs. Such an institution's "preferential" policies may be a
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has not examined Category Two preferences for Zs, but this pre-
ference is mentioned here merely to show the complex continuum
of preferences and the array of possible responses from a legal
system. A legal regime could either strike down Category Two
preferences, whether government-mandated or privately pursued,
or it could tailor its responses and distinguish between government-
mandated programs and non-government, voluntary ones, finding
the latter to be more defensible and less problematic.502
Category Three Cases
This third category which has been the focus of this Article is
distinguishable and different still. Here, if X is unable to secure the
particular transaction, it will be only in such instances as someone
of the seller's (or lender's or employer's) own ethnicity was available
and interested as well. Here, again, there is no animus toward X or
reluctance to transact with X at all; rather, Y merely prefers some-
one close within his "own community." This preference proceeds
from an exceptional sense of recognition and more immediate
identification, as it might be in respect to one's own "kin."
It may even be the case that Y is a person who would not
otherwise be making a loan at all, or selling a particular item at all
in the circumstances, but Y is moved to do so because of this special
sense of kinship.03 On a more general level, it is difficult
compound of overlapping motives, thus of mutually-reinforcing strength.
502. Some have suggested that nongovernmental, voluntary programs maybe acceptable
as an approach that would minimize some of the objections to current government-mandated
programs. See Schuck, supra note 449, at 85-86. Professor Schuck distinguishes between
government-mandated preferences and ones pursued voluntarily by private entities. Id. at
86-89 (discussing reasons why "[a) racial preference mandated by public law is much more
objectionable than one that a private entity decides to establish to reflect its own values and
for its own purposes."). Even in the case of voluntary and private preferences, however, some
may be problematic, 'especially when they are used as the basis for allocating valuable social
resources whose principle of distributive justice is and should be merit, properly defined." Id.
at 85.
This Article does not address the issues raised by Category Two, but does on the whole
agree with the distinctions raised by Professor Schuck concerning mandatory government
preferences and private, voluntary preferences. To the extent the preference described in
Category Two, practiced by X in favor of Z, is one practiced by X voluntarily as a private
person or entity, a more in-depth analysis of this type of preference is provided in the article
by Professor Schuck.
503. An analogy may be drawn to the case where Y is only moved to provide a loan
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conceptually to separate the very existence of ethnic economies
themselves from the intra-group preferential practices that support
them because it is the preferential practices, arising out of the need
and call to help each other, that gave rise to the creation of an
ethnic economy to begin with. In this sense, ethnic economies are
intrinsically and by definition self-generative, and the practices,
whether they be hiring, or apprenticeship, or in-group loans, would
not take place but for the common ethnicity and community ties
that gave rise to the practices. In other words, the existence of
ethnic economies and the intra-group preferences are mutually
reinforcing, and one would not exist without the other.
It is largely within the framework of this category that the major
portions of this Article are focused and elaborated in describing how
networks of identified types of ethnic kinship work overall, and
evidently, on balance, with highly constructive consequences both
for the participants and the economic well-being of the larger
societies or cultures within which they abide.
Nonetheless, it is important to repeat a word of caution sounded
elsewhere in the Article. There is a point at which any ethnic
community may so advance its networking, cohesion, size, struc-
ture, and inwardly-looking economic and political characteristics as
to take on a different character than it once possessed-a character
itself more of intolerance than of tolerance. This different character
would consist of a set of self-preferring practices discriminatory
toward nonmembers, and would virtually force others to fashion
their own response, ultimately stimulating rivalries and threat-
ening an ethnic balkanization of the community or country. And
just that kind of development may itself place the group once more
... beyond the pale. That is, beyond the tolerance of the law.
because of a special sense of kinship in respect to a nephew who needs such a loan. The case
presents an interesting issue, in testing an antidiscrimination law, when another person is
then refused the same treatment as that which Y's nephew just received. From one point of
view, X is refused a loan Y provided to another person, thus he is the "victim* of
"discrimination" in that respect. Looking at the matter in this way, X could have a case.
From this nepotistic example, all we need to make the case realistic so that X may assert an
ethnic discrimination complaint is to suppose that Y has made such a "special
accommodation" to someone who, though not his nephew, is still one to whom he felt a
similar, quite comparable closeness (a newly arrived fellow Chinese, fellow Thai, or fellow
West Indian from Jamaica).
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